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Abstract

Cryptographic Privacy Enhancing Technologies
The growth of information and communication technology creates difficulties for individuals to monitor and control their private information which can be copied, transferred from one location to another within a second and accessible to many people. This
thesis focuses on a number of cryptographic technologies, which have been introduced
and developed to protect user privacy, including anonymous signatures, anonymous
authentication, anonymous credentials and anonymous routing. Our contributions to
these technologies are in three aspects: more efficiency, more security and better functionality.
We identify and formalize new security requirements, and improve and build formal security models for a number of privacy-preserving primitives. We construct new
anonymous routing systems whose security relies on complexity assumptions different
from those of previous systems. We propose several anonymous signature schemes
with constant computation costs, very short signatures and keys and compact system
parameters that can be shared by multiple groups. These schemes can be converted
into anonymous authentication schemes and used as building blocks for anonymous
credential systems. Our systems provide diversified properties, such as anonymity revocability, ad-hoc group formation, signature traceability, identity-based and limitation
on the number of anonymous signatures, that allow applications in many realistic scenarios. We prove security of all proposed schemes and compare their efficiencies with
previous schemes.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Privacy can be defined as the ability of individuals to protect information about themselves, and anonymity refers to privacy of identity [GWB97]. Compared to other security objectives such as confidentiality or authenticity, privacy is a more complex issue.
Confidentiality can be achieved by encryption and authenticity can be achieved by
digital signatures or message authentication codes. However, privacy requires different
mechanisms in different contexts, and so a variety of privacy enhancing technologies
need to be developed to meet the requirements of different circumstances.
Cryptography has been used to build several privacy enhancing technologies, which
can be employed in many information and communication systems, such as the Internet,
communication networks, electronic transactions and database. In the following, we
give an outline of cryptographic privacy enhancing technologies that have been the
topic of this thesis and then summarize the motivation, contributions and structure of
this thesis.
Group signatures and related primitives
Group signature schemes, introduced by Chaum and Van Heyst [CvH91], allow a group
member to sign a message on behalf of the group without revealing his identity and
without allowing the message to be linked to other signed messages that are verifiable
with the same public key. Participants in a group signature scheme are a set of group
members and a group manager. The role of the group manager is to register new
users by issuing membership certificates that contain registration details, and in case of
dispute about a signed message, revoking anonymity of the signed message by ‘opening’
the signature. In some schemes the functions of the group manager can be split between
two managers: an issuer and an opener. This is a desirable property that allows
distribution of trust. It is required that a group member can never be framed by a
1
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collusion of the issuer, the opener and other users.
Group signature is an important cryptographic primitive for providing privacy and
has been used for applications such as anonymous credentials [AdM03], anonymous
identification [KPW96], voting and bidding [ACJT00], and electronic cash [Michels96].
An anonymous credential system, introduced by Chaum [Chaum85], consists of users
and organizations. Users can obtain credentials from organizations and prove possession of these credentials without revealing their identities and without allowing transactions to be linkable. The sets of users and organizations may change over time. The
most efficient anonymous credential system [CL01] has been implemented in [CvH02].
Group signature schemes are closely related to a number of other cryptographic primitives. They are known to be the non-interactive counterpart of identity escrow anonymous authentication systems [KP98]. In identity escrow systems, users can prove their
membership of a group without revealing their identities, and anonymity is revocable if
a dispute occurs. Most identity escrow systems can be converted into group signature
schemes using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [FS86]. Recently, it was shown that traitor
tracing schemes can be converted into group signature schemes [KY03]. Kiayias et al.
[KTY04] also introduced the traceable signature primitive, which is a group signature
system with two added properties. The first property, called “user tracing”, allows
a designated party to provably trace all signatures of a given group member without
using the open procedure. The second property, called “signature claiming”, allows
any group member to provably claim signatures he has produced.
Many group signature schemes have been proposed, but only recent schemes [CS97,
CM98, ACJT00, AdM03, KY04, BBS04, CL04] provide fixed-size group public keys
and signatures. There are two formal security models for group signatures, i.e. BSZ04
[BSZ04] and KY04 [KY04]. The most well-known method, which provides membership
revocation in group signature schemes, was proposed in [CL02]. In this system, the
costs are not dependent on the current group size or the total number of deleted
members. This improvement is provided by using a dynamic accumulator scheme,
which allows dynamic accumulation of a set of numbers into one constant-size value.
Ring signatures
Whereas group signature requires some central authority and revocable anonymity, ring
signature [RST01] allows a user to form an ad-hoc group without requiring a central
authority and to sign messages on behalf of the group with unconditional anonymity.
Another user might not even know that she has been included in the group. A ring
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signature scheme (DKNS04) with fixed-size signatures was proposed in [DKNS04]. An
ID-based ring signature scheme, where the group is formed by using members’ identities, such as email addresses, social security numbers, rather than their public keys,
was proposed in [ZK02]. ID-based cryptography was introduced by Shamir [Shamir84]
to simplify key management in public key primitives. In any ID-based system, there is
a central authority, called Private Key Generator (PKG), to extract private keys from
identities. In ID-based ring signature schemes, to comply with the ad-hoc property,
the involvement of a central authority is only to set up initial public parameters and
generate private keys from identities, and not for forming groups. The interactive counterpart of (ID-based) ring signature is an anonymous authentication primitive called
(ID-based) ad-hoc anonymous identification schemes, where a user can form ad-hoc
groups and anonymously prove membership in the groups.
k-times anonymous authentication
In many scenarios, it is required that authenticated users can anonymously access
applications while application providers can decide the number of times users can access
their applications. Teranisi et al. [TFS04] proposed k-times anonymous authentication
as a solution to this problem. In a k-TAA system, participants are a group manager
(GM), a number of application providers (AP) and a set of users. The GM registers
users into the group and each AP independently announces the number of times a user
can access his application. A registered user can then be anonymously authenticated
by APs within their allowed numbers of times and without the need to contact the
GM. Dishonest users can be traced by anyone but no one, even the GM, is able to
successfully impersonate an honest user to an AP. Apart from restricting the number
of times a user can be authenticated, another difference of k-TAA from identity escrow
is that no one, even the GM, can identify honest users or link two authentication
executions performed by the same honest user. Applications of k-TAA to e-voting,
e-cash, electronic coupons and trial browsing of content have been demonstrated in
[TFS04]. The non-interactive counterpart of k-TAA is k-times anonymous signatures,
where a group member can anonymously sign messages on behalf of the group for k
times.
Mix-nets and shuffles
Whereas the above primitives are used for anonymous signatures, authentication and
credentials, mix-nets and shuffles are used to provide anonymous routing. A shuffle
takes an input list of ciphertexts and outputs a permuted and re-encrypted version of

4

the input list. Re-encryption of a ciphertext can be defined for encryption systems
such as the El Gamal and Paillier encryption systems, and allows generation of a
ciphertext c0 from a given ciphertext c such that both ciphertexts correspond to the
same plaintext m under the same public key. The main application (motivation for
the study) of shuffles is to construct mix-nets, a cryptographic system introduced by
Chaum [Chaum81] for providing communication unlinkability and anonymity. Mixnets are among the most widely used systems for providing communication privacy,
and have found applications in anonymous email systems [Chaum81], Web browsing
[GGMM97], electronic voting [PIK93, Neff01, JJR02], anonymous payment systems
[JM98, CK03], location privacy for mobile networks [KH03] and mobile IP [CK03],
secure multiparty computation [JJ00] and privacy in advertisements [Juels01].
A mix-net consists of a number of mix-centres that collectively permute and decrypt
the mix-net’s input list of ciphertexts. Shuffles are used to implement mix-centres. A
basic shuffle permutes its input list of ciphertexts through re-encryption. The main
security property of shuffle systems is providing unlinkability of elements in its input list
to elements of its output list for outsiders, and so effectively keeping the permutation
secret. We refer to this property as shuffle privacy. A second important property of
shuffles is verifiability, that is providing a proof that the output is correctly constructed.
The proof system should not leak any information that can be used to link the input and
output of the shuffle. Verifiability of shuffles is used to provide robustness for the mixnet, that is ensuring that the mix-net works correctly even if a number of mix-servers
are malicious. If a shuffle’s proof can be verified by any party, it allows the mix-net to
provide public verifiability, that means the mix-net can prove its correct operation to
any party. These are important properties of mix-nets and so verifiability of shuffles
has received much attention. Shuffles must be efficient and the cost is measured in
terms of the amount of computation and communication that is required for providing
privacy for n users. Proving security properties of verifiable shuffles traditionally relies
on proving zero-knowledge property of the proof system used for verifying correctness.
There have been a number of constructions for verifiable shuffles [OKST97, Abe98,
Abe99, JJ99, AH01]. The three most efficient schemes are FS01 [FS01], Neff03 [Neff03]
and Groth03 [Groth03], in which the Groth03 scheme has the smallest numbers of
exponentiations and communication bits. There have been some attempts [FMMOS02,
Wikström02, AI03, Furukawa04] to formally define security requirements for verifiable
shuffles and robust mix-nets.

1.1. Motivations

1.1

5

Motivations

This work examines numerous privacy enhancing cryptographic systems, including
group signatures, identity escrow, traceable signatures, ring signatures, ad-hoc anonymous identification, k-times anonymous signatures, k-times anonymous authentication,
anonymous credentials, shuffles and mix-nets. The thesis aims to address the shortcomings of existing systems and construct new improved systems with provable security.
Specific objectives of the thesis are elaborated upon more in the following.
A trapdoor-free group signature scheme (AdM03), where no party in the system
even the group manager knows a trapdoor, was proposed in [AdM03]. The advantage
of the trapdoor-free property is that the same set of parameters can be used to initiate different groups and so many groups can share the same cryptographic domain
without compromising the security of the entire system. Using this system in realworld applications, for example when the group signature scheme is used as a building
block of an anonymous credential system among a number of organizations that need
to communicate and transfer information about users while protecting their privacy,
improves the administration and management of the system [AdM03]. A drawback of
the AdM03 scheme is that it has a single group manager who is responsible for registration of users and opening of signatures, and it is not possible to separate the two
functionalities. The security proof (corrected version) is for the informal list of security
requirements, and is given in the generic model [AdM04]. One of our objectives is to
construct efficient and provably secure trapdoor-free group signature schemes, where
the group manager can be split into an issuer and an opener.
Both of the most efficient fully dynamic group signature schemes, i.e. CL02 [CL02]
and TX03 [TX03], are based on the Strong RSA assumption, that requires the group
manager to keep some trapdoor information. Using the approach of these schemes to
extend the AdM03 scheme to be a trapdoor-free and fully dynamic scheme does not
seem to be easy, as AdM03’s membership certificates are not suitable to be accumulated
by the dynamic accumulator used in the CL02 and TX03 schemes. So the question
is that, is there an efficient trapdoor-free fully dynamic group signature scheme? We
provide an answer to this question.
The DKNS04 scheme provides constant-size ring signatures but requires user public
keys to be primes. This does not seem to allow an ID-based extension. We construct
an ID-based ring signature scheme with constant-size signatures (without counting the
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list of identities to be included in the ring).
k-TAA schemes are inflexible in the sense that the GM decides on the group membership and APs do not have any control over giving users access permission to their
services. APs are passive and their role is limited to announcing the number of times
a user can access their applications. This requires a lot of trust to be put on the GM
and all group members to share all applications offered by all APs. In practice, APs
want to select their user groups and grant or revoke access to users independently. For
example, in the case of trial browsing, the AP may prefer to give access to users with
good profile, or he may require some small fee to be included in his group. Another
case is when the AP needs to put also an expiry date on the trial access. We introduce
dynamic k-times anonymous authentication to provide these properties. In dynamic
k-TAA, APs have more control over granting and revoking access to their services,
and less trust and computation from the GM is required. Dynamic k-TAA allows APs
to restrict access to their services relying on not only the number of times but also
other factors such as expiry date and so can be used in much wider range of realistic
scenarios.
In all existing shuffle schemes, except for the Groth03 scheme, El Gamal encryption
is used, so the size of the message space can only be prime and their security depends
on the Diffie-Hellman assumptions. We propose new constructions of verifiable shuffles
that do not use El Gamal encryption and allow the size of the message space to be nonprime. Hence, our schemes can be used in situations where anonymously transmitted
messages are required to be non-prime. More importantly, the security of our schemes
relies on complexity assumptions other than the Diffie-Hellman assumptions.
The notion of privacy varies among shuffles and no formal security model for verifiable shuffles has been suggested so far. Such a formalisation will be also important for
formalising security of mix-nets. Recently proposed attacks [AI03, NS03, Wikström03]
against mix-nets clearly demonstrate the need for such a model. One of the objectives
of this thesis is to construct a formal model for verifiable shuffles and to prove security
of the proposed schemes in the new model.

1.2. Structure and Contributions of the Thesis
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Structure and Contributions of the Thesis

Our contributions can be summed up as follows. We construct and improve formal
security models of a number of technologies, including verifiable shuffles, dynamic ktimes anonymous authentication, identity escrow with membership revocation and IDbased ad-hoc anonymous identification. We propose two new efficient group signature
schemes with very short signatures and keys that allow system parameters to be shared
by multiple groups belonging to different organizations. The schemes can be converted
into identity escrow schemes, extended to traceable signature schemes and used as
building blocks for anonymous credential systems. We propose a dynamic accumulator scheme from bilinear pairings, and show applications of this accumulator scheme
in constructing an identity-based (ID-based) ring signature scheme with constant-size
signatures and its interactive counterpart, i.e. ID-based ad-hoc anonymous identification, and in providing membership revocation to group signature, traceable signature,
identity escrow and anonymous credential systems. We propose an ordinary and a dynamic k-times anonymous authentication schemes from bilinear pairings. We propose
two new efficient verifiable shuffle systems based on the Paillier encryption scheme and
a general construction of mix-nets from verifiable shuffles. We prove security of all
proposed schemes and compare their efficiencies with previous schemes.
The structure of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 provides cryptographic background and descriptions of main privacy primitives discussed in this thesis, including
group signatures, identity escrow, traceable signatures, ID-based ring signatures, ktimes anonymous authentication, mix-nets and shuffles.
In Chapter 3, which is based on [NS04b], we first propose a new efficient trapdoorfree group signature scheme with a number of attractive properties and prove its security in the BSZ04 model under the Strong Diffie-Hellman (SDH) [BB04a] and the
Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) [BB04b] assumptions, using the random
oracle model. We then give an efficient variant of this scheme and prove its security in
a reduced version of the BSZ04 model. The only difference between the original BSZ04
model and the reduced version is in modelling anonymity property: in the reduced
version, the adversary does not have access to the Open oracle. This is a plausible
model for all cases that the opener is a highly trusted entity and cannot be accessed
by the adversary. Both proposed schemes have fixed lengths for group public key and
signature, and so can be used for large-size groups. An advantage of our schemes over
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the AdM03 scheme, which is also trapdoor-free, is that they allow separation of issuer
and the opener, hence distribution of trust. Using elliptic curve cryptography in our
schemes results in very short signatures and keys, compared to previous schemes. We
also propose a new efficient traceable signature scheme with similar advantages over
previous schemes.
In Chapter 4, which is based on [Nguyen05], we propose a new dynamic accumulator
scheme and show its provably secure applications to a number of anonymity primitives.
The applications are an ID-based ring signature scheme, a trapdoor-free fully dynamic
group signature scheme and their interactive counterparts, i.e., an ID-based ad-hoc
anonymous identification scheme and an identity escrow with membership revocation
scheme. The dynamic accumulator can also be used to provide membership revocation
for other anonymity primitives. We also generalize the model of accumulators and provide formal models for ID-based ad-hoc anonymous identification schemes and identity
escrow with membership revocation schemes, based on the models in [DKNS04, BSZ04].
The schemes also have a number of attractive properties. Both signature schemes provide much shorter signature sizes compared to previous schemes. Similar to the CL02
scheme, no procedure in our fully dynamic group signature scheme depends either on
the current group size or on the total number of revoked members. The scheme is the
first trapdoor-free fully dynamic group signature scheme. Our ID-based ring signature scheme is the first one providing fixed-size signatures. All previous ring signature
schemes, except for DKNS04 [DKNS04], have signature sizes linearly dependent on the
group size.
In Chapter 5, which is extracted from [NS05], we construct a dynamic k-times
anonymous authentication scheme from bilinear pairings and extend the model in
[TFS04] to a security model for dynamic k-TAA schemes. We also propose an ordinary k-TAA scheme from bilinear pairings, and prove security for both of the schemes
under the SDH and the DBDH assumptions. In a dynamic k-TAA scheme, similar to
ordinary k-TAA, there are three types of participants, but there are two new procedures. An AP can run granting access procedure to give users permission to access his
service. Revoking access procedure is performed when an AP wants to stop a user from
accessing his service. By using the dynamic accumulator scheme proposed in Chapter
4, the costs in our dynamic scheme are not linearly dependent on the current group
size or on the number of members revoked by each AP. Our schemes provide much
lower communication costs than the only other k-TAA scheme proposed in [TFS04]
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(TFS04).
Chapter 6, based on [NSK04b, NSK04a], gives a formal security model for shuffles
that allows us to have a unified approach for assessment of shuffle systems, and shows
a general construction of robust mix-nets with public verifiability from verifiable shuffles. The two security properties, privacy and verifiability, with respect to an active
adversary are rigorously defined in the model. This is the first complete model for
shuffle security with active adversary. The model can be extended to a formal model of
mix-nets, and so providing a unified framework for security evaluation of these systems.
In Chapter 7, developed from [NSK04b, NSK04a], we present two new efficient verifiable shuffles, their security proofs in our proposed formal model and efficiency analysis. The first verifiable shuffle is based on the Paillier public-key system [Paillier99],
which provides semantic security against chosen plaintext attacks (CPA) in the standard model and similar to the El Gamal cryptosystem, has a re-encryption operation.
The shuffle uses FS01’s approach for characterisation of permutation matrices but has
computations over a composite modulus which complicates security proofs. It does
not require the message space to be prime. Next, we propose an efficient variant of
the Paillier public-key system and use it to construct the second verifiable shuffle.
Similar to the original Paillier scheme, the variant encryption scheme provides semantic security against chosen plaintext attacks (CPA) in the standard model, and has
homomorphic property. However it has more efficient encryption, re-encryption and
decryption. So the proposed shuffle has the smallest numbers of rounds and exponentiations. Chapter 8 will summarize our results and present open problems together with
future extensions.

Chapter 2
Preliminaries

2.1

Introduction

To construct provably secure cryptographic systems that perform desirable functionalities in different malicious environments, there are two stages to be completed in a
formal and rigorous manner: a definitional stage and a constructive stage [Goldreich01].
The definitional stage consists of a number of steps, i.e. defining the procedures of the
systems, specifying security requirements of the systems and describing the attacking
abilities of the adversary. The next stage is to construct specific systems from available
basic cryptographic tools. So it is essential to provide elementary cryptographic tools,
also called atomic primitives [Bellare98], which can be used as components of more
complex systems, and be able to prove security of these systems from the specified
properties of the components.
This chapter provides foundations for cryptographic systems studied in this thesis. After providing related notations, terminology and background on mathematics
and algorithms, it specifies cryptographic tools and concepts used in this thesis, including computationally difficult problems, hash functions, provable security, proof
systems, encryption systems and signature systems. Each tool is defined and its specific instances are presented. The chapter finally provides descriptions of a number
of cryptographic systems, including group signatures, identity escrow, traceable signatures, ID-based ring signatures, k-times anonymous authentication, robust mix-nets
and verifiable shuffles, that have been used in the rest of this thesis.
Notations and Terminology
Let N, Z and R be the sets of natural numbers (including 0), integers and real numbers,
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respectively. We use Z+ and R+ to denote the subsets of positive numbers of the sets Z
and R, respectively. Let Zn = {0, 1, ..., n−1} be the set of integers modulo n and Z∗n be
the subset that contains only integers relatively prime to n. Let ‘lcm’ and ‘gcd’ stand
for ‘least common multiple’ and ‘greatest common divisor’, respectively. For a real
number r, [r] denotes the greatest integer smaller than r. All integers are represented
in binary form as binary strings. For an algorithm A(·), “x ← A(·)” denotes an output
from the algorithm (more discussion of algorithms is presented in section 2.3). For a
set S, |S| denotes the number of elements in the set and “x ← S” denotes an element
x uniformly chosen from S. Let {Element|Conditions} denote the set of Elements
satisfying the Conditions. Let “Pr[P rocedures|P redicate]” or “... Pr[P redicate] ...
where P rocedures” or “Pr[P redicate where P rocedures]” denote the probability that
P redicate is true after executing the P rocedures. For a function f : X → Y, the set X
is called the domain of f and the set Y is called the codomain or range of f . If x ∈ X
and y ∈ Y satisfy f (x) = y, then y is called the image of x, x is called a preimage of
y and f −1 (y) denotes the set of all preimages of y.

2.2

Mathematical Background

2.2.1

Groups

A multiplicative group (G, ∗) consists of a set G and a binary operation ‘∗’ with the
following properties [MvOV96]:
• (closed ) if a, b ∈ G, then a ∗ b ∈ G.
• (associative) a ∗ (b ∗ c) = (a ∗ b) ∗ c for all a, b, c ∈ G.
• There is an identity element I ∈ G such that a ∗ I = I ∗ a = a for all a ∈ G. We
denote the set G∗ = G\{I}.
• For each a ∈ G, there is an inverse a0 ∈ G of a, such that a ∗ a0 = a0 ∗ a = I. The
inverse of a is denoted a−1 .
(G, ∗) is cyclic if there is an element α ∈ G, called a generator of G, such that for
each a ∈ G there exists an integer i satisfying a = αi . (G, ∗) is abelian (or commutative)
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if a ∗ b = b ∗ a for all a, b ∈ G. The number of elements in a finite group is called its
order, denoted as |G|.
An additive group (G, +) can be similarly defined, but the inverse of a is denoted
−a and an element α ∈ G is called a generator of G if for each a ∈ G there exists an
integer i satisfying a = iα.
A group family, as defined in [Boneh98], is a set of finite cyclic groups GF = {Gς },
where the index ς contains the parameters which specify the group Gς , and the set of
indices is infinite. For example, GF can be the family of subgroups of Z∗p of order q,
where p and q are prime and p = 2q + 1, and the index is ς = (p). A group instance
generator of GF is defined as a randomized algorithm GG that takes as input a security
parameter 1` and returns some random index ς and a generator g of Gς . For each 1` ,
the group instance generator induces a distribution on the set of indices ς. For the
existence of GG, all groups in GF have to be cyclic, otherwise there is no generator.

2.2.2

Bilinear Pairings

Let G1 and G2 be cyclic additive groups generated by P1 and P2 , respectively, whose
orders are a prime p, and GT be a cyclic multiplicative group with the same order p.
Suppose there is an isomorphism ψ : G2 → G1 such that ψ(P2 ) = P1 . A function
e : G1 × G2 → GT is said to be a bilinear pairing if it satisfies the following properties:
1. Bilinearity: e(aP, bQ) = e(P, Q)ab for all P ∈ G1 , Q ∈ G2 and a, b ∈ Zp .
2. Non-degeneracy: There exist P ∈ G1 , Q ∈ G2 such that e(P, Q) 6= 1.
3. Computability: There is an efficient algorithm to compute e(P, Q) for all P ∈
G1 and Q ∈ G2 .
For simplicity, hereafter, we set G1 = G2 and P1 = P2 . But our schemes can also
be modified for the general case when G1 6= G2 . A bilinear pairing family is an infinite
set of bilinear pairing tuples BPF = {hp, G, GT , ei}, where p is a prime, G is a cyclic
additive group of order p, GT is a multiplicative group of order p and e is a bilinear
map e : G × G → GT . A bilinear pairing instance generator of BPF, based on the
definition in [BF01], is a randomized algorithm BPG that takes as input a security
parameter 1` and returns a tuple t = (p, G, GT , e, P ) of bilinear pairing parameters,
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where p is a random prime of size `, |G| = |GT | = p, e is a bilinear pairing and P is
a generator of G. For denotation, we use Greek letters for GT ’s elements, uppercase
letters for G1 ’s elements and lowercase letters for Zp ’s elements.

2.3

Algorithms

Cryptography, like any other computer science disciplines, is significantly based on
algorithms, the fundamental concept of the theory of computation. An algorithm can
be loosely defined as follows [NIST, Wikipedia].
Algorithm. An algorithm is a set of steps to accomplish some task and achieve some
desired result.
An algorithm can be formalized as a Turing machine. We give a simple definition of
Turing machine that is suitable for the discussion in this thesis. More comprehensive
treatment of algorithms and Turing machines can be found in standard textbooks
[LP98, Sipser97]. An alphabet is a finite set of symbols. Examples of alphabets are
the Roman alphabet {a, b, · · · , z} and the binary alphabet {0, 1}. A string over an
alphabet is a finite sequence of symbols of the alphabet. Hereafter, |x| denotes the
length (or size) of a string x, and x||y denotes string concatenation of two strings x
and y.
Turing machine. A Turing machine (with k tapes) consists of the following components.
• A control unit, which contains
– K is a finite set of states, which includes a special initial state and a subset
H of halting states;
– Σ is an alphabet, including a special blank symbol, but not containing two
other special symbols left and right;
– δ is the transition function from (K \ H) × Σk to K × (Σ × {left, right})k
• k tapes, each of which is a two-way infinite sequence of tape squares; and each
tape square can contain a symbol in Σ.
• k corresponding read-write heads for communication between the control unit and
the tapes.
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Operation: The control unit starts at the initial state and performs a number of steps.
At each step, its current state and the k symbols, which are scanned by all k heads
from the k tapes, are given as input to δ. Suppose on an input (q, s1 , ..., sk ), the
function δ outputs (q 0 , (s01 , d1 ), ..., (s0k , dk )), where q, q 0 ∈ K, s1 , s01 , ..., sk , s0k ∈ Σ and
d1 , ..., dk ∈ {left, right}. Then the control unit changes its state from q to q 0 . On each
tape i, it overwrites the symbol si by s0i and moves the head to left or right depending
on di . If it reaches a halting state, the machine stops; otherwise, it proceeds to the next
step.
An algorithm A can simply be viewed as a machine that takes as input a string x,
performs some operations and outputs a string y. When A is formalized as a Turing
machine, the strings x and y can be represented as the contents of some tapes. It is
denoted by y ← A(x).

2.3.1

Deterministic and Probabilistic Polynomial-Time algorithms

There are different types of algorithms. We focus on deterministic and probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms. We first discuss deterministic and probabilistic (i.e.
randomized) algorithms. If given the same input, a deterministic algorithm always behaves in the same way and produces the same result. On the contrary, a probabilistic
algorithm makes some random choices for its actions and its output for a given input
is distributed over a set rather than a single value. For example, in some signature
schemes such as the El Gamal scheme [ElGamal85], the signing algorithm is probabilistic to generate a random signature for each message, but the verification algorithm
is deterministic to determine if a signature of a message is valid or not. Deterministic
and probabilistic algorithms can be informally described as follows [Goldreich01].
Deterministic algorithm. A deterministic algorithm is an algorithm that takes an
input, then executes and produces output in a deterministic way. In other words, the
steps and the output of the algorithm are completely determined by the input.
Probabilistic (randomized) algorithm. A probabilistic algorithm is an algorithm
that takes an input, then executes and produces output in a probabilistic way. In other
words, during the algorithm execution, there are a finite number of occasions at which
the algorithm faces two possible choices for the next step. The algorithm chooses the
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next step at random with probability 1/2 for each possibility (for instance, by fairly
tossing a coin). As a result, for a given input, the algorithm defines a distribution on
the set of its possible outcomes. The random choices are called the internal coin tosses
or the probabilistic input of the algorithm.
Deterministic and probabilistic algorithms, similar to general algorithm, can be formally modelled by Turing machines. The Turing machine for a probabilistic algorithm
has a special tape of a random sequence of binary symbols {0, 1}∗ , which represents
the internal coin tosses of the algorithm.
The concept ‘polynomial-time’ is used to measure the efficiency of algorithms. More
precisely, an algorithm is only considered efficient if its running time, which is the
number of steps executed, is bound by a polynomial of the input size. It is defined as
follows [Goldreich01].
Polynomial-time algorithm. An algorithm is said to be polynomial time if there
exists a polynomial f such that for every input x of the algorithm, the running time
(the number of steps executed) of the algorithm is less than f (x).
Hereafter, let PT denote polynomial-time, PPT denote probabilistic PT and DPT
denote deterministic PT.

2.3.2

Interactive machines

In many cryptographic systems, there are protocols where the participants need to
interact with each other to accomplish some task. For example, in identification protocols, the prover interacts with the verifier to prove his identity. This thesis is only
concerned with interaction between two parties and each party can be modelled by
an interactive machine (ITM), which is a Turing machine with additional properties
to allow joint computation with another interactive machine. The definitions of ITMs
and a joint computation of two ITMs are as follows.
Interactive machine [Goldreich01]. An interactive machine is a Turing machine
with the following properties.
• The tapes of the machine are a read-only input tape, a read-only auxiliary-input
tape, a read-only random tape, a read-and-write work tape, a write-only output
tape, a read-only communication tape, a write-only communication tape and a
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read-and-write switch tape consisting of a single cell.
• The machine is associated with a single bit σ ∈ {0, 1}, as its identity. The
machine is said to be active, if the symbol on the switch tape is equal to its
identity. Otherwise, the machine is said to be idle. While being idle, the state of
the machine, the contents of its tapes and the locations of its heads on the tapes
are not modified.
• The content of the input tape is called input, the content of the auxiliary-input
tape is called auxiliary input, the content of the random tape is called random
input, and the content of the output tape at termination is called output. During
an active period, the content written on the write-only communication tape is
called the message sent and the content read from the read-only communication
tape is called the message received.
Interactive machines are also algorithms, and so they can be PT, deterministic
or probabilistic. An interactive machine is never considered on its own but always
in a joint computation with another interactive machine, where some of their tapes
coincide. But it is important that their auxiliary-input tapes and random tapes are
distinct. The auxiliary input models the private information given to each party of
a joint computation and not known to the other party, so it is sometimes called the
private input. The random tape of each machine represents its internal coin tosses.
Joint computation of two ITMs [Goldreich01]. Two interactive machines are
said to be in a joint computation if they satisfy the following conditions.
• One has identity 0 and the other has identity 1; their input tapes coincide, their
switch tapes coincide, and the read-only communication tape of one machine coincides with the write-only communication tape of the other machine, and vice
versa. Other tapes of the two machines, i.e. the auxiliary-input tapes, the random
tapes, the work tapes and the output tapes, are distinct.
• Initially, a common input is provided on the common input tape, the switch tape
value is set to 0 and the machine 0 starts its operation while the machine 1 is idle.
At anytime, based on the value of the switch tape’s cell, one machine is idle while
the other one is active and performs its operation. If the content of the switch
tape is changed, the active machine becomes idle and the idle machine becomes
active. The messages sent by one machine are received by the other machine.
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• The joint computation is said to be terminated if the current active machine halts
without changing the content of the switch tape. At that time, the outputs of both
machines are determined as the content of the output tapes.

2.3.3

Adversary model and Oracle machines

To prove security of a system, it is important to model the adversary with powerful
capabilities. The adversary may corrupt some parties of the system, use some special
tools and devices for its computation and play a number of experiments on the system.
An adversary is usually modelled by an oracle machine which is defined in [Goldreich01]
as a Turing machine with additional tapes and states. These tapes and states allow
access to some oracles that perform requested tasks and provide answers to queries
from the machine. A definition of oracle machines is provided as follows.
Oracle machine [Goldreich01]. An oracle machine is a Turing machine with some
additional tapes, called oracle tapes, and two additional states, called oracle invocation and oracle appeared. Each oracle tape ti represents the machine’s access
to an oracle Oi : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ , where Oi ’s output on an empty-string input is
an empty string. When the machine’s state is not oracle invocation, the machine’s
operation is defined as for general Turing machines. If the machine’s state is oracle
invocation and the content of each oracle tape ti is qi , then the following state of the
machine is oracle appeared, the content of each oracle tape ti is changed to Oi (qi ) and
other parts of the machine are unchanged. The string qi is called a query, and Oi (qi )
is called the oracle reply. The output distribution of an oracle machine M, on input
x and with access to a set of oracles S, is denoted MS (x).
Note that oracle machines are not only for modelling adversaries but also for modelling entities with access to oracles. For example, they can be seen in the definition
of non-interactive proof systems in section 2.7.

2.4

Computational Problems

Security of computationally secure systems depends on computational problems, which
prevent the adversary from computing the target results. A security requirement can
often be proved by showing that if an adversary can break the security requirement,
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then there exists an algorithm to solve a computational problem. The computational
problems used in this thesis can be generally described as one-way functions or pairs
of computationally indistinguishable distributions.
A cryptographic primitive such as an one-way function or a cyclic group (defined in
section 2.2) is usually specified by a tuple of parameters, which is called an index. To
provide security for a cryptographic primitive, the size of its index should be sufficiently
long, thus the index should range over a sufficiently large set of indices. Selecting an
index from the set of indices is often captured by an ‘instance generator’ PT algorithm
I, that takes as input a positive integer ` and returns a p(`)-bit index where p is a
fixed-but-unspecified polynomial. The integer ` is called a security parameter and is
often presented in unary form as 1` in standard. Instance generator algorithms are
used in most definitions in this thesis.
This section provides definitions of one-way functions and computationally indistinguishable distributions (based on definitions in [Goldreich01]). We then describe
assumptions about computational problems that are the bases of secure cryptosystems
in this thesis. We first define two related concepts, negligibility and computational
difficulty.
Negligibility. For a function f : N → R+ , if for every positive number α, there exists
a positive integer `0 such that for every integer ` > `0 , it holds that f (`) < `−α , then f
is said to be negligible.
Computational Difficulty. A problem is said to be computationally difficult with
regard to a security parameter 1` if for every PT algorithm, the probability that the PT
algorithm can solve the problem is a negligible function of `.

2.4.1

One-way Functions

Intuitively, a function is one-way if there is a DPT algorithm to compute the image of
an element in the domain but it is computationally difficult to compute a preimage of
a value in the codomain. A function is a finite function if its domain is a finite set.
A family (collection) of functions is a set of finite functions {fς }, where the index ς
contains parameters of the function fς and ranges over an infinite set of indices.
Family of One-way Functions [Goldreich01]. A family of functions {fς : Dς →
{0, 1}∗ } is said to be one-way if there exist three algorithms I, D and F satisfying the
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following conditions:
• Easy to instantiate and compute: The PPT algorithm I takes as input a security
parameter 1` and returns some random `-bit index ς of a set Dς . This defines a
distribution I` on the set of `-bit indices. The PPT algorithm D takes as input
an index ς and returns an element x ∈ Dς . The DPT algorithm F takes as input
an index ς and x ∈ Dς , and always outputs fς (x).
oneway
• Hard to invert: For every PPT algorithm A, the following function AdvA
(`)
is negligible.
oneway
AdvA
(`) = Pr[A(ς, fς (x), I` ) ∈ fς−1 (fς (x))]
where ς ← I(1` ) and x ← D(ς).
The first condition means that it should be efficient to generate an instance fς :
Dς → {0, 1}∗ of the family and to generate an element x of the set Dς . There is also
a DPT algorithm to compute the image fς (x) for each element x ∈ Dς . The second
condition means that there is no PPT algorithm that with non-negligible probability,
given the index ς, the image fς (x) of an element x ∈ Dς and the distribution I` of `-bit
indices, can find an element y ∈ Dς such that fς (y) = fς (x).

2.4.2

Indistinguishable Distributions

Intuitively, two distributions on the set of all binary strings are computationally indistinguishable if it is computationally difficult to decide if a string is generated using
the first distribution or the second one. An ensemble is a set of distributions {Xς },
where the index ς contains parameters specifying the distribution Xς and ranges over
an infinite set of indices. An ensemble can also be called a family of distributions.
Indistinguishable Ensembles [Goldreich01]. Two ensembles {Xς } and {Yς } indexed by the same set of indices {ς} are said to be computationally indistinguishable
if there exists an algorithm I satisfying the following conditions:
• The PPT algorithm I takes as input a security parameter 1` and returns a random
`-bit index ς. This defines a distribution I` on the set of `-bit indices.
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indist (`) is negligible.
• For every PPT algorithm A, the following function AdvA
indist (`) = |Pr[A(ς, X , I ) = 1] − Pr[A(ς, Y , I ) = 1]|
AdvA
ς `
ς `
where ς ← I(1` ).
The first condition means that there is an PPT algorithm to generate instances
Xς and Yς of the two ensembles. The second condition means that there is no PPT
algorithm that, given the index ς, the distribution I` of `-bit indices and a string
generated using one of the distributions Xς or Yς , can correctly decide with probability
non-negligibly better than a random guess whether Xς or Yς is used to generate the
string.

2.4.3

Complexity Assumptions

This subsection presents computational assumptions that are used to prove security of
cryptosystems discussed in this thesis. The assumptions are stated over general groups
and bilinear-pairing groups. The concepts of group family, group instance generator,
bilinear pairing family and bilinear pairing instance generator have been introduced in
section 2.2.

Discrete Logarithm (DL) assumption
The Discrete Logarithm assumption is a fundamental assumption, which underlies
security of several cryptosystems, such as the Schnorr signature scheme [Schnorr90,
Schnorr91], the El Gamal signature scheme [ElGamal85] and the El Gamal public-key
encryption scheme [ElGamal85]. It is defined as follows, based on [Goldreich01].
Definition 2.4.1 The Discrete Logarithm assumption for a group family GF = {Gς }
with a group instance generator GG is the following: For every PPT algorithm A, the
following function Adv DL (`) is negligible.
A

DL (`) = Pr[A(ς, g, g x ) = x]
AdvA
where (ς, g) ← GG(1` ) and x ← Z∗|Gς | .
Intuitively, it assumes that there is no PPT algorithm that, given a group Gς , a group
generator g and a random group element h, can find x with non-negligible probability
such that h = g x .
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Strong Diffie-Hellman (SDH) assumption
The Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption [BB04a] originates from a weaker assumption
introduced by Mitsunari et al. [MSK02]. In the following definition, p is a random
prime of size `, G and GT are a cyclic additive group and a multiplicative group,
respectively, both of order p, e is a bilinear map from G × G to GT , and P is a
generator of G.
Definition 2.4.2 The q-Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption for a bilinear pairing family BPF with a bilinear pairing instance generator BPG is the following: For every
q-SDH
PPT algorithm A, the following function AdvA
(`) is negligible.
q-SDH
AdvA
(`) = Pr[(A(t, P, xP, . . . , xq P ) = (c,

1
P )) ∧ (c ∈ Zp )]
x+c

where t = (p, G, GT , e, P ) ← BPG(1` ) and x ← Z∗p .
Intuitively, it assumes that there is no PPT algorithm that, given bilinear pairing
parameters (p, G, GT , e, P ) and a tuple (P, xP, . . . , xq P ) (x is randomly chosen and
1
kept secret), can compute a pair (c, x+c
P ) with non-negligible probability.

RSA assumption
The RSA assumption underlies security of the well-known RSA public-key cryptosystem proposed by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman [RSA78].
Definition 2.4.3 Suppose a PPT algorithm I takes as input a security parameter 1`
and returns a 2[`/2]-bit number N , which is the product of two uniformly chosen [`/2]bit primes. The RSA assumption states that: For every PPT algorithm A, the following
function Adv RSA (`) is negligible.
A

RSA (`) = Pr[(A(N, e, y) = x) ∧ (x ∈ Z∗ ) ∧ (xe = y)]
AdvA
N
where N ← I(1` ), e ← Z∗N and y ← Z∗N .
Intuitively, it assumes that there is no PPT algorithm that, given a product N of two
[`/2]-bit primes, e ← Z∗N and y ← Z∗N , can find x with non-negligible probability such
that xe = y.
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Strong RSA (SRSA) assumption
The Strong RSA assumption was independently proposed by Baric and Pfitzmann
[BP97] and by Fujisaki and Okamoto [FO97].
Definition 2.4.4 Suppose a PPT algorithm I takes as input a security parameter 1`
and returns a 2[`/2]-bit number N , which is the product of two uniformly chosen [`/2]bit primes. The Strong RSA assumption states that: For every PPT algorithm A, the
following function Adv SRSA (`) is negligible.
A

SRSA (`) = Pr[(A(N, y) = (x, e)) ∧ (x, e ∈ Z∗ ) ∧ (e 6= 1) ∧ (xe = y)]
AdvA
N
where N ← I(1` ) and y ← Z∗N .
Intuitively, it assumes that there is no PPT algorithm that, given a product N of two
[`/2]-bit primes and y ← Z∗N , can find x and e 6= 1 with non-negligible probability such
that xe = y.

Computational Composite Residuosity (CCR) assumption
This assumption was proposed to prove security of the famous Paillier public-key cryptosystem [Paillier99]. We also use it to prove security of our verifiable shuffle scheme.

Definition 2.4.5 Suppose a PPT algorithm I takes as input a security parameter
1` and returns a 2[`/2]-bit number N , which is the product of two uniformly chosen
[`/2]-bit primes. The CCR assumption states that: For every PPT algorithm A, the
following function Adv CCR (`) is negligible.
A

CCR (`) = Pr[(A(N, z) = x) ∧ (x ∈ Z )
AdvA
N
∧(∃r ∈ Z∗N such that rN (1 + xN ) = z mod N 2 )]
where N ← I(1` ) and z ← Z∗N 2 .
Intuitively, it assumes that there is no PPT algorithm that, given a product N of two
[`/2]-bit primes and z ← Z∗N 2 , can find x ∈ ZN with non-negligible probability such
that there exists r ∈ Z∗N satisfying rN (1 + xN ) = z mod N 2 .
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Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption
The Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption, originated from the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol [DH76], underlies security of the El Gamal encryption scheme
[ElGamal85].
Definition 2.4.6 The Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption for a group family GF =
{Gς } with a group instance generator GG is the following: For every PPT algorithm
A, the following function Adv DDH (`) is negligible.
A

DDH (`) = |Pr[A(ς, g, g a , g b , g ab ) = 1] − Pr[A(ς, g, g a , g b , g c ) = 1]|
AdvA
where (ς, g) ← GG(1` ) and a, b, c ← Z∗|Gς | .
Loosely speaking, the DDH assumption states that there is no PPT algorithm that can
distinguish with non-negligible probability between a tuple (g, g a , g b , g ab ) and a tuple
(g, g a , g b , g c ), where g is a generator of a given group Gς and a, b, c ← Z∗|Gς | .
Decisional Composite Residuosity (DCR) assumption
This assumption was proposed to prove security of the famous Paillier public-key cryptosystem [Paillier99].
Definition 2.4.7 Suppose a PPT algorithm I takes as input a security parameter 1`
and returns a 2[`/2]-bit number N , which is the product of two uniformly chosen [`/2]bit primes. A number z ∈ Z∗N 2 is said to be a w-th residue mod N 2 if there exists
a number y ∈ Z∗N 2 such that z = y w . Let SN denote the set of N -th residues modulo
N 2 . The Decisional Composite Residuosity assumption states that it is computationally
difficult to distinguish between a uniform distribution on the set SN and a uniform
distribution on the set Z∗N 2 .
Formally, the DCR assumption states that for every PPT algorithm A, the following
function Adv DCR (`) is negligible.
A

DCR (`) = |Pr[A(N, y) = 1] − Pr[A(N, z) = 1]|
AdvA
where N ← I(1` ), y ← SN and z ← Z∗N 2 .
Intuitively, the DCR assumption states that it is computationally difficult to distinguish
between an element y N of Z∗N 2 and another random element of Z∗N 2 .
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Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption
The Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption underlies security of some famous
ID-based encryption schemes [BF01, BB04b]. In the following definition, p is a random
prime of size `, G and GT are a cyclic additive group and a multiplicative group,
respectively, both of order p, e is a bilinear map from G × G to GT , and P is a
generator of G.
Definition 2.4.8 The Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption for a bilinear
pairing family BPF with a bilinear pairing instance generator BPG is defined as follows:
For every PPT algorithm A, the following function Adv DBDH (`) is negligible.
A

DBDH (`) = |Pr[A(t, aP, bP, cP, e(P, P )abc ) = 1] −
AdvA
Pr[A(t, aP, bP, cP, Γ) = 1]|
where t = (p, G, GT , e, P ) ← BPG(1` ), Γ ← G∗T and a, b, c ← Z∗p .
Loosely speaking, the DBDH assumption states that there is no PPT algorithm that
can distinguish with non-negligible probability between a tuple (aP, bP, cP, e(P, P )abc )
and a tuple (aP, bP, cP, Γ), where Γ ← G∗T and a, b, c ← Z∗p .
Decisional Diffie-Hellman Variant (DDHV) assumption
We also present a Decisional Diffie-Hellman Variant assumption, which is very similar
to the DDH assumption, but it works over groups G and GT . As the DDH assumption
underlies security of the El Gamal encryption scheme, the DDHV assumption can be
used to build a bilinear pairing version of the El Gamal encryption scheme. Theorem
2.4.1 states that the DDHV assumption is weaker than the DBDH assumption, so
security of the El Gamal bilinear pairing version also relies on the DBDH assumption.
DDHV has been implicitly used in relation to DBDH before and we formally define it
as follows.
Definition 2.4.9 The Decisional Diffie-Hellman Variant assumption for a bilinear
pairing family BPF with a bilinear pairing instance generator BPG is the following:
For every PPT algorithm A, the following function Adv DDHV (`) is negligible.
A

DDHV (`) = |Pr[A(t, P, rP, e(P, P )x , e(P, P )xr ) = 1] −
AdvA
Pr[A(t, P, rP, e(P, P )x , e(P, P )s ) = 1]|
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where t = (p, G, GT , e, P ) ← BPG(1` ) and x, r, s ← Z∗p .
Theorem 2.4.1 If the DBDH assumption holds, then the DDHV assumption holds.
Proof: To prove the theorem, we show that if a PPT algorithm A has non-negligible
Adv DDHV (`) (i.e. the DDHV assumption does not hold), then we can build an algoA

rithm B that has non-negligible AdvBDBDH (`) (i.e. the DBDH assumption does not
hold). Suppose a, b, c ∈ Z∗p and Γ ∈ G∗T , we observe that if a and b are uniformly
distributed in Z∗p , then x = ab is also uniformly distributed in Z∗p and if Γ is uniformly
distributed in G∗T , then s is also uniformly distributed in Z∗p , where Γ = e(P, P )s . So
to distinguish between (aP, bP, cP, e(P, P )abc ) and (aP, bP, cP, Γ), the algorithm B can
simply return the outputs by A when it takes as input (t, P, cP, e(aP, bP ), e(P, P )(ab)c )
or (t, P, cP, e(aP, bP ), Γ).

2.5

2

Hashing

The following definition of hash functions is based on the definitions in [Goldreich01,
TFS04].
Hash Function. A hash function onto a set S, denoted as HS : {0, 1}∗ → S, is a
function mapping a finite binary string of arbitrary length to an element of set S.
The set S is usually the set of binary strings of a fixed length. Additional hardness
requirements of hash functions are defined based on security applications of hashing.
Hash functions with collision-freeness or universal one-way property, which are formally
defined below, can be used to construct signature schemes (hash-and-sign paradigm).
The former allows simpler and more efficient constructions of signature schemes whereas
the latter allows constructions of signature schemes from one-way functions. This
application of hashing is not discussed further in this thesis and more details can be
found in [Goldreich03]. If hash functions are assumed to be ideal as random oracles
(discussed in subsection 2.6.2), which generate a perfectly random output for each
given input, they can be used to convert interactive proof systems to non-interactive
ones [FS86], as shown in section 2.7. It is the main application of hashing in this thesis.
We provide definitions of collision-free hashing and universal one-way hashing, based
on definitions in [Goldreich03], as follows. Intuitively, a hash function h is collision-free
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if it is computationally difficult to find x and x0 such that x 6= x0 and h(x) = h(x0 ).
A hash function h is universal one-way if given an x0 it is computationally difficult to
find x such that x 6= x0 and h(x) = h(x0 ).
Family of Collision-Free Hash Functions. A family of hash functions {HS ς :
{0, 1}∗ → Sς } is called collision-free if there exist two algorithms I and F satisfying
the following conditions:
• Efficient sampling: The PPT algorithm I takes as input a security parameter 1`
and returns some random `-bit index ς, and so it defines a distribution I` on the
set of `-bit indices.
• Efficient evaluation: The DPT algorithm F takes as input an index ς and x ∈
{0, 1}∗ , and outputs HS ς (x).
CF (`) is
• Collision-free: For every PPT algorithm A, the following function AdvA
negligible.
CF (`) = Pr[ς ← I(1` ); (x, x0 ) ← A(ς, I ) | (H (x) = H (x0 )) ∧ (x 6= x0 )]
AdvA
`
Sς
Sς
The first condition means that there is a PPT algorithm to generate an instance
HS ς : {0, 1}∗ → Sς of the family. The second condition means that there is a DPT
algorithm that computes the output HS ς (x) for each input x ∈ {0, 1}∗ . The ‘collisionfree’ condition means that there is no PPT algorithm that, given the index ς and the
distribution I` of `-bit indices, can find with non-negligible probability two different
elements x, x0 ∈ {0, 1}∗ such that HS ς (x) = HS ς (x0 ).
Family of Universal One-way Hash Functions. A family of hash functions {HS ς :
{0, 1}∗ → Sς } is called universal one-way if there exist two algorithms I and F satisfying the following conditions:
• Efficient sampling: The PPT algorithm I takes as input a security parameter 1`
and returns some random `-bit index ς, and so it defines a distribution I` on the
set of `-bit indices.
• Efficient evaluation: The DPT algorithm F takes as input an index ς and x ∈
{0, 1}∗ , and outputs HS ς (x).
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• Universal one-way: For every PPT algorithm A and every PPT algorithm J , the
following function Adv UO (`) is negligible.
A

UO (`) = Pr[ς ← I(1` ); x ← J (1` ); x ← A(ς, I , x )
AdvA
0
`
0
| (HS ς (x) = HS ς (x0 )) ∧ (x 6= x0 )]
The ‘universal one-way’ condition means that there is no PPT algorithm that, given
the index ς, the distribution I` of `-bit indices and an element x0 ∈ {0, 1}∗ chosen using
any distribution of binary strings, can find with non-negligible probability another
element x ∈ {0, 1}∗ such that HS ς (x) = HS ς (x0 ).
Hereafter, unless stated otherwise, hash functions refer to collision-free hash functions.

2.6

Provable Security

Generally, a cryptographic system is said to be provably secure if its security can
be rigorously proved based on reasonable cryptographic assumptions. There are two
types of assumptions. One is on the difficulty of computational problems, as discussed
in section 2.4, and the other is on the desirable properties of cryptographic tools. For
example, the random oracle model, which will be discussed later in this section, assumes
that hash functions behave like random oracles and output an uniformly random value
for a given input. The common method for proving security is reduction, which shows
that if a security requirement is broken then a well-known computational problem can
be solved.
Provable security is a theoretical approach that would help to provide a degree of
assurance for security of systems. Security standards such as IEEE P1363 [IEEE00],
ISO IEC [Shoup01] and NESSIE [Preneel et al.] consider provable security as an important attribute of any proposed cryptographic systems, and formal security proofs have
become indispensable in designing, analyzing and assessing any emerging standards
[Baek04].
In early days of public key cryptography, it was widely believed that security of
a public-key system was equivalent to the difficulty of the underlying computational
problem and so, early research in public-key cryptography focused on constructing efficient algorithms to solve well-known computational problems. However, many poorly
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designed cryptosystems were broken while there was no significant progress in solving
the underlying computational problems. Aspects that should have been considered
were the anticipation of possible attacks, specification of security requirements with
respect to these attacks and concrete methodologies to reduce the security requirements to the underlying computational problems. The security criteria could have
been more complicated. For example, could a communication channel protected by an
encryption scheme withstand an attacker, who was able to repeatedly send ciphertexts
via the channel and obtain the corresponding plaintexts? The need for a framework
for formally defining and modelling security of cryptographic systems gave rise to the
development of the concept “provable security”. According to [Bellare98, KM04], provable security was firstly introduced by Goldwasser and Micali [GM84] in the context
of asymmetric encryption, and later consolidated by Naor-Yung [NY90] and RackoffSimon [RS91]. It was then applied to other cryptographic primitives such as digital
signatures [GMR84, GMR88] and group signatures [BMW03, BSZ04, KY04]. The
elaboration of provable security for public-key encryption and digital signatures will
be provided in sections 2.8 and 2.9.

2.6.1

Providing provable security

So what is provable security and how to achieve provable security? Based on [Bellare98,
Stinson02], a simple description of the provable security approach is as follows.
Provable Security. Provable security is a paradigm, which provides evidence of security of some cryptosystem by performing the following steps:
• Define procedures of the system and set up security goals.
• Construct a formal adversarial model and specify security requirements of the
system; at the end of this step, a formal security model for the cryptosystem is
achieved.
• Provide security proofs, which concretely show a reduction of the security requirements to well-studied computationally difficult problems.
Cryptosystems of this type are said to be provably secure.
The first step is to determine procedures and entities of the system, and define participation of entities in each procedure and their broad security objectives, for example,
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confidentiality of communication or anonymity of users. Based on this, the algorithms
used in each procedure are specified. For the second step above, the adversary can be
modelled by an oracle machine defined in section 2.3. The most important part is to
anticipate possible attacks and capabilities of the adversary that are then formalized
as oracles accessible to the oracle machine. For example, to break confidentiality of an
encryption scheme, the adversary may have access to a decryption oracle, which takes
as input a ciphertext and returns the corresponding plaintext. Next, security requirements, which imply the achievements of security objectives despite attacks from the
adversary, are specified. The security requirements of computationally secure systems
are mostly specified in terms of negligible success probabilities of a PT adversary in
violating the security objectives of the system.
The third step is to prove that a system is secure by providing a reduction of the
system security to the hardness of some computational problem. The argument for
the reduction of a security requirement can be described as follows. Suppose there is
an algorithm that can break the security requirement. Then, this algorithm can be
used to construct another algorithm that can solve some well-known computational
problem. That means the hardness of solving the computational problem implies the
hardness of breaking the security requirement. Sometimes, there are other assumptions
in a security proof, that assume the existence of some ideal cryptographic primitives,
such random oracles.
A desirable security proof should use weak assumptions [Bellare98]. If the security
of a system is proved to rely on a weaker assumption, the system is less likely to be
broken. An assumption is stronger than another if the former implies the latter, for
example, the Strong RSA assumption is stronger than the RSA assumption. This
observation is essential in deciding a selection among a number of systems. Although
from security view point, the system that relies on the weakest assumption is the most
preferable, but it is not always possible to compare different assumptions. For example,
it is not known how to compare the DDH assumption with a combination of the RSA
assumption and the random oracle assumption.

2.6.2

Random oracle model

In many situations, a reduction requires assumptions about existence of some primitives
with ideal properties. A commonly used assumption is the random oracle assumption,
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first considered by Fiat and Shamir [FS86] and later explicitly formulated by Bellare
and Rogaway [BR93]. The random oracle assumption assumes the existence of a truly
random function. In practice, the random function can be replaced by a collision-free
hash function. It means that hash functions are assumed to be random oracles that
generate a perfectly random value for each new query, and produce the same answer
for two identical queries. We can assume the oracle maintains a query-answer table,
which is initially empty. When receiving a query, the oracle first looks up the table
to find if the query has been asked before. If it has, the oracle returns the answer in
the table. Otherwise, it generates a new random value as the answer and appends the
new query-answer pair to the table. We use the following definition from Bellare and
Rogaway [BR93].
Random oracle model [BR93]. A random oracle is a map from {0, 1}∗ to {0, 1}∞
such that for every input, each bit of the output is chosen uniformly and independently.
The random oracle model assumes the existence of such a random oracle.
Note that an infinitely long output is used to merely indicate “sufficiently long”
output. The output {0, 1}∞ can be replaced by an output {0, 1}` , where ` is sufficiently
long for the applied system.
There have been much discussion on whether the transition from a random oracle to
a hash function would affect the proved security of the ideal system. There have been a
number of attempts to provide evidences against reliability of the random oracle model.
A number of cryptographic schemes [CGH98, BBP04, GT03] have been constructed,
that are provably secure in the random oracle model but are insecure with any hash
functions. However, the arguments [Stern03a, Stern03b, KM04] in favor of random
oracles point out that these systems are either “contrived and unlike any system that
would ever be designed in practice” or based on “violations of fundamental principles
of sound cryptographic practice” [KM04]. In short, usability of random oracles is still
a hotly debatable issue in the cryptographic community.

2.6.3

Forking lemma

The forking lemma is one of the most commonly used tools in providing provable
security. The lemma was introduced by Pointcheval and Stern [PS96, PS00], and is
used in the random oracle model. The forking lemma was originally stated in a specific
model of signature schemes, where the signer needs to query the random oracle. Kiayias

2.6. Provable Security

31

and Yung generalized the lemma so that it can be used for different primitives [KY04].
We present the General forking lemma as follows.
General forking lemma [KY04]. Consider a PPT algorithm P, a PPT algorithm
Q, a random oracle H with output range {0, 1}` and some public parameters param.
The algorithm Q satisfies the property if Q(x) = 1 then x is a triplet of binary strings
hρ1 , c, ρ2 i and c = H(ρ1 ). R is another oracle that given an input (t, c) appends or
overwrites H’s table so that H(t) = c. P is allowed to ask queries on H and on R,
which is denoted as P H,R (param). Moreover, it is assumed that P behaves in such a
way so that queries (t, c) submitted by P to R adhere to the following conditions:
• The component c is uniformly distributed over {0, 1}` .
• The component t follows a probability distribution so that the probability of occurrence of a specific t0 is bounded by 2/2` .
Assume now that P H,R (param) returns output x = hρ1 , c, ρ2 i such that Q(x) = 1 (without sending (ρ1 , c) to R) with non-negligible probability ² ≥ 10(s + 1)(s + q)/2` , where
q is the number of H-queries performed by P, and s is the number of R-queries. Then,
there exists a PPT algorithm P 0 so that if y ← P 0 (param) it holds with probability 1/9
(i) y = (ρ1 , c, ρ2 , c0 , ρ02 ), (ii) Q(hρ1 , c, ρ2 i) = 1 after a query (ρ1 , c) is sent to R (iii)
Q(hρ1 , c0 , ρ02 i) = 1 after a query (ρ1 , c0 ) is sent to R, (iv) c 6= c0 . The probabilities are
taken over the choices for H, the random coin tosses of P and the random choice of
the public-parameters param.
The lemma can be explained as follows. P is a PPT adversary, modelled as a oracle
machine with access to a random oracle H and another oracle R (see section 2.3 for
the discussion about the oracle machine). P’s access to the oracle R implies that P
can simulate its own random oracle. P attempts to attack a cryptosystem, which has a
PPT algorithm Q. Triplets hρ1 , c, ρ2 i are generated from the cryptosystem and satisfy
some conditions, one of which is that c = H(ρ1 ), and the algorithm Q verifies the
validity of the triplets. For example, if the cryptosystem is a digital signature scheme
(discussion about digital signatures is presented in section 2.9), then the triplets are
signatures and Q is the verification algorithm. Suppose that P is successful in forging a
triplet of the cryptosystem with non-negligible probability ² (depending on the number
of queries to H and R), then the lemma states that there exists a PPT adversary P 0 ,
who, with probability 1/9, can find a tuple (ρ1 , c, ρ2 , c0 , ρ02 ) satisfying the conditions (ii),
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(iii) and (iv). In many applicable situations, a secret of the cryptosystem is computable
from (ρ1 , c, ρ2 , c0 , ρ02 ), so P 0 can find the secret, that would solve some computational
problem underlying the cryptosystem.

2.7
2.7.1

Proof Systems
Interactive Proof Systems

Proof systems play an important role in all cryptosystems discussed in this thesis. A
proof system consists of a prover and a verifier. An interactive proof system, where
the prover and the verifier interact and send messages to each other, can be modelled
by a joint computation of two interactive machines that is described in section 2.3.
In a joint computation of two interactive machines P and V on a common input x,
if P is given an auxiliary input wa and V is given an auxiliary input wb , we denote
hP(wa ), V(wb )i(x) the output of V. We provide definitions for interactive proof systems
below. In the definitions, a language is a set of strings that satisfy some properties
(see section 2.3 for descriptions of strings, alphabets and symbols). The prover aims
to prove that the common input belongs to a given language, that means the common
input satisfies the given properties.
Interactive Proof System [Goldreich01]. A joint computation of interactive machines (P, V) is called an interactive proof system for a language L if V is PT and the
following conditions hold:
• Completeness: For every x ∈ L, there exists a string w such that
Pr[hP(w), Vi(x) = 1] ≥ 2/3
• Soundness: For every x ∈
/ L, every interactive machine B and every w ∈ {0, 1}∗ ,
Pr[hB(w), Vi(x) = 1] ≤ 1/3
If the prover is also a PT machine, the proof system is said to provide computational
soundness.
It is important to consider how much information the prover reveals to the verifier
in a proof system. The proof system, where the prover does not reveal any information,
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is said to be zero-knowledge. Before defining zero-knowledge proof systems, we define
the verifier’s view on an execution of the proof system which we sometimes refer to as
a transcript of the proof system.
View of the verifier [Goldreich01].

For an interactive proof system (P, V),

V iewVP (x) denotes all that V can see during the execution of the proof system on input
x, including all messages sent and messages received, its input, its auxiliary input, its
random input and its output.
Zero-knowledge Interactive Proof System [Goldreich01]. An interactive proof
system (P, V) for some language L is said to be perfect/computational zero-knowledge
if for every PPT interactive machine V ∗ , there exists a PPT algorithm M∗ (simulator)
such that the ensembles {V iewVP∗ (x)}x∈L and {M∗ (x)}x∈L are identical/
computationally-indistinguishable.
A weaker notion of zero-knowledge is called honest-verifier zero-knowledge, where
only simulatability of the view of an honest verifier, rather than simulatability of the
view of any possible PPT verifier, is required.
Honest-verifier Zero-knowledge Proof System [Goldreich01]. An interactive
proof system (P, V) for some language L is said to be honest-verifier zero-knowledge if
there exists a PPT algorithm M (simulator) such that the ensembles {V iewVP (x)}x∈L
and {M(x)}x∈L are computationally indistinguishable.

2.7.2

Non-interactive Proof Systems

In a non-interactive proof system, the prover sends only one message, which is called
a proof, to the verifier, who then checks if the proof is valid. All non-interactive
proof systems discussed in this thesis are in the random oracle model, and we present
definitions for non-interactive proof systems in the random oracle model as follows.
Non-interactive proof systems in the common random string model, which is outside
the scope of this thesis, can be defined similarly and further discussion can be found
in [Goldreich01]. The common random string model assumes that there is an infinite
(i.e. sufficiently long) uniformly distributed binary string accessible by all parties.
In the following definitions, both prover P and verifier V are provided with a common input x and have access to a random oracle H. The prover also has a private
input w.
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Non-interactive Proof System [BR93]. A pair of algorithms (P, V) is called a
non-interactive proof system for a language L in the random oracle model if V is PT
and the following conditions hold:
• Completeness: For every x ∈ L, there exists a string w such that
Pr[V H (x, P H (w, x)) = 1] ≥ 2/3
• Soundness: For every x ∈
/ L, every algorithm B and every w ∈ {0, 1}∗ ,
Pr[V H (x, B H (w, x)) = 1] ≤ 1/3
where H, which is accessed by both parties, is a random oracle.
If the prover is also a PT machine, the proof system is said to provide computational
soundness. Hereafter, unless stated otherwise, “soundness” means “computational
soundness”, for both interactive and non-interactive proof systems. We now define
zero-knowledge non-interactive proof system in the random oracle model [BR93].
Zero-knowledge Non-interactive Proof System [BR93]. Let (P, V) be a noninteractive proof system for some language L in the random oracle model and let H denote
the random oracle. R is another oracle that given an input (t, c) appends or overwrites
H’s table so that H(t) = c. Let SL (x) denote the set of strings wx such that the completeness condition holds with respect to x ∈ L (i.e. Pr[V H (x, P H (wx , x)) = 1] ≥ 2/3).
The proof system (P, V) is said to be zero-knowledge if there exists a PPT algorithm M (simulator), which is allowed to access H and R, such that the ensembles
{x, P H (wx , x)}x∈L for arbitrary wx ∈ SL (x), and {MH,R (x)}x∈L are computationally
indistinguishable.
In this definition, M’s access to the oracle R implies that M can simulate its own
random oracle.

Fiat-Shamir heuristic
The Fiat-Shamir heuristic [FS86] is to convert an interactive proof system, where
messages sent by the verifier are random strings, to a non-interactive one by replacing
the verifier’s sent messages with the hash values of the previously generated public
elements. Then assuming that the hash function works like a random oracle, we have
a non-interactive proof system in the random oracle model.
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The following theorem states that the Fiat-Shamir heuristic converts a zeroknowledge interactive proof system into a zero-knowledge non-interactive proof system in
the random oracle model. The proof of this theorem can be found in [BR93].
Theorem 2.7.1 If an interactive proof system (P 0 , V 0 ) is zero-knowledge and it can
be converted into a non-interactive proof system (P, V) using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic, then (P, V) is a zero-knowledge non-interactive proof system in the random oracle
model.

Simulation soundness
We present a stronger notion of soundness, called simulation soundness, for noninteractive proof systems. As shown in section 2.8, this notion is important for constructing provably secure public-key encryption systems. Simulation soundness intuitively means that it is computationally difficult for an adversary to forge a valid proof
σ ∗ for an invalid input string x∗ , even if the adversary has been given some pairs (x, σ)
of valid input string x and the corresponding valid proof σ.
Simulation soundness [Sahai99]. Let (P, V) be a non-interactive zero-knowledge
proof system for some language L in the random oracle model and let H denote the
random oracle. The proof system (P, V) is said to provide simulation soundness if for
every PPT algorithm A with access to H and an input set S, which consists of pairs
(x, σ) such that x ∈ L if and only if V H (x, σ) = 1, the probability that A successfully
computes a new pair (x∗ , σ ∗ ) ∈
/ S such that x∗ ∈
/ L and V H (x∗ , σ ∗ ) = 1 is negligible.

2.8

Public-key Encryption

Encryption schemes are used to protect confidentiality of communication. To securely
deliver a message m, the sender gives the message and a key as input to an encryption
algorithm and then sends the output c, which is returned from the algorithm, to the
receiver. The message m is called plaintext and the output c is called ciphertext. Only
the party with possession of a secret key is able to compute the plaintext from the
ciphertext by using a decryption algorithm. There are two types of encryption schemes,
i.e. secret-key (or symmetric) schemes and public-key (or asymmetric) schemes. In a
secret-key encryption scheme, the encryption algorithm and the decryption algorithm
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both use the same secret key. In a public-key encryption scheme, the encryption
algorithm uses a public key and the decryption algorithm uses a private key, which is
kept secret and only known to the receiver.
The first widely used public key encryption scheme was proposed by Rivest, Shamir
and Adleman in 1978, based on the difficulty of factorizing large integers [RSA78]. In
1984, El Gamal invented another important scheme [ElGamal85], whose security relies
on the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. A recent scheme, which has attracted
a lot of attention from the cryptographic research community, is the Paillier scheme
[Paillier99], that is provably secure under the Decisional Composite Residuosity assumption.

2.8.1

Formal security model

A formal security model is essential in providing provable security for public-key encryption schemes. The model was initiated by Goldwasser-Micali [GM84], and then
developed by Naor-Yung [NY90] and Rackoff-Simon [RS91]. We present the model,
following the approach in [Goldreich03], as follows.

Syntax
A public-key encryption scheme consists of a key generation algorithm G, an encryption
algorithm E and a decryption algorithm D. It is denoted by (G, E, D).
• Key generation: The PPT algorithm G on input 1` outputs (pk, sk) where pk is
the public key, sk is the secret key and ` is a security parameter. It is denoted
by (pk, sk) ← G(1` ).
• Encryption: The PPT algorithm E takes as input the public key pk and a plaintext
m and outputs a ciphertext c. It is denoted by c ← E(pk, m) or c ← Epk (m).
• Decryption: The DPT algorithm D takes as input the secret key sk and a ciphertext c and outputs a plaintext such that if c ← Epk (m) then Dsk (c) = m, where
Dsk (c) (or D(sk, c)) denotes the output of D on input sk and c.
A public-key encryption scheme may have a re-encryption algorithm. Following the
definition in [Wikström02], this means there is a PPT algorithm R that takes as input
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the public key pk and a ciphertext and outputs another ciphertext such that for every
plaintext m and its ciphertexts c and c0 : P r[c0 = Rpk (c)] = P r[c0 = Epk (m)] (2.8.1),
where Rpk (c) (or R(pk, c)) denotes the output of R on input pk and c. A public-key
encryption scheme with a re-encryption algorithm is denoted by (G, E, D, R).

Security
Security goals
There are three security notions that indicate security goals of public-key encryption
systems, i.e. semantic security, indistinguishability and non-malleability, where semantic security and indistinguishability have been proved to be equivalent [Goldreich03].
Before presenting their definitions, we present some related definitions about relation.
As a function is also a relation, these definitions are also applicable to functions.
Definition 2.8.1 A binary relation B ⊆ {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ is said to be polynomially
bounded if there exists a positive number α0 such that for every (x, y) ∈ B, it satisfies
|y| ≤ |x|α0 . A binary relation B ⊆ {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ is said to be recognizable in
polynomial time if there exists a DPT algorithm M such that M (x, y) = 1 if and
only if (x, y) ∈ B.
Semantic security intuitively means that whatever the adversary can compute about
the plaintext from a ciphertext, can also be computed without the ciphertext. In the
following definition [Goldreich03], semantic security for a public-key encryption scheme
holds for any distribution of plaintexts whose sizes are computed by a polynomial of
the security parameter. This is captured by a PPT algorithm I which takes as input a
security parameter 1` and returns a p(`)-bit plaintexts, where p is a fixed but unspecified
polynomial. A polynomially bounded function f captures the information regarding the
ciphertext that the adversary tries to obtain, whereas another polynomially bounded
function h captures the a-priori partial information about the ciphertext. Semantic
security is defined as follows.
Semantic Security (SS) [Goldreich03]. A public-key encryption scheme (G, E, D)
is said to provide semantic security if for every PPT algorithm A, there exists a PPT
algorithm A0 such that: For every PPT algorithm I which takes as input a security
parameter 1` and returns a p(`)-bit binary string where p is a fixed-but-unspecified
polynomial, every pair of polynomially bounded functions f, h : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ and
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every positive number α, there exists a positive integer `0 such that for every integer
` > `0 , it holds that
Pr[(pk, sk) ← G(1` ); m ← I(1` ); c ← Epk (m) | A(1` , pk, 1|m| , c, h(m)) = f (m)]
< Pr[m ← I(1` ) | A0 (1` , 1|m| , h(m)) = f (m)] + `−α
The definition states that an adversary A, who is given the security parameter 1` , the
public key pk, the size of the plaintext 1|m| , the ciphertext c and the partial information
h(m), has negligible advantage over an adversary A0 , who is only given the security
parameter 1` , the size of the message 1|m| and the partial information h(m), when they
try to find some information f (m) about the plaintext m.
Indistinguishability intuitively means that it is computationally difficult to distinguish encryptions of two plaintexts of the same length. In the definition, an adversary
A needs to distinguish encryptions of two plaintexts m1 and m2 of the same length. It
is defined as follows.
Indistinguishability (IND) [Goldreich03]. A public-key encryption scheme
(G, E, D) is said to provide indistinguishability if for every PPT algorithm A, every
positive number α, there exists a positive integer `0 such that for every integer ` > `0 ,
every m1 , m2 ∈ {0, 1}p(`) where p is a fixed-but-unspecified polynomial, it holds that
|Pr[(pk, sk) ← G(1` ); c ← Epk (m1 ) | A(1` , pk, c) = 1] −
Pr[(pk, sk) ← G(1` ); c ← Epk (m2 ) | A(1` , pk, c) = 1]| < `−α

The equivalence between semantic security and indistinguishability has been proved
[Goldreich03]. Although semantic security carries the intuitive meaning of security
for public-key encryption, it is harder to directly prove that an encryption scheme
provides semantic security and it is easier to prove that an encryption scheme provides
indistinguishability. So it is a common practice that an encryption scheme is first
proved to provide indistinguishability, which also implies semantic security.
Another type of security requirement is non-malleability, which means that given
a ciphertext, it is computationally difficult to generate a different ciphertext such that
their corresponding plaintexts are related in a known manner.
Non-malleability (NM) [Goldreich03]. A public-key encryption scheme (G, E, D)
is said to provide non-malleability if for every PPT algorithm A, there exists a PPT
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algorithm A0 such that: For every PPT algorithm I, which takes as input a security
parameter 1` and returns a p(`)-bit binary string where p is a fixed-but-unspecified polynomial, every polynomially bounded function h : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ , every polynomially
bounded relation B that is recognizable in polynomial time, every positive number α,
there exists a positive integer `0 such that for every integer ` > `0 , it holds that
Pr[(pk, sk) ← G(1` ); m ← I(1` ); c ← Epk (m); c0 ← A(1` , pk, c, 1|m| , h(m));
if c 6= c0 then m0 ← Dsk (c0 ), otherwise m0 ← 0|m|
| (m, m0 ) ∈ B]
< Pr[m ← I(1` ); m0 ← A0 (1` , 1|m| , h(m)) | (m, m0 ) ∈ B] + `−α
In the definition, an adversary A is given the security parameter 1` , the public key pk,
the size of the plaintext 1|m| , an encryption c of m and the partial information h(m),
and tries to compute another ciphertexts c0 so that m and the decryption m0 of c0 are
in the relation B. An adversary A0 is only given the security parameter 1` , the size of
the message 1|m| and the partial information h(m), and tries to compute m0 so that m
and m0 are in the relation B. Non-malleability requires that A has negligible advantage
over A0 .
Adversary
There are two types of attacks, i.e., chosen plaintext attacks (CPA) and chosen
ciphertext attacks (CCA), depending on the oracles that the adversary can access. In
a chosen plaintext attack, the adversary can access an encryption oracle that outputs
ciphertexts corresponding to input plaintexts the adversary queries. In public-key encryption schemes, as the adversary can always compute ciphertexts from given plaintexts, this oracle is redundant to the adversary. In a chosen ciphertext attack, the
adversary can access an encryption oracle and a decryption oracle that outputs plaintexts corresponding to input ciphertexts the adversary queries. Both types of attacks
proceed in 4 steps as follows [Goldreich03].
• Key generation: A trusted party generates the keys (pk, sk) ← G(1` ). The adversary
is given (1` , pk).
• Oracle queries: The adversary uses the information obtained so far to make queries
to some oracles. In chosen plaintext attacks, the adversary can access an encryption
oracle; and in chosen ciphertext attacks, the adversary can access an encryption oracle
and a decryption oracle. After making a number of queries, the adversary moves to
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the next stage.
• Challenge generation: Using the information obtained so far, the adversary specifies
a challenge template, according to which an actual challenge will be generated. For
example, in an attack against semantic security, the challenge template includes a
distribution of plaintexts, a partial information function h and a target information
function f . A plaintext m is chosen using the distribution and the actual challenge
includes an encryption of m, the size of the plaintext 1|m| and h(m). The adversary is
given the actual challenge and needs to compute some target information f (m).
• Additional oracle queries: Based on the information obtained so far, the adversary
makes additional queries as in the second step and then, produces an output and halts.

The adversary’s output decides the attack’s success. For example, the above attack
against semantic security is successful if the adversary can output f (m) with probability
non-negligibly better than a corresponding PPT algorithm that is only given 1|m| and
h(m). There are 2 types of chosen ciphertext attacks: non-adaptive CCA (or CCA1)
and adaptive CCA (or CCA2). In CCA1, the adversary does not have any additional
oracle query at step 4. In CCA2, the adversary is allowed to query the oracles at step
4, but can not send a ciphertext which is part of the actual challenge to the decryption
oracle.
Security requirements
Securing the three security goals against the three types of attacks leads to 9 possible security requirements: SS-CPA, IND-CPA, NM-CPA, SS-CCA1, IND-CCA1, NMCCA1, SS-CCA2, IND-CCA2 and NM-CCA2. Their relationship, which has been
proved in [Goldreich03], is presented in Theorem 2.8.1 and illustrated in Figure 2.1.
The equivalence of SS-CCA2 and IND-CCA2 was only recently proved in [WSI03] and
[Goldreich03].
Theorem 2.8.1 Let PE denote a public-key encryption scheme.
• PE provides SS-CPA, SS-CCA1 or SS-CCA2 if and only if PE provides INDCPA, IND-CCA1 or IND-CCA2, respectively.
• PE provides SS-CPA or SS-CCA1 if PE provides NM-CPA or NM-CCA1, respectively. PE provides SS-CCA2 if and only if PE provides NM-CCA2.
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↔
↔
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IND-CPA
↑
IND-CCA1
↑
IND-CCA2

←

NM-CPA
↑
← NM-CCA1
↑
↔ NM-CCA2

Figure 2.1: Relationship among Encryption Security Notions

• PE provides SS-CPA or NM-CPA if PE provides SS-CCA1 or NM-CCA1, respectively. PE provides SS-CCA1 or NM-CCA1 if PE provides SS-CCA2 or
NM-CCA2, respectively.

2.8.2

Twin Encryption Paradigm

The twin encryption paradigm, introduced by Naor-Yung [NY90] and developed by
Rackoff - Simon [RS91] and Fouque - Pointcheval [FP01], converts a SS-CPA publickey encryption scheme into a SS-CCA2 public-key encryption scheme. A ciphertext
of the SS-CCA2 scheme consists of two ciphertexts ca and cb of the SS-CPA scheme
encrypting the same plaintext m and a non-interactive proof ξ that the plaintexts of
the two ciphertexts ca and cb are equivalent.
Twin encryption paradigm [FP01]. Let (G, E, D) be a public-key encryption scheme
and L be a language L = {(pka , pkb , E(pka , m), E(pkb , m)) | pka ← G(1` ), pkb ← G(1` ),
m ← {0, 1}∗ }. Let (P, V) be a non-interactive proof system for the language L. The
twin encryption paradigm converts the public-key encryption scheme into a new publickey encryption scheme (G 0 , E 0 , D0 ) as follows.
• Key generation algorithm G 0 : On input 1` , it executes G(1` ) twice to get two
public-key/secret-key pairs (pka , ska ) and (pkb , skb ). The public key is P K =
(pka , pkb ) and the secret key is SK = (ska , skb ).
• Encryption algorithm E 0 : On input a message m and the public key P K, it generates a ciphertext consisting of ca = E(pka , m), cb = E(pkb , m) and a proof ξ
generated as ξ ← P(m, (pka , pkb , ca , cb )).
• Decryption algorithm D0 : On input a ciphertext (ca , cb , ξ) and the secret key SK,
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it verifies the validity of the proof ξ by checking V((pka , pkb , ca , cb ), ξ) = 1. It then
computes the plaintext m = D(ska , ca ) = D(skb , cb ).
Theorem 2.8.2 states the security relationship between the public-key encryption
schemes in the twin encryption paradigm. Its proof can be found in [FP01].
Theorem 2.8.2 Suppose the twin encryption paradigm converts a scheme (G, E, D)
into a scheme (G 0 , E 0 , D0 ) using a non-interactive proof system (P, V). If (G, E, D)
provides SS-CPA and (P, V) provides simulation soundness, then (G 0 , E 0 , D0 ) provides
SS-CCA2.

2.8.3

El Gamal Public-key Encryption scheme

This scheme, which is proposed by El Gamal [ElGamal85], has been used to construct
several verifiable shuffles [FS01, Neff01, FMMOS02, Neff03].
Key generation: A cyclic group G of order prime q and a generator g of G are generated.
The private key is x ← Zq and the public key is (y, g) where y = g x .
Encryption: The El Gamal ciphertext of a message m ∈ G is (g0 , m0 ) where g0 = g r ,
m0 = my r and r ← Zq .
Re-encryption: A ciphertext (g0 , m0 ) can be re-encrypted to another ciphertext (g0 ×
g r0 , m0 × y r0 ) of the same plaintext m, where re-encryption exponent r0 ← Zq . The
re-encryption satisfies the condition (2.8.1) in subsection 2.8.1.
Decryption: A ciphertext (g0 , m0 ) can be decrypted as m = m0 g0−x .
Security: Theorem 2.8.3 states security of the El Gamal encryption scheme. Its proof
can be found in [TY98].
Theorem 2.8.3 The El Gamal encryption scheme provides SS-CPA if and only if the
DDH assumption holds.
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Bilinear Pairing versions of El Gamal Public-key Encryption

There are two constructions of the El Gamal public-key encryption scheme using bilinear pairings that have been implicitly used before. El GamalBP 1 provides SS-CPA
and the twin encryption paradigm converts El GamalBP 1 into El GamalBP 2 , which
provides SS-CCA2. We use these schemes to construct group signatures and identityescrow systems.
El GamalBP 1
Key generation: Let p, G, GT , e be bilinear pairing parameters, as defined in section 2.2,
and G be a generator of G. Suppose x ← Z∗p and Θ = e(G, G)x . The public key is
pk = (G, Θ) and the secret key is sk = x.
Encryption: Plaintext m ∈ GT can be encrypted by choosing r ← Z∗p and computing
the ciphertext (E, Λ) = (rG, mΘr ).
Decryption: Ciphertext (E, Λ) can be decrypted as m = Λ/e(E, G)x .
Security: Security of the El GamalBP 1 system is stated in Theorem 2.8.4. The first
statement can be proved exactly the same way as the proof for the El Gamal encryption
scheme [TY98], except that it is based on the DDHV assumption instead of the DDH
assumption. The second statement can be seen as a result of the first statement and
Theorem 2.4.1.
Theorem 2.8.4 The El GamalBP 1 encryption scheme is SS-CPA if and only if the
DDHV assumption holds. The El GamalBP 1 encryption scheme is SS-CPA if the DBDH
assumption holds.
El GamalBP 2
We next present an extension, El GamalBP 2 , which is IND-CCA2 in the random oracle
model. This is the bilinear pairing version of the scheme presented and proved by
Fouque and Pointcheval [FP01], that uses the twin-encryption paradigm [NY90] and a
simulation-sound proof of equality of plaintexts.
Key generation: Let p, G, GT , e be bilinear pairing parameters, as defined in section 2.2,
and G be a generator of G. Suppose xa , xb ← Z∗p ; Θa = e(G, G)xa and Θb = e(G, G)xb .
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The public key is pk = (G, Θa , Θb ) and the secret key is sk = (xa , xb ). Choose a hash
function HZp : {0, 1}∗ → Zp , which is assumed to be a random oracle in security proofs.
Encryption: Plaintext m ∈ GT can be encrypted by choosing ra , rb ← Z∗p and computing
two El GamalBP 1 ciphertexts, ca = (Ea , Λa ) = (ra G, mΘraa ) and cb = (Eb , Λb ) =
(rb G, mΘrbb ), and a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof ξ, which proves equality of
the plaintexts of (Ea , Λa ) and (Eb , Λb ). The proof ξ involves proving the existence of
ra and rb such that Ea = ra G, Eb = rb G and Λa /Λb = Θraa Θb−rb , and can be computed
as (υ, ρa , ρb ) as follows.
• Choose wa , wb ← Zp and compute Wa = wa G and Wb = wb G.

Let π =

wb
a
(Wa , Wb , Θw
a Θb ).

• Compute υ = HZp (pk, ca , cb , π).
• Compute ρa = wa − ra υ and ρb = wb + rb υ.
• Set ξ = (υ, ρa , ρb ).
The ciphertext is (ca , cb , ξ).
Decryption: Given a ciphertext (ca , cb , ξ), where ca = (Ea , Λa ) and cb = (Eb , Λb ), check
the validity of ξ = (υ, ρa , ρb ) by verifying
?

υ = HZp (pk, ca , cb , (ρa G + υEa , ρb G − υEb , Θρaa Θρb b (Λa /Λb )υ ))
then compute the plaintext m = Λa /e(Ea , G)xa = Λb /e(Eb , G)xb .
If the ciphertext was correctly computed, then the verification succeeds as ρa G +
υEa = (wa −ra υ)G+υra G = wa G = Wa , ρb G−υEb = (wb +rb υ)G−υrb G = wb G = Wb
wb
b +rb υ
a −ra υ
a
Θw
((mΘraa )/(mΘrbb ))υ = Θw
and Θρaa Θρb b (Λa /Λb )υ = Θw
a
a Θb .
b

Security: Security of the El GamalBP 2 system is stated in Theorem 2.8.5.
Theorem 2.8.5 The El GamalBP 2 encryption scheme is SS-CCA2 if the DDHV assumption holds, in the random oracle model. The El GamalBP 2 encryption scheme is
SS-CCA2 if the DBDH assumption holds, in the random oracle model.

Proof:

The second statement can be seen as a result of the first statement and

Theorem 2.4.1. The proof of the first statement is the same as the proof in [FP01],
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except that it is based on the DDHV assumption instead of the DDH assumption. It
is briefly presented as follows.
Theorem 2.8.4 states that El GamalBP 1 provides SS-CPA under the DDHV assumption. So, based on Theorem 2.8.2, El GamalBP 2 provides SS-CCA2 under the DDHV
assumption in the random oracle model if we can prove that the proof ξ provides
simulation soundness in the random oracle model. It can be done as follows.
Let HZp be a random oracle. Suppose the proof ξ does not provide simulation
soundness, that means a PPT algorithm A with access to the random oracle and a set
S of string-proof pairs, is able to forge a new proof for an invalid string (pka , pkb , ca =
(Ea , Λa ), cb = (Eb , Λb )), with non-negligible probability. By applying the general forking lemma (see section 2.6), where A (playing the role of P in the general forking lemma
definition) makes no query to the oracle R (defined in the general forking lemma definition), there is a PPT algorithm A0 that generates two proofs for the invalid string
(pka , pkb , ca , cb ): (G, Θa , Θb , ca , cb , Wa , Wb , υ, ρa , ρb ) and (G, Θa , Θb , ca , cb , Wa , Wb , υ 0 , ρ0a ,
ρ0b ) with υ 6= υ 0 . So, we have
ρa G + υEa = ρ0a G + υ 0 Ea (= Wa )
ρb G − υEb = ρ0b G − υ 0 Eb (= Wb )
0

ρ0

Θρaa Θρb b (Λa /Λb )υ = Θρaa Θb b (Λa /Λb )υ

0

0
0
−1
b
Therefore, Ea = ra G, Eb = rb G and Λa /Λb = Θraa Θ−r
b , where ra = (ρa − ρa )(υ − υ)

and rb = (ρb − ρ0b )(υ − υ 0 )−1 . It indicates that (Ea , Λa ) and (Eb , Λb ) encrypt the same
plaintext, which is a contradiction to the assumption that (pka , pkb , ca , cb ) is an invalid
string.
Therefore, the proof ξ provides simulation soundness in the random oracle model.
As a result, El GamalBP 2 provides SS-CCA2 under the DDHV assumption in the
random oracle model.

2.8.5

2

Paillier Public-key Encryption scheme

This public-key encryption scheme was recently introduced by Paillier [Paillier99]. We
use it to construct a verifiable shuffle scheme.
Key generation: Let N = pq, where p and q are primes. Denote by λ the least common
multiple of p − 1 and q − 1 (λ = lcm(p − 1, q − 1)). The public key is pk = N and the
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secret key is sk = λ. In any description of Paillier encryption, unless stated otherwise,
we assume all modular computations are in modulo N 2 .
Encryption: Plaintext m ∈ ZN can be encrypted by choosing r ← Z∗N and computing
the ciphertext g = rN (1 + mN ).
Re-encryption: A Paillier ciphertext g for a plaintext m can be re-encrypted as g 0 =
r0N × g for the same plaintext m, where r0 ← Z∗N . The re-encryption satisfies the
condition (2.8.1) in subsection 2.8.1.
Decryption: Ciphertext g ∈ Z∗N 2 can be decrypted as
m = L(g λ mod N 2 )/λ mod N
where the function L takes its input from the set {u ∈ ZN 2 |u = 1 mod N } and is
defined as L(u) = (u − 1)/N .
Security: Theorem 2.8.6 states security of the Paillier scheme and its proof can be found
in [Paillier99].
Theorem 2.8.6 The Paillier encryption scheme has SS-CPA if and only if the DCR
assumption holds.

2.9

Digital Signatures

Authenticity of transmitted information can be provided by digital signatures. To
prove the origin of a message m, the signer gives the message and a secret signing key
as input to a signing algorithm, which returns a signature σ of the message. Any party
can run a verification algorithm, which takes as input the message-signature pair (m, σ)
and a public verification key, to verify the validity of the signature with regard to the
message. If the verification algorithm returns “valid”, the verifier can conclude and
the signer can not deny that the message is from the signer or the signer has leaked
the signing key.
Digital signatures were first introduced by Diffie and Hellman [DH76]. In 1978,
Rivest, Shamir and Adleman constructed a digital signature scheme based on the RSA
assumption [RSA78]. Other important digital signature schemes were proposed by
El Gamal [ElGamal85] and Schnorr [Schnorr90], whose security relies on the Discrete
Logarithm assumption.
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Formal security model

A formal security model for providing provable security of digital signatures has been
established [GMR84, GMR88]. We present the model, based on [Goldreich03], as
follows.

Syntax
A digital signature scheme consists of a key generation algorithm G, a signing algorithm
S and a verification algorithm V. It is denoted by (G, S, V).
• Key generation: The PPT algorithm G on input 1` outputs (pk, sk) where pk is the
public verification key, sk is the secret signing key and ` is a security parameter.
It is denoted by (pk, sk) ← G(1` ).
• Signing: The PPT algorithm S takes as input the signing key sk and a message
m and outputs a signature σ. It is denoted by σ ← S(sk, m) or σ ← Ssk (m).
• Verification: The DPT algorithm V takes as input the verification key pk, a
message m and a signature σ, and outputs 1 if the signature is valid for the
message, or 0 otherwise. Let Vpk (m, σ) (or V(pk, m, σ)) denote the output of V
on input pk, m and σ, it is required that P r[Vpk (m, Ssk (m)) = 1] = 1.

Security
The main security goal of digital signatures is unforgeability, which intuitively means
that a PPT adversary can not forge a new valid message-signature pair. The strongest
attack against digital signatures is chosen message attack, where the adversary can
access a signing oracle that returns signatures corresponding to messages the adversary
queries. A definition of unforgeability against chosen message attacks is provided as
follows.
Unforgeability against chosen message attacks (UNF-CMA) [Goldreich03].
For a probabilistic oracle machine A with access to an oracle O, let QO
A (x) denote the
set of queries made by A on input x to oracle O. A digital signature scheme (G, S, V)
is said to be UNF-CMA if for every PPT oracle machine A, every positive number α,
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there exists a positive integer `0 such that for every integer ` > `0 , it holds that
−α
S
Pr[(pk, sk) ← G(1` ); (m, σ) ← AOS (1` , pk) | (Vpk (m, σ) = 1) ∧ (m ∈
/ QO
A (x))] < `

where OS denotes the signing oracle which takes as input a message and returns a
corresponding signature.
The definition can be explained as follows. First, a trusted party generates the
keys (pk, sk) ← G(1` ) and the adversary is given (1` , pk). The adversary then uses
the information obtained so far to make queries to the signing oracle. After making a
number of such queries, the adversary outputs a message-signature pair (m, σ). The
adversary is considered to be successful if the message-signature pair (m, σ) is valid and
m has never been sent to the signing oracle. UNF-CMA requires that the adversary’s
success probability is negligible.
A general construction of UNF-CMA digital signatures was proposed by Goldwasser, Micali and Rivest [GMR88]. The Schnorr signature scheme [Schnorr90]
[Schnorr91] and an improved version of the El Gamal signature scheme [ElGamal85]
have also been proved to provide UNF-CMA in the random oracle model [PS96, PS00].

2.10

Cryptographic Privacy Enhancing Technologies

This section provides descriptions, literature reviews and formal security models of
cryptographic privacy enhancing technologies discussed in this thesis.

2.10.1

Group Signatures

Overview
As discussed in Chapter 1, group signature systems allow a group member to anonymously sign messages on behalf of the group. Participants in a group signature scheme
are a set of group members and a group manager, who plays two roles. The first role
is to register new users by issuing membership certificates, and the second role is to
revoke anonymity of a signed message by ‘opening’ the signature to find the signer. In
some schemes, the functions of the group manager can be split between two managers:
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an issuer and an opener. A group signature scheme is said to be partially dynamic
if users can be added to the group, and is said to be fully dynamic if it also allow
members to be revoked from the group.
In early group signature schemes [CvH91, CP94, Camenisch97], the sizes of the
public key and signature grew with the size of the group and so the schemes were
impractical for large groups. Schemes with fixed-size group public keys and signatures
have been first proposed in [CS97] and later extended in [CM98, ACJT00, AdM03]. In
Crypto 2000, Ateniese et al. (ACJT00) [ACJT00] proposed an efficient group signature
scheme with short length and low computation cost. This scheme has been proved to
satisfy the informal list of security requirements of group signature schemes.
Ateniese and de Medeiros (AdM03) proposed an efficient group signature scheme
[AdM03] that is ‘without trapdoor’ in the sense that no party in the system including
the group manager needs to know a trapdoor. That means the system trapdoor is
only used to initialize system parameters and can be completely removed after that. In
previous schemes, the group manager’s secret key includes a trapdoor and so in multigroup scenarios, for example when the group signature scheme is used as a building
block of an anonymous credential system among a number of organizations, different
group managers need to keep different trapdoors. Different trapdoors are usually associated with different sets of parameters, therefore, in previous group signature schemes,
it is almost impossible for different groups to share system parameters. The advantage
of trapdoor-free group signature schemes is in simplifying administration and management of multi-group systems, as the same set of parameters can be used to initiate
different groups and so many groups can share the same cryptographic domain without
compromising security.
Security of a group signature scheme has been traditionally proved by showing that
it satisfies a list of informally defined requirements. Bellare et al. [BMW03] gave
a formal security model of group signature schemes for static groups and reduced the
number of requirements to two, Full Anonymity and Full Traceability, hence simplifying
security goals and analysis. It was later extended [BSZ04] to a formal security model
(referred to as the BSZ04 model) for partially dynamic groups with three security
requirements (Anonymity, Traceability and Non-frameability). This model will be
described later in this section. Kiayias et al. [KY04] independently proposed a second
formal model (the KY04 model) for group signatures with three requirements, Security
against Anonymity attacks, Security against Misidentification attacks and Security
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against Framing attacks, that share many features of the BSZ04 model. Both models
use various oracles including an Open oracle that takes a signed message and reveals
the signer’s identity. The ACJT00 scheme although satisfies the conventional list of
requirements but cannot be proved secure in either of the two formal models mainly
because of the inclusion of the Open oracle in these models. Kiayias et al. [KY04]
proposed an extension (the KY04 scheme) of the ACJT00 scheme that is proved secure
in their formal model.
A new direction in constructing group signature schemes is to use bilinear pairings
to shorten the lengths of the signature and key. Boneh et al. [BBS04] proposed a
short group signature scheme (BBS04) based on the Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption
and a new assumption on bilinear pairing groups, called the Decisional Linear assumption. The scheme is provably secure in a variant of the BSZ04 model where the Open
oracle is not available and the Non-frameability property is not required. They also
showed how to construct an extension, which provides Non-frameability. Based on the
LRSW assumption [LRSW99], Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [CL04] proposed a group
signature scheme (CL04) derived from a signature scheme which allows an efficient
zero-knowledge proof of the knowledge of a signature on a committed message, and
used it to construct an efficient anonymous credential system. Our group signature
schemes belong to this direction and were proposed independently from the BBS04
and CL04 schemes.
In a fully dynamic group signature scheme, the group manager can revoke members from the group and a revoked user can no longer sign messages on behalf of the
group. Providing efficient fully dynamic group signature schemes has been a difficult
problem. Early approaches [AT01, BS01, Song01] have communication and computation costs linearly dependent either on the current group size or on the total number
of deleted members. The most notable scheme with membership revocation (CL02)
was proposed in [CL02], where these linear dependencies are removed; and Tsudik and
Xu [TX03] later proposed another scheme (TX03), which has less computation costs
in some operations. Both schemes use dynamic accumulators as the key for efficiency
improvements.
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Formal Security Model
In order to provide provable security (see section 2.6) for group signature schemes, the
first step is to construct a formal security model for group signatures. We present the
BSZ04 security model [BSZ04], which is used to prove security of our group signature
schemes. We first describe participants and procedures in this model, then define
oracles accessible to the adversaries and finally present formal security requirements.
Participants and Procedures
A group signature scheme consists of a trusted party for initial set-up, two group
managers (the issuer and the opener), and users with unique identities i ∈ Z+ (the set
of positive integers). A user can join the group and become a group member. A table
upk is publicly readable and a table reg is readable by the opener and writable by the
issuer. The scheme is specified as a tuple GS = (GKg, UKg, Join, Iss, GSig, GVf, Open,
Judge) of polynomial-time algorithms described as follows.
• GKg: In the setup phase, the trusted party runs the group-key generation PPT
algorithm GKg that takes as input a security parameter 1` and outputs a triple
of keys (gpk, ik, ok), where ik is given to the issuer and ok is given to the opener.
The group public key gpk is published.
• UKg: A user i runs the user-key generation PPT algorithm UKg that takes as
input a security parameter 1` and outputs a personal public and private key pair
(upk[i], usk[i]), where upk[i] is stored in the table upk.
• Join, Iss: This is a joint computation of two PPT interactive machines, including
Join executed by a user i with a personal public and private key pair, and Iss
executed by the issuer. The communication is assumed to be secure (i.e. private
and authenticated), and Join is assumed to start the computation and send the
first message. At termination, each machine outputs a value and a decision which
is accept or reject. If Iss accepts, the issuer makes an entry reg[i] for i, in the
registration table reg, and fills this entry with a new membership certificate,
which is the output by Iss. If Join accepts, the user i stores the output by Join
as its private signing key gsk[i].
• GSig: A group member i runs the group signing PPT algorithm GSig that takes
as input the user’s signing key gsk[i] and a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗ and returns a
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signature on m.
• GVf: Anyone can run the group signature verification DPT algorithm GVf on
input gpk, a message m, and a candidate signature ω for m, to obtain a bit. The
signature ω is valid for m with respect to gpk if and only if this bit is 1 (accept).
• Open: The opener has read-access to the registration table reg, and can run
the opening DPT algorithm Open that takes as input the opening key ok, the
registration table reg, a message m, and a valid signature ω of m under gpk and
returns a pair (i, τ ), where i is a non-negative integer. If i ≥ 1, the algorithm is
claiming that the group member i produced ω and τ is a proof of this claim, and
if i = 0, it is claiming that no group member produced ω.
• Judge: Anyone can run the judge DPT algorithm Judge that takes as input the
group public key gpk, an integer j ≥ 1, the public key upk[j] of the user j (this
is an empty string if this user has no public key), a message m, a valid signature
ω of m, and a proof-string τ , and returns accept or reject. It aims to check if τ
is a valid proof that j produced ω. Note that the judge will base its verification
on j’s personal public key.

Oracles
As shown later, the security requirements are formulated via experiments in which
an adversary’s capabilities are modelled by access to certain oracles. The adversary can
request the oracles to perform some tasks or to compute some results. It is assumed
that each experiment has run GKg on input 1` to obtain keys gpk, ik and ok, and all
entries of the tables upk and reg are assumed initially to be empty strings. It is also
assumed that the experiment maintains the following sets which are initially empty and
manipulated by the oracles: a set HU of honest users; a set CU of corrupted users; and
a set GSet of message-signature pairs. Different experiments will provide the adversary
with different subsets of the following oracles.
• AddU(·): The add user oracle with argument i ∈ N, which is an identity, allows the
adversary to add i to the group as an honest user. The oracle adds i to the set HU
of honest users, and picks a personal public and private key pair (upk[i], usk[i])
for i. It then executes the group-joining protocol by running Join (on behalf of
i, initialized with gpk, upk[i], usk[i]) and Iss (on behalf of the issuer, initialized
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with gpk, ik, i, upk[i]). When Iss accepts, its output is recorded as entry reg[i] in
the registration table. When Join accepts, its output is recorded as i’s private
signing key gsk[i]. The calling adversary is returned upk[i], but it is not given
the transcript of the interaction generated by the oracle.
• CrptU(·, ·): The corrupt user oracle with arguments i ∈ N, which is an identity,
and a string upk, allows the adversary to corrupt a user i and set its personal
public key upk[i] to the value upk chosen by the adversary. The oracle initializes
the issuer in anticipation of a group-joining protocol with i (so i is not yet in the
group).
• SndToI(·, ·): Having corrupted user i, the adversary can use this send to issuer oracle to engage in a group-joining protocol with the honest issuer, itself playing the
role of i and not necessarily executing the interactive algorithm Join prescribed
for an honest user. The adversary provides the oracle with i and a message Min
to be sent to the issuer. The oracle, which represents the issuer (who has been
initialized by an earlier call to CrptU(i, ·)), computes a response as per Iss, returns
the outgoing message to the adversary, and sets entry reg[i] of the registration
table to Iss’s output if the latter accepts.
• SndToU(·, ·): In some definitions, we consider an adversary that has corrupted
the issuer. The send to user oracle can be used by such an adversary to engage
in a group-joining protocol with an honest user, itself playing the role of the
issuer and not necessarily executing the interactive algorithm Iss prescribed for
the honest issuer. The adversary provides the oracle with i and a message Min
to be sent to i. The oracle represents the user i, initializing it the first time it
is called by choosing a personal public and private key pair for i, computing a
response as per Join, returning the outgoing message to the adversary, and setting
i’s private signing key to Join’s output if the latter accepts.
• USK(·): The adversary can call this user secret keys oracle with argument the
identity i ∈ N of a user to expose both the secret key gsk[i] and the personal
private key usk[i] of this user.
• RReg(·): The adversary can read the content of entry i of the registration table
reg by calling the read registration table oracle with argument i ∈ N.
• WReg(·, ·): The adversary may write/modify the entry i of the registration table
reg by calling the write registration table oracle with argument i ∈ N.
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• GSig(·, ·): This signing oracle enables the adversary to specify the identity i of a
user and a message m, and obtain the signature of m under the private signing
key gsk[i], as long as i is an honest user whose private signing key has been
defined.
• Ch(b, ·, ·, ·): A challenge oracle is provided to an adversary against anonymity, and
depends on a challenge bit b set by the experiment. The adversary provides a
pair i0 , i1 of identities and a message m, and obtains the signature of m under the
private signing key of ib , as long as both i0 and i1 are honest users with defined
private signing keys. The oracle records the message-signature pair in GSet to
ensure that the adversary does not later call the Open oracle on it.
• Open(·, ·): The adversary can call this oracle with arguments a message m and its
signature ω to obtain the output of the opening algorithm on m and ω, computed
under the opener’s key ok, as long as ω was not previously returned in response
to a query to Ch(b, ·, ·, ·).

Correctness Condition and Security Requirements
The correctness condition and security requirements are modelled by experiments.
We briefly recall the experiments and refer the reader to [BSZ04] for further detail.
• Correctness: In this experiment the adversary is not computationally restricted
and has access to AddU(·) and RReg(·) oracles. The adversary returns a message
and the identity of an honest group member and the group member produces a
signature of the message. The correctness condition holds if the probability that
one of the following steps fails is 0: given the message and signature, GVf algorithm accepts the signature; Open algorithm returns the correct group member;
and Judge algorithm accepts the proof returned by Open algorithm.
• Anonymity: The anonymity experiment involves a PT adversary, who knows the
issuing key ik and has access to Ch(b, ·, ·, ·), Open(·, ·), SndToI(·, ·), SndToU(·, ·),
WReg(·, ·), USK(·) and CrptU(·, ·) oracles. The adversary provides the Ch(b, ·, ·, ·)
oracle identities of two honest members and a message and is returned a signature of the message generated by one of the members (according to bit b). The
anonymity condition holds if the probability that the adversary can correctly
guess the bit b is negligibly better than a random guess. Note that the adversary
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can not send the challenge signature to Open(·, ·) oracle, the opener is uncorrupt
and the issuer is corrupt.
• Traceability: The traceability experiment involves a PT adversary, who knows
the opening key ok and has access to AddU(·), RReg(·), SndToI(·, ·), USK(·) and
CrptU(·, ·) oracles. The adversary returns a message and a signature. The traceability condition holds if the probability that all of the following steps succeed
is negligible: given the message and signature, GVf algorithm accepts the signature; and Open algorithm can not return the identity of the signer, or Open
algorithm can return the identity of the signer but Judge algorithm rejects the
proof returned by Open algorithm. Note that the issuer is uncorrupt and the
opener is partially corrupted, that means he performs correctly but his secret
key is available to the adversary.
• Non-frameability: The non-frameability experiment involves a PT adversary, who
knows the opening key ok and the issuing key ik, and has access to SndToU(·, ·),
WReg(·, ·), GSig(·, ·), USK(·) and CrptU(·, ·) oracles. The adversary returns a
message, a signature, an identity of an honest group member and a proof of an
opening claim. The non-frameability condition holds if the probability that the
following steps succeed is negligible: GVf algorithm accepts the signature; and
Judge algorithm accepts the proof returned by the adversary, who claims that
the honest group member is the signer. Note that the adversary can not send the
challenge member’s identity and the challenge message to USK(·) and GSig(·, ·),
and the opener and the issuer are both corrupt.

2.10.2

Identity Escrow

As an interactive dual of group signatures, identity escrow [KP98] allows users to
prove their membership of a group without revealing their identities. Participants in
an identity escrow system are a set of group members and a group manager, who plays
two roles. The first role is to register new users by issuing membership certificates, and
the second role is to revoke anonymity of an authentication execution by ‘opening’ the
execution’s transcript to find the group member in case of a dispute. In some schemes,
the functions of the group manager can be split between two managers: an issuer and
an opener. In identity escrow with membership revocation systems, members can be
revoked from the group.

2.10. Cryptographic Privacy Enhancing Technologies

56

An identity escrow system where messages sent by the authentication verifier are
random strings, can be converted into a group signature scheme using the Fiat-Shamir
heuristic [FS86]. A group signature scheme can be turned into an identity escrow
system by a modification in the authentication protocol: the group member generates
a group signature on a random message chosen by the verifier.
A formal security model for identity escrow can be derived directly from the BSZ04
formal security model. The only difference is that the GSig and GVf algorithms are
replaced by interactive protocols between a group member and a verifier. In Chapter
4, we show a formal security model for identity escrow with membership revocation
systems that is extended from the BSZ04 model.

2.10.3

Traceable Signatures

Kiayias et. al. [KTY04] proposed the traceable signature primitive, which is a group
signature system with two added properties: (i) user tracing means that given a group
member, all his signatures can be provably traced by a designated party, called tracer,
without using the Open procedure; (ii) signature claiming means that a given signature
can be provably claimed by its signer. Compared with the traditional group signature
mechanism, traceable signatures allow a variety of privacy levels for users. For example,
tracing all signatures of a misbehaving user can be done without opening all signatures
and revealing identities of other users in the system. The only existing traceable
signature scheme (KTY04) was also proposed in [KTY04].
In [KTY04], a traceable signature scheme was defined with a set of users, a single
group manager (GM), whose role is similar to a combination of an issuer and an opener
in a group signature scheme, and a tuple of procedures (Setup, Join, Sign, Verify, Open,
Reveal, Trace, Claim, Claim-Verify), where Setup, Sign, Verify and Open are the same
as GKg, GSig, GVf and Open, respectively, in a group signature scheme. The Join
procedure is a protocol between a new user and the GM. It is the same as the (Join,
Iss) joint computation between a new user and the issuer in a group signature scheme,
except that the user also obtains a tracing secret which is computable in polynomial
time from the protocol transcript, and the protocol transcripts are stored by the GM
in a private database. In case of dispute, the tracing secret of a user can be retrieved
and used by the tracer to trace all signatures that have been generated by the user.
Other procedures are:
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• Reveal: The GM runs this PPT algorithm that takes as input the Join transcript
of a user i and outputs the tracing secret tracei of that user.
• Trace: The tracer runs this DPT algorithm that takes as input the group public
key, a message-signature pair and the tracing secret of a user, and checks if the
signature was signed by the user.
• Claim: Any user, who wants to claim a signature of a message, runs this PPT algorithm that takes the group public key, his private signing key and the messagesignature pair and outputs a proof that he produced the signature.
• Claim-Verify: A party can run this DPT algorithm that takes the group public
key, a message-signature pair and a claim proof and checks if the proof holds.
Kiayias et al. [KTY04] defined Correctness and security of a traceable signature
scheme against three types of attacks: Misidentification, Anonymity and Framing. Correctness requires four conditions: Sign-correctness, Open-correctness, Trace-correctness
and Claim-correctness. Sign-correctness means that if the Verify algorithm is given as
input a message and a valid group signature of the message, then it outputs ‘accept’.
Open-correctness means that if the Open algorithm is given as input a valid group signature generated by a user i, then it outputs i. Trace-correctness means that the Trace
algorithm outputs ‘true’ if and only if its input includes a user’s tracing secret and a
valid group signature generated by the user. Claim-correctness means that the ClaimVerify algorithm outputs ‘true’ if its input includes a message, a valid group signature
of the message and a valid claiming proof on the message-signature pair generated
by the signer. Security against misidentification attacks is similar to the Traceability
requirement in the BSZ04 model, but it also requires that the adversary not be able
to produce a valid signature that does not trace to any of the users controlled by the
adversary. Security against anonymity attacks is similar to the Anonymity requirement
in the BSZ04 model, except that there is no Open oracle for the adversary. Security against framing attacks is similar to the Non-frameability requirement in the BSZ04
model, but it requires that the adversary not be able to produce a signature that traces
to an honest user, or claim a signature that was generated by an honest user.
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ID-based Ring Signatures

Overview
In 1984, Shamir [Shamir84] introduced ID-based cryptography as a methodology to improve key management in public-key cryptosystems. In ordinary public-key primitives,
which do not use ID-based approach, the key generation algorithm often generates the
secret key sk first and the public key pk is computed from the secret key sk using a
one-way function f such that pk = f (sk). An important part of key management in
these systems is to assure the authenticity of public keys. It means that a public key
must be associated with a proof that it really belongs to its legitimate owner. The
authenticity of public keys is often provided by a certificate authority (CA). The CA
issues a certificate for each public key as a proof of its origin, and any party, who
wants to use a certified public key, must verify the validity of its certificate. Therefore, certificate-based approach often involves high costs in storage, computation and
communication when one party retrieves the public keys of other parties. ID-based
cryptography was introduced to solve this problem. In ID-based cryptosystems, users’
identities, such as names, email addresses, phone numbers, can be used as public keys.
There is a central authority, called Private Key Generator (PKG), who has a secret
master key and uses a key extraction algorithm to extract secret keys from identities.
The key extraction algorithm takes as input the master key and an identity and outputs a secret key corresponding to the identity. A user uses his identity and the secret
key extracted by the PKG as a public-key/secret-key pair.
ID-based cryptography has been studied and developed in many cryptographic systems. Shamir proposed the first ID-based signature scheme in 1984 [Shamir84], but the
first ID-based encryption scheme was only recently constructed from bilinear pairings
by Boneh and Franklin in 2001 [BF01]. A number of other ID-based cryptosystems
from bilinear pairings have been proposed since then, such as an ID-based signature
scheme [CC03], a joint ID-based signature/encryption scheme with a common set of parameters and keys [Boyen03] and ID-based encryption schemes without random oracles
[BB04b, BB04c]. Methodologies for proving security of ID-based cryptosystems have
also been developed along side with the proposed systems [BF01, Boyen03, BNN04].
As discussed in Chapter 1, ring signatures, introduced by Rivest et al. [RST01],
allow a user to form an ad-hoc group and anonymously sign messages on behalf of the
group. The user does not need any cooperation from other users or a central authority
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to form the group and no one can open a signature to find the signer. Bresson et
al. [BSS02] later improved the Rivest et al. scheme and proposed a provably secure
threshold ring signature scheme. In this scheme, at least k users, instead of a single
user, in an ad-hoc group of n users need to cooperate to generate a signature on behalf
of the group and no one can open the signature to find any of the k signers. Zhang and
Kim [ZK02] extended the concept of ring signatures to ID-based ring signature schemes,
where the group is formed by using members’ identities rather than their public keys.
(ID-based) ad-hoc anonymous identification schemes, where a user can form ad-hoc
groups and anonymously prove membership in such groups, are the interactive version
of (ID-based) ring signature schemes.
While having simple group formation set-up is an advantage, the size of ring signatures depends linearly on the group size, as the verifier needs to know at least the group
description. However, as pointed out in [DKNS04], in many scenarios, the group does
not change for a long time or has a short description. So an appropriate measurement
of ring signature sizes does not need to include the group description and it is a good
direction to find constant-size ring signatures without the group description part. A
ring signature scheme (DKNS04) with such a property has been proposed by Dodis et
al. [DKNS04]. They provide an ad-hoc anonymous identification scheme and use the
Fiat-Shamir heuristic [FS86] to convert it into the ring signature scheme.

Formal Security Model
Based on the model in [ZK02], an ID-based ring signature scheme is a tuple IR =
(RSetup, RKeyGen, RSign, RVerify) of PT algorithms.
• The PPT algorithm RSetup takes as input a security parameter 1` and returns
the public parameters params and a master key mk. The master key is only
known to the Private Key Generator (PKG).
• The DPT algorithm RKeyGen, run by the PKG as the key extraction algorithm,
takes as input params, mk and an arbitrary identity of a user and outputs a
private key for the user. The identity is used as the corresponding public key.
• The PPT algorithm RSign takes as input the public parameter params, a user
private key sid , a set of identities, which includes the identity corresponding to
sid , and a message m; and outputs a signature for m.
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• The DPT algorithm RVerify takes as input a set of identities, a message and a
ring signature; and outputs either accept or reject.
An adversary attacking an ID-based ring signature scheme can have access to the
following oracles:
• The ID extraction oracle OExID takes as input an identity and returns the private
key associated with that identity.
• The signing oracle OSign takes as input a message, a group of identities and a
signer in that group, and returns the corresponding ring signature.
• The challenge oracle OCha is only given to the adversary in the experiment of the
Anonymity requirement below, and the adversary is only allowed to query OCha
once. This oracle takes as input two pairs of identity/private key and a set of
other identities. It returns a ring signature where the signer randomly uses one
of the two private keys and the group formed by the set of identities and the two
identities from the pairs.
ID-based ring signature schemes are required to satisfy the Correctness condition
and two security requirements, Unforgeability against Chosen Message, Group and Signer
Attacks (UNF-ID-CMGSA), and Anonymity.
• Correctness requires that if RSign is given a valid private key corresponding to
an identity in the input set of identities, then its output signature is accepted by
RVerify with overwhelming probability.
• UNF-ID-CMGSA involves the following experiment. The Setup algorithm is run
and the resulting public parameters are given to the adversary. The adversary can
adaptively choose identities to query OExID and get the corresponding private
keys. For many times, the adversary can adaptively choose a message and a
group of identities, specify a signer in that group and query OSign to obtain the
corresponding ring signature. The adversary wins if he can forge a new valid
ring signature of a group such that the adversary does not know a private key of
an identity in that group. UNF-ID-CMGSA requires that the probability for an
adversary to win is negligible.
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• Anonymity intuitively requires that given a ring signature, the adversary cannot
tell the identity of the signer with probability non-negligibly better than a random
guess. It involves the following experiment. The Setup algorithm is run and the
resulting public parameters are given to the adversary. Then, as in the UNF-IDCMGSA experiment, the adversary can adaptively send queries to OExID and
OSign , even after receiving the challenge ring signature from the challenge oracle
OCha . At a point, he chooses two pairs of identity/private key and a set of other
identities to query OCha and receives a challenge ring signature. The adversary
can then continue querying OExID and OSign before outputting an identity which
is in one of the two pairs used as the query to OCha . The adversary wins if
the identity he outputs corresponds to the private key the challenge oracle used
to generate the challenge ring signature. The ID-based ring signature scheme
provides anonymity if the probability that the adversary wins is negligibly better
than a random guess. If the condition holds even assuming that the adversary has
unlimited computing resources, then the scheme is said to provide Unconditional
Anonymity.

2.10.5

k-Times Anonymous Authentication

Overview
As discussed in Chapter 1, k-times anonymous authentication (k-TAA) schemes, recently introduced by Teranisi et al. (TFS04) [TFS04], allow members of a group
to anonymously access applications for a number of times determined by application
providers. Entities taking part in a k-TAA system include a group manager (GM),
application providers (AP) and users. The GM registers users into the group and each
AP independently publishes the number of times a user is allowed to access his application. A registered user can then be anonymously authenticated by APs within their
bounded numbers of times. Anyone can trace a dishonest user while nobody, even an
authority, can trace an honest user or link two authentication executions performed by
the same honest user. The only known k-TAA scheme was also proposed in [TFS04].
k-TAA has applications in e-voting, e-cash, electronic coupons and anonymous trial
browsing of content. In trial browsing of content, each provider allows members of a
designated group to anonymously and freely browse content (e.g. movies or music on
trial) while he also wants to limit the number of times that users can access the service
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on trial. Users who try to go over the prescribed quota will be identified and removed.
It is shown that none of the known related primitives such as identity escrow, group
signature, blind signature [Chaum84], multiple-show cash [Brands93] and electronic
coupon [NHS99], can provide all the required properties listed above. For example,
an identity escrow/group signature scheme can be used to anonymously authenticate
users to APs, but it does not provide anonymity against the group manager who can
identify all users. Moreover, dishonest users can only be traced by the group manager
and it is not straightforward to limit the number of times users can use applications.

Formal Security Model
We briefly present the TFS04 formal security model [TFS04] as follows.
Entities and Procedures
Entities in the model are the group manager (GM), application providers (AP)
and users. The procedures are setup, joining, bound announcement, authentication and
public tracing. In the setup procedure (SETUP), the GM obtains a group public key
and a group secret key. The joining procedure (UJOIN −GM , UJOIN −U ) allows a user
to join the group by obtaining a member public key and a member secret key and
the GM adds the user’s identification and public key to an identification list LIST. In
the bound announcement procedure (BD-ANN), an AP announces the number of times
a group member can access his application by publishing his identity, and the upper
bound. The authentication procedure (UAU T H−AP , UAU T H−U ) between a user and an
AP succeeds if and only if the user is a group member and the number of times he has
been authenticated is less than the allowed limit. The AP records the transcripts of
authentication executions in the authentication log LOG. The public tracing procedure
TRACE can be executed by anyone using the public information and the authentication
log. Possible outputs of the procedure are a user’s identity, GM, or NO-ONE, which
mean “the user is authenticated by the AP for more than the announced limit”, “the
GM’s published information is not correct”, and “the public tracing procedure cannot
find any malicious entity”, respectively.
Oracles and List oracle model
The adversary may send queries to a number of oracles to support his attack on
the system and the oracles perform the specified tasks required by the adversary.
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List oracle model: The list oracle OLIST [TFS04] is used to ensure correct correspondence between the identity of a group member and his public key. The list oracle
model assumes that there exists an OLIST oracle which manages the identification list
LIST that contains identities and the corresponding public keys. The oracle’s response
to a query containing a group member’s identity is the member’s public key. The oracle
allows an entity to choose and write a user’s pair of identity and public key to LIST
only if the entity is the user or a colluder with the user. The oracle allows an entity to
delete data from LIST only if the entity is the GM or a colluder with the GM.
Other oracles: Beside the list oracle OLIST , the TFS04 model has the join GM oracle
OJOIN −GM , the join user oracle OJOIN −U , the authentication AP oracle OAU T H−AP ,
the authentication user oracle OAU T H−U and the query oracle OQU ERY . The OJOIN −GM
oracle, given a user specified by the adversary, performs the UJOIN −GM algorithm in a
joining procedure between the honest GM and the user. The OJOIN −U oracle, given
an honest user specified by the adversary, performs the UJOIN −U algorithm in a joining
procedure between the GM and the honest user. The OAU T H−AP oracle, given an
honest AP and a user from the adversary, makes the AP to perform an authentication
procedure with the user. The OAU T H−U oracle, given an honest user and an AP, makes
the user to perform an authentication procedure with the AP. The OQU ERY oracle gives
the adversary a challenged authentication transcript in the definition of the security
requirement Anonymity, which is provided later. The OQU ERY oracle takes as input an
AP identity, the AP’s bound number and two user identities, randomly chooses one
of the two user identities, executes the authentication procedure between the chosen
identity and the AP, and outputs the authentication transcript.
There is a SCHEDULER algorithm that manages concurrent executions of different
algorithms in different procedures by the adversary. SCHEDULER takes as input a
tuple (ALGO, I, S, (sid, i, M )), where ALGO is the scheduled algorithm, such as the
user joining algorithm UJOIN −U or the GM joining algorithm UJOIN −GM ; I is some
input to ALGO; S is the set of session tuples; and (sid, i, M ) means “the adversary
impersonates an entity i and sends data M to ALGO with the session identity sid”. A
session tuple (sid0 , i0 , St0 ) consists of a session identity sid0 , an entity identity i0 and
a state St0 . Given an input (ALGO, I, S, (sid, i, M )), SCHEDULER searches S for a
session tuple with identity sid. If it is not found, SCHEDULER adds tuple (sid, i, i) to
S and returns (⊥, ⊥). Otherwise, ALGO is executed with input (I, M, St), where St is
the state of ALGO obtained from S. SCHEDULER then updates the session tuple in S
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with the new state St0 of ALGO and returns (m, St0 ), where m is the output of ALGO.
SCHEDULER (ALGO, I, S, (sid, i, M ))
If (∃ St such that (sid, i, St) ∈ S)
(m, St0 ) ← ALGO(I, M, St).
S ← (S \ {(sid, i, St)}) ∪ {(sid, i, St0 )}.
Return (m, St0 ).
Else
S ← S ∪ {(sid, i, i)}.
Return (⊥, ⊥).
Correctness condition and Security Requirements
Security requirements of k-TAA are Anonymity, Detectability, Exculpability for users
and Exculpability for the GM.
• Correctness requires that an honest user who has been registered in a group by
the GM and has performed the authentication procedure with an AP for less
than the allowed number of times, is successfully authenticated by the AP.
• Anonymity intuitively means that given two honest group members i1 and i2 , who
have not performed authentication with an AP for more than the limited number
of times, it is computationally difficult to distinguish between authentication
executions, which are performed by the AP and one of the two members. In
the formal experiment, the adversary A is allowed to collude with the GM, all
APs, and all users except target users i1 and i2 , and to query oracles OLIST ,
OJOIN −U , OAU T H−U , OQU ERY . For e = 0, 1, the adversary is allowed to make
a query OQU ERY (b, gpk, (i1 , i2 ), (ID, k), (e, ·)) once only. On receiving such a
query, OQU ERY asks OAU T H−U to execute UAU T H−U using the public-key/secretkey pair of the user i1+b⊕e . The adversary must have authenticated user i1 or
i2 using (ID, k) for less than k times. If the adversary can guess b correctly, he
wins. The formula of the experiment is as follows. H is assumed to be a random
oracle.
anon−((i1 ,i2 ),(ID,k),b)

Experiment ExpA,H

(κ)

(gpk, St) ← A(1κ )
b0 ← AORACLES (St) where ORACLES = {OLIST ({i1 , i2 }c , ·), OJOIN −U (gpk, ·),
OAU T H−U (gpk, ·), OQU ERY (b, gpk, (i1 , i2 ), (ID, k), (·, ·))}
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If (OQU ERY has output OVER) Return ⊥.
Return b0 .
A k-TAA scheme provides Anonymity if the following function
anon−((i1 ,i2 ),(ID,k))

AdvA

(κ) is negligible.

anon−((i1 ,i2 ),(ID,k))

AdvA

anon−((i1 ,i2 ),(ID,k),0)

(κ) = |Pr[ExpA,H

anon−((i1 ,i2 ),(ID,k),1)

Pr[ExpA,H

(κ) = 1] −

(κ) = 1]|

• Detectability means that if a group of corrupted members have performed the
authentication procedure with the same honest AP for more than the allowed
number of times, then the public tracing procedure using the AP’s authentication
log outputs NO-ONE with negligible probability. The adversary A is allowed to
corrupt all group members and to query the three oracles OLIST , OJOIN −GM
and OAU T H−AP . The adversary wins if he can be successfully authenticated by
an honest AP with identity ID and access bound k for more than k × |LIST |,
where |LIST | is the number of group members. The set SAU T H−AP contains
all APs’ information used by OAU T H−AP , and LOGID,k is the authentication log
produced by OAU T H−AP using information of the AP (ID, k). The formula of the
experiment is as follows. H is assumed to be a random oracle.
Experiment Expdecis
A,H (κ)
(gpk, gsk) ← SET U P (1κ ).
AORACLES (1κ ) where ORACLES = {OLIST ({GM }c , ·), OJOIN −GM (gpk, gsk, ·),
OAU T H−AP (gpk, ·, ·)}.
If (∃(ID, k) ∈ SAU T H−AP s.t. |LOGID,k | > k × |LIST |)
Return T RACE OLIST (∅,·) (gpk, LOGID,k ).
Return ⊥.
decis
A k-TAA scheme provides Detectability if the following function AdvA
(κ) is

negligible.
decis
(κ) = Pr[Expdecis
AdvA
A,H (κ) = NO-ONE]

• Exculpability for users intuitively means that the tracing procedure does not output
the identity of an honest user even if other users, the GM and all APs collude.
In the formal experiment, the adversary, who wants to frame an honest user i1 ,
is allowed to corrupt all entities except the user i1 . If the adversary succeeds
in computing an authentication log, with which the public tracing procedure
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outputs i1 with non-negligible probability, the adversary wins. The adversary
must authenticate user i1 using OAU T H−U within the allowable number of times
set by each AP. The formula of the experiment is as follows. H is assumed to be
a random oracle.
1
Experiment Expexcul−i
(κ)
A,H

(gpk, St) ← A(1κ )
LOG ← AORACLES (St) where ORACLES = {OLIST ({i1 }c , ·),
OJOIN −U (gpk, ·), OAU T H−U (gpk, ·)}
Return T RACE OLIST (∅,·) (gpk, LOG).
A k-TAA scheme provides Exculpability for users if the following function
excul−i1
AdvA
(κ) is negligible.
excul−i1
excul−i1
AdvA
(κ) = Pr[ExpA,H
(κ) = i1 ]

• Exculpability for the GM means that the tracing procedure does not output the
honest GM even if all users and all APs collude. In the formal experiment, the
adversary wants to frame the honest GM and he is allowed to corrupt all users
and all APs. The adversary wins if he succeeds in computing an authentication
log with which the public tracing procedure outputs GM with non-negligible
probability. The formula of the experiment is as follows. H is assumed to be a
random oracle.
Experiment Expexcul−GM
(κ)
A,H
(gpk, gsk) ← SET U P (1κ )
LOG ← AORACLES (1κ ) where ORACLES = {OLIST ({GM }c , ·),
OJOIN −GM (gpk, gsk, ·)}
Return T RACE OLIST (∅,·) (gpk, LOG).
A k-TAA scheme provides Exculpability for the GM if the following function
excul−GM
AdvA
(κ) is negligible.
excul−GM
excul−GM
(κ) = Pr[ExpA,H
AdvA
(κ) = GM]
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Robust Mix-nets and Verifiable Shuffles

Descriptions
Mix-nets, introduced by Chaum [Chaum81], are one of the most popular cryptographic
systems for providing communication unlinkability and anonymity. Participants in a
mix-net system are users and servers that are all assumed to be PPT Turing machines.
Communication between participants is assumed to be done via a bulletin board which
is a shared memory where all participants have read access to and can append messages after being authenticated. A bulletin board simulates an authenticated broadcast
channel. The adversary, whose objective is to compromise security of the mix-net, is
modelled by a PPT oracle machine. An adversary can corrupt a number of users
and mix servers but the corruption is done before the system starts operation (static
adversary).
The operation of a mix-net system with users U1 ,...,Un and servers S1 ,...,St can be
described as follows. First, a key generation procedure generates a mix-net public key
pk mix and a set of secret keys {sk1 , ..., skt }. The mix-net public key is known to all
participants and each secret key skj is given to the server Sj . After that, several mix
sessions can be executed. In each mix session, each user Ui takes as input a message
mi and the mix-net public key and outputs an encryption ci of the message. The list
of ciphertexts c1 , ..., cn are sent to the first server S1 . Each server, starting from S1 ,
takes as input its secret key and a list of ciphertexts, permutes the list, does some
computation to the input ciphertexts and then outputs a list of other ciphertexts,
which could be used as input to the next server. The last server St finally outputs a
permuted list of the corresponding plaintexts m1 , ..., mn . By keeping the permutation
secret, the mix-net can hide the correspondence between input items and output items
hence providing privacy for the originators and receivers of messages.
Informally, a robust mix-net must satisfy the following properties:
• privacy: it is infeasible for the adversary to output a pair of an input item and
the corresponding output item of an honest user with probability non-negligibly
greater than random guess.
• robustness: the probability that the mix-net produces correct output is negligibly
less than 1.
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It is also desirable for a robust mix-net to achieve,
• public verifiability: that means the correctness of the mix-net’s operation can be
verified by any participant in the system.
Each server in a mix-net system can be implemented as a shuffle, which receives
a list of ciphertexts and outputs a permutation of the re-encrypted ciphertexts. If
being verifiable, it then runs a proof system to prove that the output ciphertexts are a
permutation of correct re-encryptions of input ciphertexts. A verifiable shuffle should
satisfy the following security requirements:
• privacy: the shuffle’s execution does not reveal any information about the permutation.
• verifiability: the proof system can prove the correctness of the shuffle’s execution.
Chapter 6 provides a formal security model for verifiable shuffles.

Previous Works on Robust Mix-nets and Verifiable Shuffles
A number of efficient constructions for verifiable shuffles have been proposed [OKST97,
Abe98, Abe99, JJ99, AH01]. In Crypto’01, Furukawa and Sako [FS01] gave a characterization of permutation matrices in terms of two equations that can be efficiently proved,
hence proposing an efficient (3 round proof system) verifiable shuffle scheme (FS01).
The zero-knowledge property of this scheme has not been proved yet, as Furukawa et
al. [FMMOS02] noted a flaw in their original proof. They however gave a definition
of privacy for shuffles and showed that the FS01 scheme satisfied the definition. The
definition requires that the verifier cannot learn anything about the ‘relation’ between
the output of the shuffle and its input, using the transcript of the proof system. Neff
[Neff01] proposed an efficient verifiable shuffle and later gave a revised version (Neff03)
[Neff03]. The construction uses a generalisation of Chaum-Pedersen proof of knowledge
of equality of discrete logarithms and the fact that polynomials of degree n have at
most n roots. The shuffle provides unconditional soundness that means the soundness
of the proof system is guaranteed without any assumption on the computational power
of the adversary. In all of these schemes, the underlying encryption system is El Gamal
and security of the system relies on the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. Building on Neff’s approach but leaving out the unconditional soundness, Groth [Groth03]

2.10. Cryptographic Privacy Enhancing Technologies

69

proposed a very efficient proof system that uses homomorphic commitment and has
zero-knowledge property. The input ciphertexts in this scheme can be encrypted by
any homomorphic cryptosystem. Groth’s scheme has the lowest computation cost but
its interactive proof system requires 7 rounds. A recent direction in designing mix-nets
has been to trade off privacy or correctness for efficiency [BG02, GZBJJ02, JJR02].
With regard to formal security modelling, Furukawa et al. [FMMOS02] gave a
definition of privacy for security evaluation of their shuffle scheme but this definition is
for passive adversary and does not model the corruption of input messages by senders or
a-priori partial information about the permutation. Wikström [Wikström02] proposed
a notion of privacy for non-verifiable shuffles with an adversary who has access to an
input and output of the shuffle. None of the above formally defines verifiability of
shuffles. In [AI03], a formalisation of mix-nets and their security properties, including
anonymity and robustness, was proposed, but no application of this model to proving
security of mix-nets has been found.
As our verifiable shuffle schemes are based on the FS01 scheme, we provide a brief
description of this scheme in the following.

FS01 Shuffle
Furukawa and Sako [FS01] proposed an efficient verifiable shuffle scheme (FS01) based
on the El Gamal public-key system (presented in subsection 2.8.3). Consider an instance of the El Gamal public-key system, where the key generation algorithm generates
a group G of order prime q, a generator g of G, the private key x ← Zq and the public
key (y = g x , g). Input to a shuffle is a list of El Gamal ciphertexts {(gi , mi )|i = 1, ..., n}
encrypted by the public key (y, g), and so gi , mi ∈ G, i = 1, ..., n. The shuffle uses
a permutation φ and re-encryption exponents {ri |i = 1, ..., n} to compute its output
{(gi0 , m0i )|i = 1, ..., n} as follows:
gi0 = g ri gφ−1 (i)
m0i = y ri mφ−1 (i)
In the FS01 scheme, a permutation is represented as a permutation matrix, which
is defined in definition 2.10.1.
Definition 2.10.1 A matrix (Aij )n×n is a permutation matrix modulo ` if it satisfies
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the following for some permutation π
(
1 mod l if π(i) = j
Aij =
0 mod l otherwise
Representing the permutation φ used in the shuffle as a permutation matrix, the
shuffle’s proof system, which proves the correctness of the shuffle, must show the knowledge of a permutation matrix modulo q (Aij )n×n and {ri |i = 1, ..., n} satisfying the
following relationship between input and output items:
gi0

= g

ri

m0i = y ri

n
Y
j=1
n
Y

A

gj ji , i = 1, ..., n
A

mj ji , i = 1, ..., n

(2.1)
(2.2)

j=1

Theorem 2.10.1 states two conditions to achieve a permutation matrix. Then the
proof system needs to prove the knowledge of a matrix (Aij )n×n and {ri |i = 1, ..., n}
satisfying equations (2.1) and (2.2) and two conditions on the matrix, as stated in
theorem 2.10.1.
Theorem 2.10.1 A matrix (Aij )n×n is a permutation matrix modulo q, where q is a
prime, if and only if for all i, j and k, both
(
n
X
1
Ali Alj =
0
l=1
(
n
X
1
Ali Alj Alk =
0
l=1

mod q if i = j
mod q otherwise
mod q if i = j = k
mod q otherwise

(2.3)
(2.4)

hold.
Based on Theorem 2.10.1, the proof system needs to prove the following statements:
• Given {gi } and {gi0 }, {gi0 } can be expressed as equation (2.1) using {ri } and a
matrix that satisfies equation (2.3).
• Given {gi } and {gi0 }, {gi0 } can be expressed as equation (2.1) using {ri } and a
matrix that satisfies equation (2.4).
• The matrix and {ri } in the above two statements are the same.
• For each pair (gi0 , m0i ), the same ri and {Aij } has been used.

Chapter 3
New Schemes for Group Signatures,
Traceable Signatures and Identity Escrow

3.1

Introduction

Group signature schemes are cryptographic systems that provide revocable anonymity
for signers. We first propose a group signature scheme with constant-size public key and
signature that is provably secure in the BSZ04 formal model [BSZ04], using the random
oracle, Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman and Strong Diffie-Hellman assumptions. We
then give a more efficient variant scheme and prove its security in a formal model,
which is a modification of the BSZ04 model and has a weaker anonymity requirement.
Both schemes allow separation of the issuer and the opener, hence distribution of trust.
The schemes are efficient and their signature sizes are much smaller than the signature
size of the well-known ACJT00 scheme [ACJT00]. We will show that the schemes can
be used to construct a traceable signature scheme and identity escrow systems. They
can also be extended to provide membership revocation, as shown in Chapter 4.
The main difference between our two schemes is that in the first scheme, the opener
uses an encryption scheme that is indistinguishable against adaptive chosen ciphertext
attacks, whereas in the variant scheme, the encryption scheme is indistinguishable
against chosen plaintext attacks. The difference between the anonymity requirement
and the weak anonymity requirement is similar to the difference in modelling chosen
ciphertext attacks and chosen plaintext attacks in encryption schemes. That is in
the experiments of the anonymity and weak-anonymity requirements, the identity is
encrypted and access to the open oracle is similar to access to the decryption oracle.
As the open oracle is not used in the informal list of security requirements, using the
same arguments as in [BMW03, BSZ04], we can conclude that the weak anonymity,
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traceability and non-frameability properties are sufficient to capture the conventional
list of security requirements for group signature schemes. We state that the ACJT00
scheme [ACJT00] provides weak anonymity under the Strong RSA and Decisional
Diffie-Hellman assumptions in the random oracle model. We note that the relationship
between ACJT00 and KY04 [KY04] is similar to the relationship between our two
schemes.
In the following, we outline attractive features of our group signature schemes in
comparison with previous schemes and point out the relationship between them. Our
traceable signature and identity escrow schemes also have similar advantages. They
have constant-size group public key and signature, and are trapdoor-free. So system
parameters can be shared by multiple groups belonging to different organizations. All
previous efficient constant-size group signature schemes, except the BBS04 and CL04
schemes, are based on the Strong RSA assumption which allows many user keys to
be issued using the same composite modulus and involves a trapdoor. Our proposed
group signature schemes are based on the Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption and are
without a trapdoor.
Using elliptic curve cryptography in our schemes results in shorter lengths for signatures and keys. For example, for a comparable level of security as the ACJT00
scheme with 1024 bit composite modulus, our schemes require elliptic curve groups of
order 170 bit prime, resulting in the sizes of signatures to be one third and one half,
respectively, of the size of the ACJT00 scheme. For higher security levels, this ratio
will be smaller.
Finally in our schemes, the interactive protocol underlying the signature scheme
achieves perfect zero-knowledge, whereas in the ACJT00 and KY04 schemes, the corresponding protocols achieve statistical zero-knowledge. We note that all these zeroknowledge proofs including ours, are in the honest verifier model. Also, our schemes
achieve higher level of unconditional security. That is, given a signature of our schemes,
an adversary with unlimited power but without access to the registration table of group
members can compute only one part of the signer’s private signing key. However in the
ACJT00 and KY04 schemes, the same unlimited adversary can construct the whole
private signing key of the signer.
Part of this chapter appeared in the Proceedings of Asiacrypt 2004 [NS04b].
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A Group Signature scheme
Overview

Our group signature scheme is built upon two digital signature schemes. The first one
is used in the (Join, Iss) protocol for the issuer to generate a signature (ai , Si ) for each
xi , which is randomly generated by both a member and the issuer, but known only
to the member. The second digital signature scheme is used in the GSig algorithm
as the non-interactive version of a zero-knowledge protocol, that proves the signer’s
knowledge of (ai , Si ) and xi . The security of the two signature schemes underlies the
security of the group signature scheme.
Our group signature scheme is constructed in cyclic groups with bilinear mapping. The pairing operation plays an important role in the verification algorithm
GVf. Intuitively, bilinear pairing allows a party, given A, B, C, D ∈ G, to prove that
logA B = logC D without knowing logA B or logA C. This is not possible in cyclic groups
without bilinear pairing and where the DDH assumption holds.

3.2.2

Descriptions

Our group signature scheme uses a trusted party in the initial set-up, two group managers (the issuer and the opener), and users, each with a unique identity i ∈ Z+ , that
may become group members. The scheme is a tuple GS1 =(GKg, UKg, Join, Iss, GSig,
GVf, Open, Judge) of polynomial-time algorithms which are defined as follows.
GKg: Suppose ` is a security parameter and the Bilinear Pairing Instance Generator
BPG generates a tuple of bilinear pairing parameters t = (p, G, GT , e, P ) ← BPG(1` ),
that is also the publicly shared parameters. Choose a hash function HZp : {0, 1}∗ → Zp ,
which is assumed to be a random oracle in the security proofs.
0

Choose P0 , G, H ← G, x, x0a , x0b ← Z∗p and compute Ppub = xP , Θa = e(G, G)xa and
0

Θb = e(G, G)xb . The group public key is gpk = (P, P0 , Ppub , H, G, Θa , Θb ), the issuing
key is ik = x, and the opening key is ok = (x0a , x0b ).
UKg: This algorithm generates keys that provide authenticity for messages sent by
the user in the (Join, Iss) protocol. This algorithm is the key generation algorithm KS
of any digital signature scheme (KS , Sign, V er) that is unforgeable against chosen
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message attacks (UNF-CMA). A user i runs the UKg algorithm that takes as input
a security parameter 1` and outputs a personal public and private signature key pair
(upk[i], usk[i]). Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) can be used here. Although any
UNF-CMA signature scheme can be used, but using schemes, whose security is based
on the DBDH or SDH assumptions, will reduce the underlying assumptions of the
group signature scheme. One example of such schemes is in [BB04a].
Join, Iss: In this protocol, a user i and the issuer first jointly generate a random value
xi ∈ Z∗p whose value is only known by the user. The issuer then generates (ai , Si ) for
the user such that e(ai P + Ppub , Si ) = e(P, xi P + P0 ). The user uses usk[i] to sign his
messages in the protocol. Note that the formal model assumes the communication to
be private and authenticated. We also assume that the communication is protected
from replay attacks. The protocol is as follows.
1. user i −→ issuer: I = yP + rH, where y, r ← Z∗p .
2. user i ←− issuer: u, v ← Z∗p .
3. The user computes xi = uy + v, Pi = xi P .
4. user i −→ issuer: Pi and a proof of knowledge of (xi , r0 ) such that Pi = xi P and
vP + uI − Pi = r0 H.
5. The issuer verifies the proof, then uniformly chooses ai in Z∗p and different from
all corresponding elements previously issued, and computes Si =

1
(Pi
ai +x

+ P0 ).

6. user i ←− issuer: ai , Si .
7. The user computes ∆i = e(P, Si ), verifies if e(ai P + Ppub , Si ) = e(P, xi P + P0 ),
and stores the private signing key gsk[i] = (xi , ai , Si , ∆i ). Note that only the
user knows xi . The issuer also computes ∆i and makes an entry in the table reg:
reg[i] = (i, ∆i , hJoin, Issi transcript).
GSig: A group signature of a user i shows his knowledge of (ai , Si ) and a secret xi
such that: e(ai P + Ppub , Si ) = e(P, xi P + P0 ). The signature does not reveal any
information about his knowledge to anyone, except for the opener, who can compute
∆i by decrypting an encryption of that value. The algorithm for a user i to sign a
message m ∈ {0, 1}∗ is as follows.
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1. Encrypt ∆i by El GamalBP 2 with public key (G, Θa , Θb ) as σ = (Ea = tG, Λa =
∆i Θta , Eb , Λb , ξ).
2. Perform the non-interactive version of a protocol, which we call the Signing protocol, as follows.
(a) Generate r, r0 , k0 , ..., k6 ← Zp and compute:
V = Si + rH; R = rG + r0 H; T1 = k1 G + k2 H;
T2 = k3 G + k4 H − k5 R; T3 = k6 G;
Π1 = e(P, P )k0 e(P, V )−k5 e(P, H)k3 e(Ppub , H)k1 ; Π2 = e(P, H)−k1 Θka6
(b) Compute c = HZp (gpk, σ, V, R, T1 , T2 , T3 , Π1 , Π2 , m)
(c) Compute in Zp : s0 = k0 + cxi ; s1 = k1 + cr; s2 = k2 + cr0 ; s3 = k3 + crai ;
s4 = k4 + cr0 ai ; s5 = k5 + cai ; s6 = k6 + ct
3. Output the signature (c, s0 , ..., s6 , V, R, Ea , Λa , Eb , Λb , ξ) for message m.
GVf : The verification algorithm for m and (c, s0 , ..., s6 , V, R, Ea , Λa , Eb , Λb , ξ) outputs
accept if and only if verifying the proof ξ outputs accept and the following equation
holds.
c = HZp (gpk, σ, V, R,
s1 G + s2 H − cR, s3 G + s4 H − s5 R, s6 G − cEa ,
e(P, P )s0 e(P, V )−s5 e(P, H)s3 e(Ppub , H)s1 e(P, P0 )c e(Ppub , V )−c ,
c
e(P, H)−s1 Θsa6 Λ−c
a e(P, V ) , m)

Open: To open m and its valid signature (c, s0 , ..., s6 , V, R, Ea , Λa , Eb , Λb , ξ) to find the
signer, the opener performs the following steps.
1. Use the GVf algorithm to check the signature’s validity. If the algorithm rejects,
return (0, ε), where ε denotes an empty string.
0

2. Compute ∆i = Λa e(Ea , G)−xa and find the corresponding entry i in the table
reg. If no entry is found, return (0, ε).
3. Return reg[i] and a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof % of knowledge of x0a
0

0

such that Θa = e(G, G)xa and Λa /∆i = e(Ea , G)xa .
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Judge: On an output by the Open algorithm for a message m and its signature ω, the
Judge algorithm is performed as follows:
1. If Open algorithm outputs (0, ε), run GVf algorithm on m, ω. If GVf rejects,
return accept; otherwise, return reject.
2. If Open algorithm outputs (reg[i], %), return reject if one of the following happens:
(i) on m, ω, GVf algorithm rejects; (ii) verification of the proof % rejects; (iii) the
hJoin, Issi transcript is invalid with regard to upk[i]; (iv) ∆i 6= e(P, Si ) where Si
is extracted from the hJoin, Issi transcript. Otherwise, return accept.
Remarks:
• Our scheme is trapdoor-free. This improves efficiency and manageability, and
various groups can share the same initial set-up p, G, GT , e, P, P0 , G, H.
• Threshold Open is also possible by using a Threshold Encryption scheme similar
to the scheme in [FP01].

3.2.3

Correctness and Security

Correctness and Security of the group signature scheme GS1 is stated in Theorems
3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3 and 3.2.4. Proofs of Theorems 3.2.2, 3.2.3 and 3.2.4 are provided in
Section 3.4. Theorem 3.2.1 can be proved by checking equations as follows.
Theorem 3.2.1 The group signature scheme GS1 provides Correctness.

Proof:

Consider a group signature system where group public key is gpk = (P, P0 ,

Ppub , H, G, Θa , Θb ), the issuing key is ik = x, and the opening key is ok = (x0a , x0b ).
Suppose an honest group member i, with a personal public and private signature
key pair (upk[i], usk[i]) and a private signing key gsk[i] = (xi , ai , Si , ∆i ), correctly
performs the GSig algorithm to produce a signature (c, s0 , ..., s6 , V, R, Ea , Λa , Eb , Λb , ξ)
for message m. We show that GVf, Open and Judge will perform as required by the
Correctness condition.
We first prove that GVf outputs accept on input (m, (c, s0 , ..., s6 , V, R, Ea , Λa , Eb , Λb ,
ξ)), as the conditions are shown to hold as follows.
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• c = HZp (gpk, σ, V, R, s1 G + s2 H − cR,
s3 G + s4 H − s5 R, s6 G − cEa , e(P, P )s0 e(P, V )−s5 e(P, H)s3 e(Ppub , H)s1 e(P, P0 )c
c
e(Ppub , V )−c , e(P, H)−s1 Θsa6 Λ−c
a e(P, V ) , m), as s1 G+s2 H −cR = T1 , s3 G+s4 H −

s5 R = T2 , s6 G − cEa = T3 , e(P, P )s0 e(P, V )−s5 e(P, H)s3 e(Ppub , H)s1 e(P, P0 )c
c
e(Ppub , V )−c = Π1 and e(P, H)−s1 Θsa6 Λ−c
a e(P, V ) = Π2 .

• ξ is valid, as it is in a correct El GamalBP 2 encryption of ∆i .
The Open algorithm, when opening (m, (c, s0 , ..., s6 , V, R, Ea , Λa , Eb , Λb , ξ)), com0

putes ∆i = Λa e(Ea , G)−xa and finds the corresponding entry i in the table reg. Therefore, it returns the identity of the user i together with ∆i , hJoin, Issi transcript for i
0

0

and a proof % of knowledge of x0a such that Θa = e(G, G)xa and Λa /∆i = e(Ea , G)xa .
Suppose the Judge algorithm takes as input gpk, i, upk[i], m, (c, s0 , ..., s6 , V, R, Ea ,
Λa , Eb , Λb , ξ), ∆i , hJoin, Issi transcript for i and the proof %. It will outputs accept,
as the following holds: (i) on m, (c, s0 , ..., s6 , V, R, Ea , Λa , Eb , Λb , ξ), GVf algorithm
accepts; (ii) the proof % is valid; (iii) the hJoin, Issi transcript is valid with regard to
upk[i]; (iv) ∆i = e(P, Si ) where Si is extracted from the hJoin, Issi transcript.
In short, GVf, Open and Judge perform as required by the Correctness condition.
Hence, GS1 provides correctness.

2

Theorem 3.2.2 The group signature scheme GS1 provides Anonymity in the random
oracle model if the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption holds.
Theorem 3.2.3 The group signature scheme GS1 provides Traceability in the random
oracle model if the q-Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption holds, where q is the upper
bound of the group size.
Theorem 3.2.4 The group signature scheme GS1 provides Non-frameability in the
random oracle model if the Discrete Logarithm assumption holds over the group G and
the digital signature scheme (KS , Sign, V er) is UNF-CMA.

3.3

Variations

In this section, we propose Weak Anonymity requirement as an alternative for the
Anonymity requirement. We then present a second group signature scheme, GS2, and
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prove that it provides Weak Anonymity, Traceability and Non-Frameability. We expect
the ACJT00 scheme to provide the same properties. We also discuss the possibility
that the ACJT00 and GS2 schemes provide Anonymity.

3.3.1

Weak Anonymity requirement

This security requirement is introduced to account for a class of group signature
schemes, including the ACJT00 scheme, which can not be proved to achieve Anonymity
requirement.
Weak Anonymity requirement is defined exactly the same as Anonymity requirement, except that the adversary does not have access to the Open(·, ·) oracle. In
practice, when the opener is assumed to be uncorrupted as in Anonymity requirement, it could be hard for the adversary to have access to the Open oracle. As Open
oracle is not used in the conventional list of requirements, the same argument as in
[BMW03, BSZ04] shows that Weak anonymity, Traceability and Non-frameability are
sufficient to imply the conventional list of requirements. For a group signature scheme
GS, an adversary A, a bit b ∈ {0, 1} and a security parameter ` ∈ N, the experiment
for Weak Anonymity is as follows.
Experiment Expweak.anon-b
(`) // b ∈ {0, 1}
GS,A
(gpk, ik, ok) ← GKg(1` ); CU ← ∅; HU ← ∅; GSet ← ∅
d ← A(gpk, ik : Ch(b, ·, ·, ·), SndToI(·, ·), SndToU(·, ·), WReg(·, ·), USK(·), CrptU(·, ·))
Return d
The group signature scheme GS provides Weak Anonymity if the following function
Adv weak.anon (`) is negligible.
GS,A

weak.anon (`) = |Pr[Expweak.anon-1 (`) = 1] − Pr[Expweak.anon-0 (`) = 1]|
AdvGS,A
GS,A
GS,A

3.3.2

A Variant Group Signature scheme

The scheme GS2 is the same as GS1, except that in the signature, ∆i is encrypted by
the El GamalBP 1 encryption scheme instead of El GamalBP 2 . So in the GKg algorithm,
x0b and Θb are not generated and in the GSig algorithm, ∆i is encrypted by El GamalBP 1
public key (G, Θa ) as (Ea = tG, Λa = ∆i Θta ). So there is no Eb , Λb or ξ in the signature
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and in the executions of GSig, GVf, Open and Judge algorithms. Security of GS2 is
stated in Theorem 3.3.1, whose proof is shown in Section 3.4.
Theorem 3.3.1 GS2 provides Correctness. GS2 provides Weak Anonymity if the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption holds. GS2 provides Traceability in the
random oracle model if the q-Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption holds, where q is the
upper bound of the group size. GS2 provides Non-frameability in the random oracle
model if the Discrete Logarithm assumption holds over the group G and the digital
signature scheme (KS , Sign, V er) is UNF-CMA.

3.3.3

Do ACJT00 and GS2 provide Anonymity?

The ACJT00 scheme refers to the scheme proposed in [ACJT00], plus some simple
extensions to accommodate the Judge algorithm (defining the UKg algorithm as in our
scheme, using usk[i] to sign messages in the Join, Iss protocol, and verifying signatures
in the Open and Judge algorithms).
It is an open question if the ACJT00 and GS2 schemes provide Anonymity, in line
with the open problem whether a combination of an El Gamal encryption (IND-CPA)
and a proof of knowledge of the plaintext can provide IND-CCA2. This combination
has been proved to provide IND-CCA2 in the random oracle model, but the proof
has required either another very strong assumption [TY98] or is in the generic model
[SJ00]. In ACJT00 and GS2 signatures, the identity-bound information is encrypted
by variations of El Gamal encryption and the other part of the signatures proves
knowledge of the identity-bound information. The Open oracle plays a similar role as
the Decryption oracle in the model of IND-CCA2.

3.3.4

Variants based on the DDH assumption

We can build variants of GS1 and GS2, whose security is based on the DDH assumption
over the group GT instead of the DBDH (DDHV) assumption. Specifically, ∆i will be
encrypted by the normal El Gamal encryption scheme or the twin-paradigm extension
of El Gamal encryption scheme (proposed in [FP01]). The Open algorithm in these
variant schemes requires one less pairing operation than in GS1 and GS2.
We can actually provide a group signature scheme with 4 options, where the users,
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the issuer and the opener use the same keys for all options. The first two options are
GS1 and GS2, offering smaller signature size and more efficient signing and verification.
The last two options are the variant schemes based on the normal DDH assumption,
with more efficient opening.

3.4

Security Proofs

Before proving security of GS1 and GS2, we first prove the Zero-knowledge property
of the Signing protocol in GSig algorithm and the Coalition-Resistance property of
GS1 and GS2. Coalition-Resistance intuitively means that a colluding group of signers, with the knowledge of the opening key and access to some oracles, should not be
able to generate a new valid user private signing key. We then use these results to
prove that GS1 and GS2 provide Traceability (Theorem 3.2.3 and Theorem 3.3.1) and
Non-frameability (Theorem 3.2.4 and Theorem 3.3.1), GS1 provides Anonymity (Theorem 3.2.2) and GS2 provides Weak Anonymity (Theorem 3.3.1), under corresponding
assumptions.

3.4.1

The Signing protocol is zero-knowledge

Lemma 3.4.1 Under the Discrete Log assumption on G, the interactive Signing protocol underlying the GSig algorithm is an (honest-verifier) perfect zero-knowledge proof
of knowledge of (ai , Si ), xi and t such that e(ai P + Ppub , Si ) = e(P, xi P + P0 ), Ea = tG
and Λa = e(P, Si )Θta .
Proof: Consider a GS1 instance where the group public key is gpk = (P, P0 , Ppub , H,
G, Θa , Θb ), the issuing key is ik = x, and the opening key is ok = (x0a , x0b ). We
prove that the Signing protocol provides completeness, soundness and zero-knowledge
property as follows.
Completeness: Consider an honest group member i with a private signing key gsk[i] =
(xi , ai , Si , ∆i ) such that e(ai P +Ppub , Si ) = e(P, xi P +P0 ). Suppose i generates t ← Z∗p ,
computes Ea = tG, Λa = ∆i Θta and correctly performs the Signing protocol to a verifier.
Then the verifier outputs accept, as the following equations hold.
• T1 = k1 G + k2 H = s1 G + s2 H − cR.
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• T2 = k3 G + k4 H − k5 R = s3 G + s4 H − s5 R.
• T3 = k6 G = s6 G − cEa .
• Π1 = e(P, P )k0 e(P, V )−k5 e(P, H)k3 e(Ppub , H)k1 = e(P, P )s0 e(P, V )−s5 e(P, H)s3
e(Ppub , H)s1 e(P, P0 )c e(Ppub , V )−c .
• Π2 = e(P, H)−k1 Θka6 = e(P, H)−s1 Θsa6 Λa−c e(P, V )c .
Soundness: If the protocol accepts with non-negligible probability, we show that under
the Discrete Log assumption on G, a PPT prover must have the knowledge of (ai , Si ),
xi and t satisfying the relations stated in the lemma. Suppose the protocol accepts
two different pairs of challenges and responses (c, s0 , ...s6 ) and (c0 , s00 , ..., s06 ) for the
same commitment (V, R, T1 , T2 , T3 , Π1 , Π2 ). Let fi =

si −s0i
,
c−c0

i = 0, ..., 6, as the protocol

accepts, we have:
• s1 G + s2 H − cR = s01 G + s02 H − c0 R(= T1 ), thus, R = f1 G + f2 H.
• s3 G + s4 H − s5 R = s03 G + s04 H − s05 R(= T2 ), thus, f5 R = f3 G + f4 H.
• s6 G − cEa = s06 G − c0 Ea (= T3 ), thus, Ea = f6 G.
0

• e(P, P )s0 e(P, V )−s5 e(P, H)s3 e(Ppub , H)s1 e(P, P0 )c e(Ppub , V )−c = e(P, P )s0
0

0

0

0

0

e(P, V )−s5 e(P, H)s3 e(Ppub , H)s1 e(P, P0 )c e(Ppub , V )−c (= Π1 ), thus, e(Ppub , V )
e(P, P0 )−1 = e(P, P )f0 e(P, V )−f5 e(P, H)f3 e(Ppub , H)f1 .
0

s0

0

0

c
−s1
c
• e(P, H)−s1 Θsa6 Λ−c
Θa6 Λ−c
a e(P, V ) = e(P, H)
a e(P, V ) (= Π2 ), thus,

Λa e(P, V )−1 = e(P, H)−f1 Θfa6 .
From the first two equations, the prover has O = (f3 − f5 f1 )G + (f4 − f5 f2 )H (O is
the identity element of G). Under the Discrete Log assumption on G, it implies that
f3 = f5 f1 .
Let ai = f5 , Si = V − f1 H, xi = f0 , t = f6 , then Ea = tG, Λa = e(P, Si )Θta and
e(ai P + Ppub , Si ) = e(P, xi P + P0 ). So the prover has the knowledge of (ai , Si ), xi and
t satisfying the relations.
Zero-knowledge: The simulator chooses c, s0 , ...s6 ← Zp , V, R ← G and computes
T1 = s1 G + s2 H − cR; T2 = s3 G + s4 H − s5 R; T3 = s6 G − cEa ; Π1 = e(P, P )s0 e(P, V )−s5
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c
e(P, H)s3 e(Ppub , H)s1 e(P, P0 )c e(Ppub , V )−c ; Π2 = e(P, H)−s1 Θsa6 Λ−c
a e(P, V ) . The sim-

ulator then outputs (V, R, T1 , T2 , T3 , Π1 , Π2 , c, s0 , ...s6 ). Then, the distribution of the
simulator’s output is the same as the distribution of the transcript generated from the
Signing protocol execution, which is the uniform distribution over the set
{(V, R, T1 , T2 , T3 , Π1 , Π2 , c, s0 , ...s6 ) | (V, R, T1 , T2 , T3 ∈ G) ∧ (Π1 , Π2 ∈ GT ) ∧
(c, s0 , ...s6 ∈ Zp ) ∧ (T1 = s1 G + s2 H − cR) ∧
(T2 = s3 G + s4 H − s5 R) ∧ (T3 = s6 G − cEa ) ∧
(Π1 = e(P, P )s0 e(P, V )−s5 e(P, H)s3 e(Ppub , H)s1 e(P, P0 )c e(Ppub , V )−c ) ∧
c
(Π2 = e(P, H)−s1 Θsa6 Λ−c
a e(P, V ) )}

2

3.4.2

Coalition-Resistance

We first give a formal definition of Coalition-Resistance and then prove that this property is provided by GS1 and GS2. Coalition-Resistance property is not a security
requirement for a provably secure group signature scheme. We just use it as a step to
prove the Traceability requirement.
In the following Coalition-Resistance definition, there is a PPT adversary A attacking a group signature scheme GS. A PPT algorithm U can determine the validity of a
user private signing key, that means U, on input a group public key and a user private
signing key, outputs 1 if and only if the user private signing key is valid with regard to
the group public key. An experiment is played as follows (the reader can refer to the
BSZ04 model in section 2.10 for explanation of the following notations, sets, tables and
oracles). The experiment first runs GKg on input 1` to obtain keys gpk, ik, ok that are
used by the oracles, and all entries of the tables upk and reg are assumed to be empty
initially. It is also assumed that the experiment maintains the following sets which are
initially empty and manipulated by the oracles: a set HU of honest users; a set CU of
corrupted users. The adversary with the knowledge of ok can query the oracles CrptU,
SndToI, AddU, RReg and USK. The adversary finally outputs a user private signing key
gsk 0 . The adversary is considered successful if gsk 0 has not been generated before in
the experiment and U(gpk, gsk 0 ) = 1. The Coalition-Resistance property requires that
the probability that the adversary succeeds is negligible.
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Coalition-Resistance. For a group signature scheme GS, a PPT adversary A, a
PPT algorithm U that takes as input a group public key and a user private signing key
and returns 0 or 1 (it determines the validity of a user private signing key), and any
security parameter ` ∈ N, the experiment for Coalition-Resistance is defined as follows.
Experiment Expcoal.re
GS,A,U (`)
(gpk, ik, ok) ← GKg(1` ); CU ← ∅; HU ← ∅
gsk 0 ← A(gpk, ok : CrptU(·, ·), SndToI(·, ·), AddU(·), RReg(·), USK(·))
If gsk 0 ∈ {gsk[i]| i ∈ CU ∪ HU} then return 0 else return U(gpk, gsk 0 )
The group signature scheme GS provides Coalition-Resistance with regard to U if the
following function Adv coal.re (`) is negligible.
GS,A,U

coal.re (`) = Pr[Expcoal.re (`) = 1]
AdvGS,A,U
GS,A,U

We now prove that GS1 and GS2 provide Coalition-Resistance, where the algorithm
U determines that a user private signing key hxi , ai , Si , ∆i i is considered valid with
regard to a group public key hP, P0 , Ppub , H, G, Θa , Θb i if and only if it satisfies e(ai P +
Ppub , Si ) = e(P, xi P + P0 ).
Lemma 3.4.2 If the q-SDH assumption holds, then the group signature schemes GS1
and GS2, whose group sizes are bounded by q, provide Coalition-Resistance, where the
algorithm U is required to satisfy:
U(hP, P0 , Ppub , H, G, Θa , Θb i, hxi , ai , Si , ∆i i) = 1 ⇔ e(ai P + Ppub , Si ) = e(P, xi P + P0 ).
Proof:

We prove the lemma for both GS1 and GS2. Suppose there is a PPT

adversary A that can break the Coalition-Resistance property of GS1 or GS2 with
respect to the algorithm U defined above. Let the set of private signing keys generated during A’s attack be {(xi , ai , Si , ∆i )}qi=1 and let his output be a new private
signing key (x∗ , a∗ , S ∗ , ∆∗ ) ∈
/ {(xi , ai , Si , ∆i )}qi=1 . It means (a∗ , S ∗ ) ∈
/ {(ai , Si )}qi=1 ,
as e(ai P + Ppub , Si ) = e(P, xi P + P0 ) and ∆i = e(P, Si ).

We show a construc-

tion of a PPT adversary B that can break the q-SDH assumption. Suppose a tuple
challenge = (Q, zQ, . . . , z q Q) is given, where z ← Z∗p ; we show that B can compute
(c, 1/(z + c)Q), where c ∈ Zp with non-negligible probability. We consider two cases.
Case 1: This is a trivial case, where A outputs (x∗ , a∗ , S ∗ , ∆∗ ) ∈
/ {(xi , ai , Si , ∆i )}qi=1
satisfying S ∗ ∈ {S1 , ..., Sq } with non-negligible probability. In this case, B chooses
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x, x0a , x0b ← Z∗p and G, H ← G, gives A the group signature public key (P = Q, P0 =
0

0

zQ, Ppub = xP, H, G, Θa = e(G, G)xa , Θb = e(G, G)xb ) and the opening key (x0a , x0b ) (no
x0b , Θ0b in case of GS2), and simulates an issuer, an opener, a set of possible users, an
empty registration table reg and an empty user-personal-key table upk. B has all the
secret keys x, x0a , x0b and controls the issuer, the opener, the users and the tables reg
and upk, therefore, B can simulate all oracles that A needs to access, including CrptU,
SndToI, AddU, RReg and USK. Suppose a set of private signing keys {(xi , ai , Si , ∆i )}qi=1
is generated and A outputs a new (x∗ , a∗ , S ∗ , ∆∗ ) with non-negligible probability such
that S ∗ ∈ {S1 , ..., Sq }. Suppose S ∗ = Sj , where j ∈ {1, ..., q}, then
1
(xj P + P0 ), so
aj +x
(a∗ xj − aj x∗ + xj x

∗

∗

∗

1
(x∗ P
a∗ +x

+ P0 ) =

∗

(aj − a )P0 = (a xj − aj x + xj x − x x)P , thus (aj − a∗ )z =
− x∗ x). Therefore, z is computable by B from this, and so is

(c, 1/(z + c)Q), for any c ∈ Zp .
Case 2: This is when the first case does not hold. That means A outputs (x∗ , a∗ , S ∗ , ∆∗ )
∈
/ {(xi , ai , Si , ∆i )}qi=1 satisfying S ∗ ∈
/ {S1 , ..., Sq } with non-negligible probability. Then
B plays the following game:
1. Generate α, ai , xi ← Z∗p , i = 1, ..., q, where ai s are different from one another,
and choose m ← {1, ..., q}.
2. Let x = z − am (B does not know x). Then the following P, Ppub , P0 are computable by B from the tuple challenge = (Q, zQ, . . . , z q Q).
q
Y

P =

(z + ai − am )Q

i=1,i6=m

Ppub = xP = (z − am )

q
Y

(z + ai − am )Q

i=1,i6=m
q

P0 = α

Y

(z + ai − am )Q − xm

i=1

q
Y

(z + ai − am )Q

i=1,i6=m

3. Generate x0a , x0b ← Z∗p and G, H ← G and give A the group signature public key
0

0

(P, P0 , Ppub , H, G, Θa = e(G, G)xa , Θb = e(G, G)xb ) and the opening key (x0a , x0b )
(no x0b , Θ0b in case of GS2) and simulates an issuer, an opener, a set of possible
users, an empty registration table reg and an empty user-personal-key table upk.
4. As B controls the issuer, the opener, the users and the tables reg and upk, B can
simulate oracles CrptU, RReg and USK that A needs to access. For oracle AddU,
B simulates the addition of an honest user i by generating a pair (upk[i], usk[i])
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for i and simulating the Join, Iss protocol. As playing both sides of the Join, Iss
protocol, B can simulate the first 4 steps of the protocol as specified and generate
ai at the step 5 so that the prepared ai and xi above are computed in the protocol
to be the corresponding parts of the user i’s private signing key. B then completes
the protocol by computing Si as follows:
• If i = m, then
q
Y
1
Sm =
(xm P + P0 ) = α
(z + ai − am )Q
am + x
i=1,i6=m

This is computable from the tuple challenge.
• If i 6= m, then
q
Y
1
(z + aj − am )Q +
Si =
(xi P + P0 ) = (xi − xm )
ai + x
j=1,j6=m,i

α

q
Y

(z + aj − am )Q

j=1,j6=i

This is computable from the tuple challenge.
For oracle SndToI, B simulates the addition of a corrupted user as follows. Suppose A wants an execution of the Join, Iss protocol between the issuer (controlled
by B) and a user i (controlled by A). As being able to extract information from
A, after receiving the commitment I from A, B can find y, r and generate u, v, ai
at the first 5 steps of the protocol so that the prepared ai and xi above are computed in the protocol to be the corresponding parts of the user i’s keys. B then
completes the protocol by computing Si as shown above for the oracle AddU.
5. Get the output (x∗ , a∗ , S ∗ , ∆∗ ) from A, where
1
(x∗ P + P0 )
a∗ + x
q
Y
1
∗
=
(αz + x − xm )
(z + ai − am )Q
z + a∗ − am
i=1,i6=m

S∗ =

If αz + x∗ − xm = α(z + a∗ − am ) with non-negligible probability, then S ∗ =
Qq
α i=1,i6=m (z + ai − am )Q = Sm with non-negligible probability. This contradicts the
condition of Case 2 that A outputs (x∗ , a∗ , S ∗ , ∆∗ ) ∈
/ {(xi , ai , Si , ∆i )}qi=1 satisfying
S ∗ ∈ {S1 , ..., Sq } with negligible probability.
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So αz + x∗ − xm 6= α(z + a∗ − am ) happens with non-negligible probability ²1 .
Suppose the probability that a∗ ∈ {a1 , ..., aq } is ²2 . Then the probability that a∗ ∈
/
{a1 , ..., aq }\{am } is ²1 −

q−1
²
q 2

(as m ← {1, ..., q}), which is also non-negligible if q is

bound by a polynomial of `. As αz+x∗ −xm 6= α(z+a∗ −am ) and a∗ ∈
/ {a1 , ..., aq }\{am }
Q
q
and S ∗ = z+a∗1−am (αz + x∗ − xm ) i=1,i6=m (z + ai − am )Q, B can compute z+a∗1−am Q
1
from the tuple challenge and S ∗ . So B can compute (c, z+c
Q), where c = a∗ − am . 2

3.4.3

Proof of GS1’s Anonymity and GS2’s Weak Anonymity

We prove Anonymity of GS1 (Theorem 3.2.2) and Weak Anonymity of GS2 (Theorem
3.3.1) at the same time. Suppose there is a PPT adversary A that can break Anonymity
property of GS1 (or Weak Anonymity of GS2). We show a construction of a PPT
adversary C with access to a random oracle that can break IND-CPA property of El
GamalBP 1 (without access to the random oracle in the GS2 case). We first construct
a PPT adversary B that attempts to break IND-CCA2 property of El GamalBP 2 (or
IND-CPA property of El GamalBP 1 in the GS2 case). We then construct C from B (C
is the same as B in the GS2 case).
We construct B as follows. Suppose an El GamalBP 2 public key (G, Θa , Θb ) and a
Decryption oracle (or only an El GamalBP 1 public key (G, Θa ) in the GS2 case) are
given, we show a PPT adversary B, who attempts to win the IND-CCA2 experiment (or
IND-CPA experiment in the GS2 case). That means B can query the Decryption oracle
a number of times; then B chooses 2 plaintexts m0 and m1 and receives a challenge
ciphertext cip encrypting md , where d ← {0, 1}; then B sends ciphertexts, except for
cip, to the Decryption oracle a number of times more before finally outputting a bit d0 .
B wins if the probability that d0 = d is non-negligibly better than a random guess (in
the GS2 case, B does not access a Decryption oracle, but he can compute ciphertexts
for a number of plaintexts during the IND-CPA experiment).
B does that by simulating an instance of GS1 (or GS2), playing the Anonymity
experiment (or Weak-Anonymity experiment in the GS2 case) with A and outputting
the bit, which is returned by A in the experiment. It is described as follows.
B constructs an instance of GS1 (or GS2) by generating the issuing key ik = x and
the group public key gpk = (P, P0 , Ppub , H, G, Θa , Θb ) (no Θb in the GS2 case). The
opening key ok is the private key (x0a , x0b ) of the El GamalBP 2 public key (G, Θa , Θb )
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(or the private key x0a of the El GamalBP 1 public key (G, Θa ) in the GS2 case), and is
unknown to B. In GSig, we assume the signer, instead of using the hash function HZp ,
queries a random oracle, whose query-answer table can be appended by B. Let B play
the role of an issuer, simulate an opener and a set of possible users and provide A with
gpk, ik and the following simulated oracles:
• SndToI(·, ·), SndToU(·, ·), WReg(·, ·), USK(·) and CrptU(·, ·). B has the secret key
ik and controls the issuer, the users and the tables reg and upk, therefore, B can
simulate these oracles. For SndToI, B can simulate an execution of the Join, Iss
protocol between the issuer and a user, whose messages are specified by A. For
SndToU, B can simulate an execution of the Join, Iss protocol between a user and
the issuer, whose messages are specified by A. For WReg, B can modify the table
reg as requested by A. For USK, B can reveal the private signing key gsk and
the personal private key usk of any user to A. For CrptU, B can corrupt any user
for A.
• Ch(d, ·, ·, ·). When receiving a query (i0 , i1 , m) from A, B finds m0 = ∆i0 and
m1 = ∆i1 from reg, and asks for an El GamalBP 2 challenge encryption cip =
(Ea , Λa , Eb , Λb , ξ) (or an El GamalBP 1 challenge encryption cip = (Ea , Λa ) in the
GS2 case) of md = ∆id . From that, B simulates c, s0 , ...s6 , V, R, T1 , T2 , T3 , Π1 and
Π2 as in the Zero-knowledge proof of Lemma 3.4.1, such that the value que =
(gpk, σ, V, R, T1 , T2 , T3 , Π1 , Π2 , m) has not been queried to the random oracle.
Then B appends (que, c) to the random oracle’s table and returns to A the
challenge signature (c, s0 , ..., s6 , V, R, Ea , Λa , Eb , Λb , ξ) (no Θb , Eb , Λb , ξ in the GS2
case).
• Open(·, ·). In the GS2 case, this oracle is not accessible by the adversary. In the
GS1 case, when receiving a query (m, ω) from A, B answers A by extracting the
El GamalBP 2 ciphertext part from ω, sending that ciphertext to the Decryption
oracle and from that finding an answer for A. We will later discuss the case when
the extracted El GamalBP 2 ciphertext is the same as the challenge ciphertext cip
with non-negligible probability.
At last, B outputs the bit d0 returned by A.
In the GS2 case, as A can break Weak Anonymity property, the probability that
d0 = d is non-negligibly better than a random guess. That means B, which is the same
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as C in this case, can win the IND-CPA experiment. Therefore, based on Theorem
2.8.4, if the DBDH assumption holds, then GS2 provides Weak Anonymity. We end
discussion about the GS2 case here.
In the GS1 case, following procedures in the proof of Theorem 2.8.2 shown in [FP01],
we can construct a PPT adversary C with access to a random oracle such that if B can
break IND-CCA2 property of El GamalBP 2 , then C can break IND-CPA property of
El GamalBP 1 . We consider 2 cases.
• Case 1: In this case, when querying the Open oracle, the probability that A manages to find a signature (c̄, s¯0 , ..., s¯6 , V̄ , R̄, Ea , Λa , Eb , Λb , ξ), whose El GamalBP 2
ciphertext part is the same as the challenge ciphertext cip, is negligible. That
means the probability that Open fails is negligible, and A can output the bit d0
with non-negligible probability. As A can break Anonymity property, the probability that d0 = d is non-negligibly better than a random guess. That means B
can win the IND-CCA2 experiment. Therefore, based on Theorem 2.8.5, if the
DBDH assumption holds, then GS1 provides Anonymity in the random oracle
model.
• Case 2: Now we discuss the case that for querying the Open oracle, A manages to
find a signature (c̄, s¯0 , ..., s¯6 , V̄ , R̄, Ea , Λa , Eb , Λb , ξ), whose El GamalBP 2 ciphertext part is the same as the challenge ciphertext cip with non-negligible probability. Suppose that C is given a challenge (m0 = ∆i0 , m1 = ∆i1 , cip0 = (Ea , Λa ))
corresponding to B’s challenge (m0 = ∆i0 , m1 = ∆i1 , cip = (Ea , Λa , Eb , Λb , ξ))
(based on the proof of Theorem 2.8.2 shown in [FP01]). We observe that the General forking lemma is applicable to C, where C, GVf, (gpk, m, T1 , T2 , T3 , Π1 , Π2 , V̄ ,
R̄, Ea , Λa , Eb , Λb , ξ), c̄ and (s¯0 , ..., s¯6 ) respectively represent P, Q, ρ1 , c and ρ2
in the lemma definition. So, by applying the General forking lemma, there is
a PPT algorithm C 0 such that, for the same ρ1 and with non-negligible probability, C 0 can obtain two valid signatures (c̄, s¯0 , ..., s¯6 , V̄ , R̄, Ea , Λa , Eb , Λb , ξ) and
(c̄0 , s¯0 0 , ..., s¯6 0 , V̄ , R̄, Ea , Λa , Eb , Λb , ξ) with c̄ 6= c̄0 . Following an argument similar
to the Soundness proof of Lemma 3.4.1, C 0 can find t, ∆i such that Ea = tG
and Λa = ∆i Θta with non-negligible probability. By comparing the computed ∆i
with ∆i0 and ∆i1 , C can output a bit d0 such that the probability that d0 = d is
non-negligibly better than a random guess. That means C can win the IND-CPA
experiment. Therefore, based on Theorem 2.8.4, if the DBDH assumption holds,
then GS1 provides Anonymity in the random oracle model.
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Proof of Traceability for GS1 and GS2

We prove Traceability of GS1 (Theorem 3.2.3) and GS2 (Theorem 3.3.1) at the same
time, based on Lemma 3.4.2. The outline of the argument is as follows. Suppose there
is a PPT adversary A that can break Traceability property of GS1 (or GS2). We show
that there exists a PPT adversary B that can break Coalition-Resistance of GS1 (or
GS2). Then, from Lemma 3.4.2, we can construct a PPT adversary C that can break
the SDH assumption.
Suppose a SDH tuple challenge = (Q, zQ, . . . , z q Q) is given to C, where z ← Z∗p .
Following procedures in the proof of Lemma 3.4.2, C simulates a GS1 instance with
oracles for B, where the group public key is gpk = (P, P0 , Ppub , H, G, Θa , Θb ), the
issuing key is ik = x, and the opening key is ok = (x0a , x0b ) (no Θb , x0b in the GS2
case), such that if B can break Coalition-Resistance of this GS1 instance, then C can
break the SDH assumption on the tuple challenge. B then pass this GS1 instance
with oracles to A. Suppose A can output a valid message-signature pair (m, ω =
(c, s0 , ..., s6 , V, R, Ea , Λa , Eb , Λb , ξ)) so that the opener can not trace the identity of the
signer, or the opener can find the identity but can not prove that to Judge (no Eb , Λb , ξ
in the GS2 case). First, we observe that by applying the General forking lemma
to C, where C, GVf, (gpk, m, T1 , T2 , T3 , Π1 , Π2 , V, R, Ea , Λa , Eb , Λb , ξ), c and (s0 , ..., s6 )
respectively represent P, Q, ρ1 , c and ρ2 in the lemma definition, we will have a PPT
adversary C 0 that can output two valid signatures ω = (c, s0 , ..., s6 , V, R, Ea , Λa , Eb ,
Λb , ξ) and (c0 , s00 , ..., s06 , V, R, Ea , Λa , Eb , Λb , ξ) with c 6= c0 for the same ρ1 = (gpk,
m, T1 , T2 , T3 , Π1 , Π2 , V, R, Ea , Λa , Eb , Λb , ξ) with non-negligible probability (no Eb , Λb , ξ
in the GS2 case). By using C 0 and following an argument similar to the one as in
the Soundness proof of Lemma 3.4.1, B can find ai , Si , xi and t such that Ea = tG,
Λa = e(P, Si )Θta and e(ai P + Ppub , Si ) = e(P, xi P + P0 ). Thus the opener, who is
assumed to operate correctly, can find ∆i = e(P, Si ) from the signature. The issuer is
assumed to be uncorrupt and no oracle accessible by the adversaries can write on the
reg table or overwrite upk[j] of a group member j (as CrptU does not apply to group
members). So if ∆i can not be found on reg, B has produced a new valid user private
signing key (xi , ai , Si , ∆i ) and breaks the Coalition-Resistance property, therefore, C
can break the SDH assumption.
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Proof of Non-frameability for GS1 and GS2

We prove Non-frameability of GS1 (Theorem 3.2.4) and GS2 (Theorem 3.3.1) at the
same time. Suppose there is a PPT adversary A that can break Non-frameability
property of GS1 (or GS2), we show that there exists a PPT adversary B that can
break the Discrete Logarithm assumption over G. Suppose that B is given a challenge
(P, P ∗ = zP ), where P ← G∗ and z ← Z∗p , and B needs to compute z. B constructs
an instance of GS1 (or GS2) by generating x, x0a , x0b , d ← Z∗p and G, H ← G, and gives
0

A the group signature public key (P, P0 = dP, Ppub = xP, H, G, Θa = e(G, G)xa , Θb =
0

e(G, G)xb ), the issuing key ik = x and the opening key (x0a , x0b ) (no x0b , Θ0b in case of
GS2). B simulates an issuer, an opener and a set of possible users {1, ..., q}, where q
is the upper bound of the group size, chooses i0 ← {1, ..., q} and provides A access to
the following simulated oracles:
• SndToU(i, Min ). If i 6= i0 , B just plays as an honest user i and executes Iss as
specified in Min . If i = i0 , B simulates the Join, Iss protocol so that Pi0 = P ∗
(by controlling the random oracle, B can simulate the proof of knowledge in the
protocol). Suppose the private signing key obtained for i0 is (xi0 , ai0 , Si0 , ∆i0 ),
where xi0 = z is unknown to B.
• WReg(·, ·), GSig(·, ·), USK(·) and CrptU(·, ·). B has all the secret keys x, x0a , x0b
and controls the issuer, the opener, the users, the tables reg and upk, and the
random oracle, therefore, B can simulate all these oracles, except the case when
he gets a query USK(i0 ). In this case, B fails.
If A succeeds with probability ², then the probability that he can output a valid
message-signature pair (m, ω = (c, s0 , ..., s6 , V, R, Ea , Λa , Eb , Λb , ξ)) (no Eb , Λb , ξ in the
GS2 case) of i0 is at least ²/q, as i0 ← {1, ..., q}. We observe that the General forking lemma is applicable to B, where B, GVf, (gpk, m, T1 , T2 , T3 , Π1 , Π2 , V, R, Ea , Λa ,
Eb , Λb , ξ), c and (s0 , ..., s6 ) respectively represent P, Q, ρ1 , c and ρ2 in the lemma
definition. By applying the General forking lemma to B, there is a PPT adversary
B 0 that can output two valid signatures ω = (c, s0 , ..., s6 , V, R, Ea , Λa , Eb , Λb , ξ) and
(c0 , s00 , ..., s06 , V, R, Ea , Λa , Eb , Λb , ξ) with c 6= c0 for the same ρ1 = (gpk, m, T1 , T2 , T3 , Π1 ,
Π2 , V, R, Ea , Λa , Eb , Λb , ξ) (no Θb , Eb , Λb , ξ in the GS2 case). By using B 0 and following
a similar argument as in the Soundness proof of Lemma 3.4.1, B can find ai1 , Si1 , xi1
and t such that Ea = tG, Λa = e(P, Si1 )Θta and e(ai1 P + Ppub , Si1 ) = e(P, xi1 P + P0 ).
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Then we have ∆i0 = e(P, Si1 ) and so e(P, Si0 ) = e(P, Si1 ) or Si0 = Si1 . Therefore,
1
(xi0 P
ai0 +x

3.5

+ dP ) =

1
(xi1 P
ai1 +x

+ dP ), from that, B can compute z = xi0 .

Extensions

3.5.1

A Traceable Signature scheme

We extend GS2 to be a traceable signature scheme T S =(Setup, Join, Sign, Verify,
Open, Reveal, Trace, Claim, Claim-Verify) with similar advantages over the only other
known traceable signature scheme KTY04 [KTY04].
Setup: This is the same as GKg for GS2, but the group public key also includes a
Q ← Z∗p . The group public key is gpk = (P, P0 , Ppub , Q, H, G, Θa ), the issuing key is
ik = x, and the opening key is ok = x0a . Choose a hash function HZp : {0, 1}∗ → Zp (a
random oracle).
Join: This protocol is similar to the Join, Iss protocol in section 3.2.2 and is described
as follows:
1. user i −→ GM: I = yP + rH, where y, r ← Z∗p .
2. user i ←− GM: u, v ← Z∗p .
3. The user computes xi = uy + v, Pi = xi P .
4. user i −→ GM: Pi and a proof of knowledge of (xi , r0 ) such that Pi = xi P and
vP + uI − Pi = r0 H.
5. The GM verifies the proof, then chooses ai , x̄i ← Z∗p so that ai is different from all
corresponding elements previously issued, and computes Si =

1
(Pi + x̄i Q+P0 ).
ai +x

6. user i ←− GM: ai , Si , x̄i .
7. The user computes ∆i = e(P, Si ), verifies if e(ai P + Ppub , Si ) = e(P, xi P + x̄i Q +
P0 ), and stores the private signing key gsk[i] = (xi , x̄i , ai , Si , ∆i ). Note that only
the user knows xi . The GM also computes ∆i and stores it with the protocol’s
transcript.
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Sign: The algorithm for a user i to sign a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗ is as follows.
0

0

1. Compute Ea = tG, Λa = ∆i Θta , Υ1 = Θxa¯i r , Υ2 = Θra , Υ3 = Θxai r and Υ4 = Θra ,
where t, r, r0 ← Z∗p . Let σ = (Ea , Λa ).
2. Generate r1 , r2 , k0 , ..., k7 ← Zp and compute:
(a) V = Si + r1 H; R = r1 G + r2 H; T1 = k1 G + k2 H; T2 = k3 G + k4 H − k5 R;
T3 = k6 G; Π1 = e(P, Q)k7 e(P, P )k0 e(P, V )−k5 e(P, H)k3 e(Ppub , H)k1 ; Π2 =
e(P, H)−k1 Θka6 ; Π3 = Υk27 ; Π4 = Υk40
(b) c = HZp (gpk, σ, V, R, T1 , T2 , T3 , Π1 , Π2 , Π3 , Π4 , m)
(c) Compute in Zp : s0 = k0 + cxi ; s1 = k1 + cr1 ; s2 = k2 + cr2 ; s3 = k3 + cr1 ai ;
s4 = k4 + cr2 ai ; s5 = k5 + cai ; s6 = k6 + ct; s7 = k7 + cx̄i
3. Output the signature (c, s0 , ..., s7 , V, R, Ea , Λa , Υ1 , Υ2 , Υ3 , Υ4 ) for message m.
Verify: The verification algorithm for m, (c, s0 , ..., s7 , V, R, Ea , Λa , Υ1 , Υ2 , Υ3 , Υ4 ) outputs accept if and only if the following equation holds: c = HZp (gpk, σ, V, R, s1 G+s2 H−
cR, s3 G + s4 H − s5 R, s6 G − cEa , e(P, Q)s7 e(P, P )s0 e(P, V )−s5 e(P, H)s3 e(Ppub , H)s1
s7 −c
s0 −c
c
e(P, P0 )c e(Ppub , V )−c , e(P, H)−s1 Θsa6 Λ−c
a e(P, V ) , Υ2 Υ1 , Υ4 Υ3 , m).

Open: To open m and its valid signature (c, s0 , ..., s7 , V, R, Ea , Λa , Υ1 , Υ2 , Υ3 , Υ4 ) to
0

find the signer, the GM computes ∆i = Λa e(Ea , G)−xa and finds the corresponding
entry i in the table of stored Join transcripts. The GM returns i and a non-interactive
0

zero-knowledge proof % of knowledge of x0a such that Θa = e(G, G)xa and Λa /∆i =
0

e(Ea , G)xa .
Reveal and Trace: Given the Join transcript of user i, the GM recovers the tracing
secret tracei = x̄i . Given tracei and a message-signature pair, a designated party
recovers Υ1 and Υ2 and checks if Υ1 = Υx2¯i . If the equation holds, the tracer concludes
that user i has produced the signature.
Claim and Claim-Verify: Given a message-signature pair, a user i can claim that
he is the signer by recovering Υ3 and Υ4 and producing a non-interactive proof of
knowledge of the discrete-log of Υ3 base Υ4 . Any party can run Claim-Verify by verifying
the signature and the proof.
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Security Justification
The extension of the traceable signature scheme T S from the group signature scheme
GS2 is similar to the extension of the KTY04 traceable signature scheme from the
ACJT04 group signature scheme. The main extension includes a tracing secret x̄i in
0

0

private signing keys, and two pairs (Υ1 = Θxa¯i r , Υ2 = Θra ) and (Υ3 = Θxai r , Υ4 = Θra )
in signatures. The Reveal and Trace algorithms involve checking Υ1 = Υx2¯i and the
Claim and Claim-Verify algorithms involve a non-interactive proof of knowledge of the
discrete-log of Υ3 base Υ4 . In short, T S uses the same methodology used in the
KTY04 scheme. Therefore, we expect that security proofs of the T S scheme are based
on arguments similar to those in KTY04’s security proofs.
We do not provide formal security proofs for T S, as it requires extensive work
whereas the techniques would be the same as those in the KTY04 scheme. We expect
the following statement on T S’s security to be correct and we will provide formal
proofs in the future.
Statement. T S provides correctness. In the random oracle model, T S provides security against misidentification attacks based on the q-SDH and DDH assumptions, where
q is the upper bound of the group size. In the random oracle model, T S provides security against anonymity attacks based on the DBDH assumption. In the random oracle
model, T S provides security against framing attacks based on the DL assumption.

3.5.2

Identity Escrow schemes

As discussed in subsection 2.10.2, identity escrow schemes can be derived directly from
the group signature schemes. Specifically, the GSig and GVf algorithms are replaced by
the corresponding interactive protocol between a group member and a verifier, where
the random challenge c is generated by the verifier instead of being computed from the
hash function.

3.6

Efficiency

By using elliptic curves for bilinear-pairing groups, the sizes of signatures and keys in
our schemes are much shorter than those used in the Strong-RSA-based schemes at
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a comparable level of security. This difference grows when higher level of security is
required.
Based on the comparison in [BLS01, LV01], we now provide a specific comparison
between sizes in our new group signature schemes with those in the ACJT00 scheme,
where our schemes use 170-bit elliptic curve groups and the ACJT00 scheme uses 1024bit RSA modulus. We assume that our scheme is implemented using an elliptic curve
or a hyperelliptic curve over a finite field, where p is a 170-bit prime, G is a subgroup of
an elliptic curve group or a Jacobian of a hyperelliptic curve over a finite field of order
p. GT is a subgroup of a finite field of size approximately 21024 . A possible choice for
these parameters can be found in [BLS01], where G is derived from the curve E/GF (3ι )
defined by y 2 = x3 − x + 1. We assume that system parameters in the ACJT00 scheme
are ² = 1.1, `p = 512 (it results in a 1024-bit RSA modulus), k = 160, λ1 = 838,
λ2 = 600, γ1 = 1102 and γ2 = 840, as recommended in [ACJT00]. We summarize the
result in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Size Comparison of Group Signature schemes (in Bytes)
Signature gpk gsk ik
ok
Security
ACJT00
1087
768 370 128 128 Weak Anonymity
GS1
574
363 192 22 44
Anonymity
GS2
361
235 192 22 22 Weak Anonymity

3.7

Summary

In this chapter, we proposed new group signature schemes from bilinear pairings and
proved their security in the BSZ04 formal model. Compared to previous schemes, the
new schemes have shorter sizes for signatures and keys, are trapdoor-free and provide
higher level of unconditional security for signers. We also extended the schemes to a
traceable signature scheme and identification escrow systems. We will provide formal
security proofs for the traceable signature scheme in the future.

Chapter 4
A New Dynamic Accumulator Scheme and
Applications to ID-based Ring Signatures
and Group Membership Revocation

4.1

Introduction

An accumulator scheme, introduced by Benaloh and de Mare [BdM93] and further
developed by Baric and Pfitzmann [BP97], allows aggregation of a large set of inputs
into one constant-size value. For a given element, there is a witness if the element has
been included in the accumulated value, whereas it is not possible to compute a witness
for an element that is not accumulated. Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [CL02] introduced
the concept dynamic accumulators, where the cost of adding or deleting elements and
updating individual witnesses does not depend on the number of aggregated elements.
Accumulators have been used in a number of privacy-enhancing applications, including
ad-hoc anonymous identification, ring signatures [DKNS04] and fully dynamic group
signature schemes [CL02].
We propose a dynamic accumulator scheme using bilinear pairings, whose security is based on the Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption. We show application of the
accumulator in constructing an identity-based (ID-based) ring signature scheme with
constant-size signature and also its interactive counterpart, and providing membership
revocation for group signature, traceable signature, identity escrow and anonymous credential systems. The ID-based ring signature scheme and the group signature scheme
have very short signature sizes. For example, at a comparable level of security where
the CL02 [CL02] and ACJT00 [ACJT00] schemes use 1024 bit composite modulus and
our group signature with membership revocation scheme uses elliptic curve groups of
order 160 bit prime, the signature size in our scheme is just nearly one fourth and
95
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one half of the sizes of CL02 and ACJT00 signatures, respectively. For higher security
levels these ratios will be smaller. When using elliptic curve groups of order 160 bit
prime, our ring signature size is only about 220 bytes, which is much shorter than the
shortest known ring signature size in [DKNS04].
The schemes do not require trapdoor, so system parameters can be shared by multiple groups belonging to different organizations. All schemes proposed are provably
secure in corresponding formal models. We generalize the definition of accumulators
to model a wider range of practical accumulators. We propose formal models for IDbased ad-hoc anonymous identification schemes and identity escrow with membership
revocation schemes, based on the DKNS04 [DKNS04] and BSZ04 [BSZ04] models,
respectively.
Part of this chapter appeared in the Proceedings of Cryptographers’ Track, RSA
Conference 2005 [Nguyen05].

4.2

Models

This section provides our models for accumulators, ID-based ad-hoc anonymous identification and identity escrow with membership revocation. The models are extended
from previous models proposed in [CL02, DKNS04, BSZ04].

4.2.1

Accumulators

An accumulator allows a set of elements to be accumulated into one constant-size
value and each element has a witness that the element has been included in the accumulated value. In the existing accumulator definition [CL02, DKNS04], an accumulator
is modelled as a single function that maps a set of elements to an accumulated value.
But there are accumulator schemes, such as our proposed scheme, where modelling an
accumulator requires a combination of functions rather than a single function. We generalize definitions of accumulators provided in [CL02, DKNS04] so that an accumulator
is modelled as a pair of functions (f, g) rather than a single function f . The existing
definition of accumulators [CL02, DKNS04] is a special case of our general definition,
where Uf = Ug and the function g is the identity function g(x) = x.
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In the following definition of accumulators, a set of elements in X` is to be accumulated into a single value in the set Ug . The accumulator is a pair of functions
(f, g) such that f : Uf × Xext
→ Uf for some Xext
⊇ X` , and g : Uf → Ug . The
f
f
accumulated value of a set X = {x1 , ..., xq } ⊂ X` is defined as g(f (...f (u, x1 )..., xq )).
Definition 4.2.1 An accumulator is defined as a tuple ({X` }`∈N , {F` }`∈N ), where the
sequence of sets {X` }`∈N is called the value domain of the accumulator; and {F` }`∈N
is a sequence of sets such that each member (f, g) of F` is a pair of functions defined
ext
as f : Uf × Xext
f → Uf for some Xf ⊇ X` , and g : Uf → Ug is a bijective function.

In addition, the following properties must be satisfied:
• (efficient generation) There exists an efficient algorithm G that takes as input a
security parameter 1` and outputs a random element (f, g) ← F` , possibly together
with some auxiliary information af .
• (quasi commutativity) For every ` ∈ N, (f, g) ∈ F` , u ∈ Uf , x1 , x2 ∈ X` :
f (f (u, x1 ), x2 ) = f (f (u, x2 ), x1 ). For any ` ∈ N, (f, g) ∈ F` , and X = {x1 , ..., xq }
⊂ X` , we call g(f (...f (u, x1 )..., xq )) the accumulated value of the set X over
u. Due to quasi commutativity, the value f (...f (u, x1 )..., xq ) is independent of
the order of the xi ’s and is denoted by f (u, X). We say that w is a witness
for the fact that x ∈ X` has been accumulated in a value v ∈ Ug whenever
g(f (g −1 (w), x)) = v. The notion of witness for a set of values X ⊆ X` can be
defined similarly.
• (efficient evaluation) For every (f, g) ∈ F` , u ∈ Uf and X ⊂ X` with size bound
by a polynomial of `: g(f (u, X)) is computable in time polynomial in `, even
without the knowledge of the auxiliary information af .
An accumulator may have dynamic property, which provides efficient addition and
efficient deletion. Efficient addition means that there exist PT algorithms Da and Wa
satisfying the following. Given the accumulated value v of a set X, a value x0 ∈
/ X and
the auxiliary information af , Da outputs the accumulated value v 0 of the set X ∪ {x0 }.
Given the functions f and g, the old and new accumulated values v and v 0 , the element
x0 , an element x ∈ X and the witness w that x has been accumulated in v, Wa outputs
the new witness w0 that x has been accumulated in v 0 . Efficient deletion means that
there exist PT algorithms Dd and Wd satisfying the following. Given the accumulated
value v of a set X, a value x0 ∈ X and the auxiliary information af , Dd outputs the
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accumulated value v 0 of the set X \ {x0 }. Given the functions f and g, the old and new
accumulated values v and v 0 , the element x0 , an element x ∈ X \ {x0 } and the witness
w that x has been accumulated in v, Wd outputs the new witness w0 that x has been
accumulated in v 0 .
Definition 4.2.2 (Dynamic Accumulator) A dynamic accumulator is defined as
an accumulator with the following properties:
• (efficient addition) there exist PT algorithms Da and Wa such that, if v =
g(f (u, X)), x ∈ X, x0 ∈
/ X and g(f (g −1 (w), x)) = v, then (i) Da (af , v, x0 ) = v 0
such that v 0 = g(f (u, X ∪ {x0 })); and (ii) Wa (f, g, v, v 0 , x, x0 , w) = w0 such that
g(f (g −1 (w0 ), x)) = v 0 .
• (efficient deletion) there exist PT algorithms Dd and Wd such that, if v =
g(f (u, X)), x, x0 ∈ X, x 6= x0 and g(f (g −1 (w), x)) = v, then (i) Dd (af , v, x0 ) = v 0
such that v 0 = g(f (u, X\{x0 })); and (ii) Wd (f, g, v, v 0 , x, x0 , w) = w0 such that
g(f (g −1 (w0 ), x)) = v 0 .
An accumulator scheme that provides collision resistant property, can be used in
many cryptographic systems. Collision resistance requires that it is computationally
difficult to find a tuple (x, w, X) such that x ∈
/ X and w is the witness that x has been
accumulated in the accumulated value v of the set X.
Definition 4.2.3 (Collision Resistant Accumulator) An accumulator is defined
as collision resistant if for every PPT algorithm A, the following function Adv col.acc (`)
A

is negligible.
col.acc (`) = Pr[(f, g) ← F ; u ← U ; (x, w, X) ← A(f, g, U , U , u) |
AdvA
`
f
f
g
(X ⊆ X` ) ∧ (w ∈ Ug ) ∧ (x ∈ Xext
f \X)
∧(f (g −1 (w), x) = f (u, X))]
Similar to Theorem 2 in [CL02], we can prove the following theorem about security
of collision resistant dynamic accumulators against adaptive attacks. In the experiment, an accumulator oracle obtains the functions f and g and the value u and hides
the auxiliary information af . The adversary adaptively modifies the set X. When a
value is added or deleted, the oracle updates the accumulated value accordingly and
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publishes the result. At the end, the adversary attempts to produce a witness that
x∈
/ X is in the current accumulated value of X. In the Theorem 4.2.1, for interactive
Turing machines A(·) and B(·), “(a ← A(·) ↔ B(·) → b)” denotes that a and b are
outputs of the joint computation between A(·) and B(·).
Theorem 4.2.1 Suppose DA is a collision resistant dynamic accumulator and O is
an interactive Turing machine, which operates as an oracle as follows. It receives
input (f , g, af , u), where (f, g) ∈ F` , af is the auxiliary information and u ∈ Uf .
It maintains a list of values X, which is initially empty, and the current accumulated
value v, which is initially g(u). It responds to two types of messages: when receiving
the (add, x) message, it checks that x ∈ X` , and if so, adds x to the list X, then updates
the accumulated value (using efficient addition Da ), and finally sends back this updated
value. Similarly, when receiving the (delete, x) message, it checks that x ∈ X, and if
so, deletes it from the list and updates v (using efficient deletion Dd ) and sends back
the updated value of v. At the end of the computation, O returns the current values
for X and v.

adap.col
For every PPT adversary A, the following function AdvA
(`) is negligible.
adap.col
AdvA
(`) = Pr[(f, g) ← F` ; u ← Uf ; (x, w) ← A(f, g, Uf , Ug , u) ↔
O(f, g, af , u) → (X, v) | (X ⊆ X` ) ∧ (w ∈ Ug ) ∧
−1
(x ∈ Xext
f \X) ∧ (f (g (w), x) = f (u, X))]

Proof: Similar to [CL02], suppose there exists an adversary A that violates the theorem, we show an adversary B that breaks the collision-resistance property of the accumulator. The reduction is quite straightforward. B forwards its input (f, g, Uf , Ug , u)
as input to A. As the accumulator provides efficient evaluation, B can simulate the
machine O as follows. To respond to an (add, x) query or a (delete, x) query from A,
B updates X and computes v = g(f (u, X)). B finally returns the output of A and the
current set X. The success of the adversary B directly corresponds to the success of
the adversary A.

4.2.2

2

ID-based Ad-hoc Anonymous Identification

In an ID-based ad-hoc anonymous identification scheme, a user can collect a set of
identities (names, email address,...) to form an ad-hoc group and can anonymously
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prove his membership of the group. Other members of the group might not even
know that they have been included in the group and no one can identify the user,
who has produced the membership proof. ID-based ad-hoc anonymous identification is
the interactive counterpart of ID-based ring signatures, as an ID-based ad-hoc anonymous identification scheme can be converted to an ID-based ring signature scheme by
applying the Fiat-Shamir heuristic.

Syntax
The following definition is similar to the definition of an ad-hoc anonymous identification scheme in [DKNS04] except for some ID-based-related features: a KeyGen
algorithm replaces the Register algorithm, the Setup generates a master key and does
not maintain a database of users’ public keys, and other algorithms take as input a set
of identities instead of a set of public keys.
An identity-based ad-hoc anonymous identification scheme is defined as a tuple
IA =(Setup, KeyGen, MakeGPK, MakeGSK, IAIDP , IAIDV ) of PT algorithms, which
are described as follows.
• Setup takes as input a security parameter 1` and returns the public parameters
params and a master key mk. The master key is only known to the Private Key
Generator (PKG).
• KeyGen, run by the PKG, takes as input params, mk and an arbitrary identity
of a user and outputs a private key for the user. The identity is used as the
corresponding public key.
• MakeGPK takes as input params and a set of identities and deterministically
outputs a single group public key which is used in the identification protocol
IAID described below.
• MakeGSK takes as input params, a set of identities and a pair consisting of an
identity and the corresponding private key and deterministically outputs a single
group secret key which is used in the identification protocol IAID described below.
It can be observed that a group secret key gsk ← MakeGSK(params, S0 , (sid , id))
corresponds to a group public key gpk ← MakeGPK(params, S) if and only if
S = S0 ∪ {id}. More than one group secret key might correspond to the same
group public key.
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• IAID = (IAIDP , IAIDV ) is a two-party identification protocol, which allows a prover
(IAIDP ) to anonymously show his membership in a group of identities. Both of
the prover and the verifier (IAIDV ) take as input params and a group public
key and IAIDP has also the corresponding group secret key. At the end of the
protocol, IAIDV outputs 0 (reject) or 1 (accept).

Oracles
Similar to the DKNS04 model for ad-hoc anonymous identification [DKNS04], the adversary can access the ID extraction oracle OExID (corresponding to the user corruption
oracle in the DKNS04 model), the transcript oracle OScr and the challenge oracle OCha .
Compared to the DKNS04 model, identities are used instead of public keys.
• OExID is defined as in the model for ID-based ring signatures in subsection 2.10.4.
It takes as input an identity and returns the private key associated with that
identity.
• OScr takes as input an identity of a user and a set of other identities and outputs
a valid transcript of the IAID protocol’s execution, where the user anonymously
proves his membership of a group formed by the set of identities and himself.
• The challenge oracle OCha is only given to the adversary in the experiment of the
Anonymity requirement below and the adversary is only allowed to query OCha
once. This oracle takes as input two pairs of identity/private key and a set of
other identities. It returns a transcript of the IAID protocol’s execution where
the prover randomly uses one of the two private keys to prove membership in a
group formed by the set of identities and the two identities from the pairs.

Correctness Condition and Security Requirements
The requirements are similar to those for ad-hoc anonymous identification schemes
in [DKNS04], and include Soundness and Anonymity. The only difference is that
identities are used instead of public keys. Similar to the model in [DKNS04], we only
define these security notions appropriate to capture security of ID-based ring signature
schemes obtained by applying the Fiat-Shamir heuristic to ID-based ad-hoc anonymous
identification schemes.
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• Correctness. It intuitively requires that in an execution of the IAID protocol,
if IAIDP is given a group secret key corresponding to the common input group
public key, then IAIDV outputs accept with overwhelming probability.
• Soundness. This requirement is modelled by a game played between an honest
dealer and an adversary. The game is played as follows. The honest dealer first
runs the Setup algorithm and sends the resulting public parameters to the adversary. The adversary then adaptively sends queries to OExID and OScr . At some
point, the adversary returns a target group of identities and then executes the
IAID protocol with the honest dealer, in the role of the prover and the verifier
respectively. Here the common input are the public parameters and the group
public key corresponding to the target group. The adversary may send queries
to OExID and OScr during the execution of IAID and also after its completion.
The adversary wins the game if the honest dealer outputs accept, and the adversary never sends OExID an identity in the target group. The ID-based ad hoc
anonymous identification scheme provides Soundness if the probability that the
adversary wins the game is negligible.
• Anonymity. This requirement is modelled by a game being played between an
honest dealer and an adversary. The adversary can send only one query to the
challenge oracle. The honest dealer first runs the Setup algorithm and sends the
resulting public parameters to the adversary. Then, the adversary can adaptively
send queries to OExID and OScr , even after receiving the challenge transcript
from the challenge oracle OCha later. At some point, he chooses two pairs of
identity/private key and a set of other identities to query OCha and receives a
challenge transcript. The adversary then can continue querying OExID and OScr
before outputting an identity in one of the two pairs he queried OCha . The
adversary wins the game if the identity he outputs corresponds to the private
key the challenge oracle used to generate the challenge transcript. The ID-based
ad hoc anonymous identification scheme provides Anonymity if the probability
that the adversary wins the game is negligibly better than a random guess. If
the condition holds even assuming that the adversary has unlimited computing
resources, then the scheme is said to provide Unconditional Anonymity.
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Identity Escrow with Membership Revocation

As discussed in subsection 2.10.2, identity escrow [KP98] allows users to anonymously
prove their membership of a group. In case of a dispute, a prover’s anonymity can be
revoked by ‘opening’ the transcript of the identification protocol. In identity escrow
systems with membership revocation, members can be revoked from the group. An
identity escrow system, where messages sent by the verifier are random strings, can be
converted into a group signature scheme using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [FS86].
Based on the BSZ04 formal model for group signature schemes outlined in subsection 2.10.1, we propose a formal model for identity escrow schemes with membership revocation. The model can be used for many existing schemes, such as ones in
[CL02, TX03], where some public information needs to be updated after each addition
or deletion of group members. The main extensions from the BSZ04 formal model are
as follows.
• A public archive arc records the history of the public information that needs to
be updated. After each addition or deletion of group members, the issuer needs
to add new information to arc.
• The issuer, with access to arc and reg, uses an algorithm Revoke to remove a
specified member from the group by updating arc.
• Apart from the unchanged membership secret key (private signing key in the
BSZ04 model), each group member also keeps a membership witness. Based
on information in the public archive, each group member can run an algorithm
Update to update the membership witness.
• There is an algorithm CheckArchive, that can be run by any party after each
change in the public archive. This algorithm checks if the issuer updates the
archive arc correctly. With such an algorithm, we can assume arc is always
updated correctly.
We first describe participants and procedures in an identity escrow schemes with
membership revocation (IEMR) and then model oracles accessible to the adversaries
and finally define formal security requirements.
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Participants and Procedures
Similar to the BSZ04 model, an IEMR scheme consists of a trusted party for initial
set-up, two group managers (the issuer and the opener), and users, each with a unique
identity i ∈ Z+ (the set of positive integers). Each user can join the group and become
a group member. There are two publicly readable tables upk and arc (public archive),
and a table reg is only readable by the opener and only writable by the issuer. The
scheme is specified as a tuple IE =(GKg, UKg, Join, Iss, IEIDP , IEIDV , Open, Judge,
Revoke, Update, CheckArchive) of PT algorithms. Compared to the BSZ04 model, the
new algorithms are Revoke, Update and CheckArchive; and the joint computation of
IEIDP and IEIDV corresponds to the algorithms GSig and GVf in the BSZ04 model.
The algorithms GKg and UKg are defined as in subsection 2.10.1.
• Join, Iss: This is defined the same as in subsection 2.10.1, except that Iss also
outputs a value on arc and Join also outputs a membership witness. This is a joint
computation of two PPT interactive machines, including Join executed by a user
i with a personal public and private key pair, and Iss executed by the issuer. The
communication is assumed to be secure (i.e., private and authenticated), and Join
is assumed to start the computation and send the first message. At termination,
each machine outputs two values and a decision which is one of accept and reject.
If Iss accepts, the issuer makes an entry reg[i] for i, in the registration table
reg, and fills this entry with a new membership certificate, which is the first
value output by Iss. The issuer appends the second value output by Iss to the
arc table. If Join accepts, the user i stores the two values output by Join as its
membership secret key gsk[i] and membership witness w[i].
• IEIDP , IEIDV : This identification protocol IEID is a joint computation of two
PPT interactive machines. It takes as common input the group public key and
the prover takes as auxiliary input a membership secret key and his updated
membership witness. The verifier outputs accept if and only if the prover is a
current member of the group.
• Open: This is defined the same as in subsection 2.10.1, except that the input
includes a transcript of the identification protocol instead of a group signature.
The opener can run the opening DPT algorithm Open that takes as input the
opening key ok, the registration table reg, and a valid transcript of the IEID
protocol under gpk and returns a pair (i, τ ), where i is a non-negative integer.
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If i ≥ 1, the algorithm is claiming that the group member i took part in the
protocol execution of this transcript and τ is a proof of this claim. If i = 0, it is
claiming that no group member took part in the protocol.
• Judge: This is defined the same as in subsection 2.10.1, except that the input
includes a transcript of the identification protocol instead of a group signature.
Anyone can run the judge DPT algorithm Judge that takes as input the group
public key gpk, an integer j ≥ 1, the public key upk[j] of the user j (this is an
empty string if this user has no public key), a transcript of the IEID protocol, and
a proof-string τ output from the Open algorithm. It aims to check if τ is a proof
that user j took part in the protocol execution that produced the transcript. The
judge will base its verification on j’s personal public key. As the IEID protocol
should be simulatable, the transcript is assumed to be from a reliable source.
• Revoke: The issuer, with read-write access to the table arc, can apply this algorithm to a user identity, and remove the user from the group by updating the
table arc.
• Update: This algorithm takes as input the group public key, a group member
identity and the table arc and returns the updated membership witness for the
member.
• CheckArchive: This algorithm can be run by any party after a change in the
public archive. It returns accept if and only if the issuer updates the archive arc
correctly.

Oracles
The security requirements are formulated via experiments in which an adversary’s
capabilities are modelled by providing access to certain oracles. It is assumed that
each experiment has run GKg on input 1` to obtain keys gpk, ik, ok that are used by
the oracles, and all entries of the tables upk, reg and arc are assumed to be empty
initially. It is also assumed that the experiment maintains the following sets which are
initially empty and manipulated by the oracles: a set HU of honest users and a set
CU of corrupted users. Different experiments will provide the adversary with different
subsets of oracles. Compared to the BSZ04 model, presented in subsection 2.10.1,
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there are two more oracles, RevokeU(·) and Witness(·). The oracles CrptU(·, ·), USK(·),
RReg(·) and WReg(·, ·) are defined the same as in subsection 2.10.1.
• AddU(·): It is defined the same as in subsection 2.10.1, except for the appearance
of arc and membership witnesses. This add user oracle with argument an identity
i ∈ N allows the adversary to add i to the group as an honest user. The oracle
adds i to the set HU of honest users, and picks a personal public and private key
pair (upk[i], usk[i]) for i. It then executes the group-joining protocol by running
Join (on behalf of i, initialized with gpk, upk[i], usk[i]) and Iss (on behalf of the
issuer, initialized with gpk, ik, i, upk[i]). When Iss accepts, its final output is
recorded as an entry reg[i] in the registration table and an update on the arc
table. When Join accepts, its final output is recorded as a membership secret key
gsk[i] and a membership witness w[i]. The calling adversary is returned upk[i],
but it is not given the transcript of the interaction generated by the oracle.
• SndToI(·, ·): This send to issuer oracle is defined the same as in subsection 2.10.1,
except that the oracle also updates arc if Iss accepts.
• SndToU(·, ·): This send to user oracle is defined the same as in subsection 2.10.1,
except that the oracle also returns the membership witness obtained from Join’s
final output, if Join accepts.
• IEIDP (·): The adversary can use this oracle to make a user i (specified in the
argument) perform the IEID protocol with a honest verifier, and get the transcript
of the protocol execution.
• Ch(b, ·, ·): A challenge oracle is provided to an adversary attacking anonymity,
and depends on a challenge bit b set by the overlying experiment. The adversary
provides a pair i0 and i1 of identities and obtains the transcript of an IEID protocol’s execution under the membership secret key of ib , as long as both i0 , i1 are
honest users with defined membership secret keys.
• RevokeU(·): This revoke user oracle makes the issuer run the Revoke algorithm
to remove a user (specified in the argument) from the group. The user is also
removed from HU ∪ SU.
• Witness(·): This oracle returns the membership witness of a user specified in the
argument.
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Correctness Condition and Security Requirements
The correctness condition and security requirements are modelled by experiments,
which are similar to experiments in the BSZ04 model presented in subsection 2.10.1. An
IEMR scheme must satisfy the Correctness condition and three security requirements,
Anonymity, Traceability and Non-frameability.
• Correctness: In this experiment the adversary is not computationally restricted
and has access to AddU(·) and RReg(·) oracles. The adversary returns the identity
of an honest group member and the group member performs the IEID protocol
with an honest verifier. The correctness condition holds if the probability that
one of the following steps fails is 0: IEIDV accepts; Open algorithm returns the
correct group member; and Judge algorithm accepts the proof returned by Open
algorithm.
• Anonymity: The anonymity experiment involves a PT adversary, who knows the
issuing key ik and has access to Ch(b, ·, ·), SndToI(·, ·), SndToU(·, ·), WReg(·, ·),
USK(·), CrptU(·, ·), RevokeU(·) and Witness(·) oracles. The adversary provides
the Ch(b, ·, ·) oracle identities of two honest members and is returned a transcript
of the IEID protocol executed by one of the members (according to bit b). The
anonymity condition holds if the probability that the adversary can correctly
guess the bit b is negligibly better than a random guess. Note that the adversary
can not send the identity of challenge members to RevokeU(·, ·) oracle, the opener
is uncorrupt and the issuer is corrupt.
• Traceability: The traceability experiment involves a PT adversary, who knows
the opening key ok and has access to AddU(·), RReg(·), SndToI(·, ·), USK(·),
CrptU(·, ·), RevokeU(·) and Witness(·) oracles. The adversary then performs the
IEID protocol with an honest verifier. The traceability condition holds if the
probability that all of the following steps succeed is negligible: IEIDV accepts; and
Open algorithm can not return the identity of the prover or Open algorithm can
return the identity of the prover but Judge algorithm rejects the proof returned
by Open algorithm. Note that the issuer is uncorrupt and the opener is partially
corrupt, that means he performs correctly but his secret key is available to the
adversary.
• Non-frameability: The non-frameability experiment involves a PT adversary, who
knows the opening key ok and the issuing key ik, and has access to SndToU(·, ·),
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WReg(·, ·), IEIDP (·), USK(·), CrptU(·, ·), RevokeU(·) and Witness(·) oracles. The
adversary then performs the IEID protocol with an honest verifier and returns an
identity of an honest user and a proof of an opening claim. The non-frameability
condition holds if the probability that all of the following steps succeed is negligible: IEIDV accepts; and Judge algorithm accepts the proof returned by the
adversary, which claims that the honest user is the prover. Note that the adversary can not send the challenge user’s identity to USK(·) and IEIDP (·), and the
opener and the issuer are both corrupt.

4.3

A Dynamic Accumulator scheme from Bilinear
Pairings

We propose a dynamic accumulator DA1 = ({X` }`∈N , {F` }`∈N ) from bilinear pairings
as follows.
• Efficient Generation: To generate an instance of the accumulator from a security
parameter `, the bilinear pairing instance generator BPG (defined in section 2.2)
generates a tuple t = (p, G, GT , e, P ) and a secret s ← Z∗p is generated. A tuple
t0 = (P, sP, . . . , sq P ) is published, where q is the upper bound on the number of
elements to be accumulated by the accumulator. The domain for elements to be
accumulated is Zp \{−s} and the auxiliary information is af = s. The functions
(f, g) are defined as:
f :
Zp × Zp → Zp

and

g:

Zp → G

f : (u, x) 7→ (x + s)u
g : u 7→ uP
Corresponding to the accumulator definition in subsection 4.2.1, we have X` =
Zp \{−s}, Xext
f = Zp , Uf = Zp , Ug = G and each F` is a set of pairs of functions
(f, g) defined as above.
• Quasi Commutativity: It holds that: f (f (u, x1 ), x2 ) = f (f (u, x2 ), x1 ) = (x1 +
s)(x2 + s)u.
• Efficient Evaluation: For u ∈ Zp and a set X = {x1 , ..., xk } ⊂ Zp \{−s}, where
Q
k ≤ q, the value g(f (u, X)) = ki=1 (xi +s)uP is computable in time polynomial in
` from the tuple t0 = (P, sP, . . . , sq P ) and without the knowledge of the auxiliary
information s.
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• Efficient Addition: Suppose V = g(f (u, X)), x ∈ X, x0 ∈
/ X and
g(f (g −1 (W ), x)) = V , then V 0 = g(f (u, X ∪ {x0 })) can be computed as V 0 =
(x0 + s)V . The value W 0 such that g(f (g −1 (W 0 ), x)) = V 0 can be computed as
W 0 = V + (x0 − x)W .
• Efficient Deletion: Suppose V = g(f (u, X)), x, x0 ∈ X, x 6= x0 and
g(f (g −1 (W ), x)) = V , then V 0 = g(f (u, X\{x0 })) can be computed as V 0 =
1/(x0 + s)V . The value W 0 such that g(f (g −1 (W 0 ), x)) = V 0 can be computed as
W 0 = (1/(x0 − x))(W − V 0 ).
Theorem 4.3.1 states the collision resistant property of DA1 based on the Strong
Diffie Hellman assumption as follows.
Theorem 4.3.1 The accumulator scheme DA1 provides Collision Resistance if the
q-SDH assumption holds, where q is the upper bound on the number of elements to be
accumulated by the accumulator.

Proof:

Suppose there is a PPT adversary A that can break Collision-Resistance

property of DA1, we show a construction of a PPT adversary B that can break the
q-SDH assumption. Suppose a tuple challenge = (P, zP, . . . , z q P ) is given, where
z ← Z∗p , we show that B can compute (c, 1/(z + c)P ), where c ∈ Zp , with nonnegligible probability. Let u ← Z∗p , as A breaks Collision-Resistance property of DA1,
he can output X = {x1 , ..., xk } ⊂ Zp \{−z}, x ∈ Zp \({−z} ∪ X) and W ∈ G such that
Q
k ≤ q and (x + z)W = ki=1 (xi + z)uP . From this equation and the tuple challenge,
(1/(x + z))P can be computed and hence the q-SDH assumption is broken.

4.4

2

An ID-based Ad-hoc Anonymous Identification
scheme

This section presents an ID-based ad-hoc anonymous identification scheme that is based
on the accumulator from bilinear pairings. We do not need the dynamic properties
(efficient addition and deletion) of the accumulator for this construction.
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Descriptions

As defined in the formal model, our scheme is a tuple IA1 =(Setup, KeyGen, MakeGPK,
MakeGSK, IAIDP , IAIDV ) of PT algorithms, which are described as follows.
Setup, on a security parameter `, generates an instance of the accumulator scheme
DA1, including functions (f, g) and tuples t = (p, G, GT , e, P ) and t0 = (P, Ppub =
sP, . . . , sq P ), where s ← Z∗p and q is the upper bound on the number of identities to be aggregated. The auxiliary information s can be safely deleted, as it will
never be used later. It also generates G1 , G2 , H, Q ← G∗ , u, sm ← Z∗p and computes
Qpub = sm Q. Choose a hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → Zp , which is assumed to be
a random oracle in the security proofs. Then, the public parameters are params =
(`, t, t0 , f, g, G1 , G2 , H, Q, Qpub , u, H) and the master key is mk = sm .
KeyGen extracts a private key sid = Rid for an identity id as Rid = 1/(H(id) + sm )Q.
?

The user can verify the private key by checking e(H(id)Q + Qpub , Rid ) = e(Q, Q).
MakeGPK, given a set of identities {idi }ki=1 , computes the set X = {H(idi )}ki=1 and
generates the group public key for the set gpk = V = g(f (u, X)).
MakeGSK generates the group secret key gsk for a user id and a set of identities
{idi }ki=1 by computing the set X0 = {H(idi )}ki=1 , hid = H(id) and the witness W =
g(f (u, X0 )). The group secret key is gsk = (hid , sid , W ).
(IAIDP , IAIDV ) This protocol IAID has the common input params and gpk and
the prover (user id) also has gsk. It is a combination of a proof that an identity
is accumulated and a proof of knowledge of the user private key corresponding to
that identity. The protocol proves the knowledge of (hid , Rid , W ) satisfying equations
e(hid Q + Qpub , Rid ) = e(Q, Q) and e(hid P + Ppub , W ) = e(P, V ).
1. IAIDP generates r1 , r2 , r3 , k1 , ..., k7 ← Zp and computes
U1 = Rid + r1 H; U2 = W + r2 H; R = r1 G1 + r2 G2 + r3 H;
T1 = k1 G1 + k2 G2 + k3 H; T2 = k4 G1 + k5 G2 + k6 H − k7 R;
Π1 = e(Q, U1 )−k7 e(Q, H)k4 e(Qpub , H)k1 ;
Π2 = e(P, U2 )−k7 e(P, H)k5 e(Ppub , H)k2
2. IAIDP −→ IAIDV : U1 , U2 , R, T1 , T2 , Π1 , Π2

4.4. An ID-based Ad-hoc Anonymous Identification scheme

111

3. IAIDP ←− IAIDV : c ← Zp
4. IAIDP computes s1 = k1 + cr1 ; s2 = k2 + cr2 ; s3 = k3 + cr3 ; s4 = k4 + cr1 hid ;
s5 = k5 + cr2 hid ; s6 = k6 + cr3 hid ; s7 = k7 + chid
5. IAIDP −→ IAIDV : s1 , ..., s7
?

?

6. IAIDV verifies that T1 = s1 G1 + s2 G2 + s3 H − cR; T2 = s4 G1 + s5 G2 + s6 H − s7 R;
?

?

Π1 = e(Q, U1 )−s7 e(Q, H)s4 e(Qpub , H)s1 e(Q, Q)c e(Qpub , U1 )−c ; Π2 = e(P, U2 )−s7
e(P, H)s5 e(Ppub , H)s2 e(P, V )c e(Ppub , U2 )−c

4.4.2

Security

Security of the scheme IA1 is stated in Theorem 4.4.1.
Theorem 4.4.1 In the random oracle model, the ID-based ad-hoc anonymous identification scheme IA1 provides Correctness and Unconditional Anonymity; and it provides
Soundness if the q-Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption holds, where q is the upper bound
of the group size.
Before showing the proof of Theorem 4.4.1, we prove the zero-knowledge property
of IAID, in Lemma 4.4.1.
Lemma 4.4.1 Under the Discrete Log assumption on G, the IAID protocol is an (honest verifier) perfect zero-knowledge proof of knowledge (hid , Rid , W ) satisfying equations
e(hid Q + Qpub , Rid ) = e(Q, Q) and e(hid P + Ppub , W ) = e(P, V ).

Proof:

Consider an ID-based ad-hoc anonymous identification system where the

public parameters are params = (`, t, t0 , f, g, G1 , G2 , H, Q, Qpub , u, H) and the master
key is mk = sm . We prove that the IAID protocol provides completeness, soundness
and zero-knowledge property as follows.
Completeness: Consider a user with identity id generates a group public key gpk = V
and a group secret key gsk = (hid , Rid , W ) such that e(hid Q + Qpub , Rid ) = e(Q, Q) and
e(hid P + Ppub , W ) = e(P, V ). Suppose user id correctly performs the IAID protocol to
a verifier. Then the verifier outputs accept, as the following equations hold.
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• T1 = k1 G1 + k2 G2 + k3 H = s1 G1 + s2 G2 + s3 H − cR.
• T2 = k4 G1 + k5 G2 + k6 H − k7 R = s4 G1 + s5 G2 + s6 H − s7 R.
• Π1 = e(Q, U1 )−k7 e(Q, H)k4 e(Qpub , H)k1 = e(Q, U1 )−s7 e(Q, H)s4 e(Qpub , H)s1
e(Q, Q)c e(Qpub , U1 )−c .
• Π2 = e(P, U2 )−k7 e(P, H)k5 e(Ppub , H)k2 = e(P, U2 )−s7 e(P, H)s5 e(Ppub , H)s2
e(P, V )c e(Ppub , U2 )−c .
Soundness: If the protocol accepts with non-negligible probability, we show that under the Discrete Log assumption on G, a PPT prover must have the knowledge of
(hid , Rid , W ) with the relations stated in the lemma. Suppose the protocol accepts
for the same commitment (U1 , U2 , R, T1 , T2 , Π1 , Π2 ) with two different pairs of
challenges and responses (c, s1 , ...s7 ) and (c0 , s01 , ..., s07 ). Let fi =

si −s0i
,
c−c0

i = 1, ..., 7,

then R = f1 G1 + f2 G2 + f3 H; f7 R = f4 G1 + f5 G2 + f6 H; e(Qpub , U1 )e(Q, Q)−1 =
e(Q, U1 )−f7 e(Q, H)f4 e(Qpub , H)f1 ; e(Ppub , U2 )e(P, V )−1 = e(P, U2 )−f7 e(P, H)f5
e(Ppub , H)f2 .
From the first two equations, the prover has O = (f4 − f7 f1 )G1 + (f5 − f7 f2 )G2 +
(f6 − f7 f3 )H (O is the identity element of G). Under the Discrete Log assumption on
G, it implies that f4 = f7 f1 and f5 = f7 f2 .
Let hid = f7 , Rid = U1 −f1 H and W = U2 −f2 H, then e(hid Q+Qpub , Rid ) = e(Q, Q)
and e(hid P + Ppub , W ) = e(P, V ). So the prover has the knowledge of (hid , Rid , W )
satisfying these relations.
Zero-knowledge: The simulator chooses c, s1 , ...s7 ← Zp , U1 , U2 , R ← G and computes
T1 = s1 G1 +s2 G2 +s3 H −cR; T2 = s4 G1 +s5 G2 +s6 H −s7 R; Π1 = e(Q, U1 )−s7 e(Q, H)s4
e(Qpub , H)s1 e(Q, Q)c e(Qpub , U1 )−c ; Π2 = e(P, U2 )−s7 e(P, H)s5 e(Ppub , H)s2 e(P, V )c
e(Ppub , U2 )−c . The simulator then outputs (U1 , U2 , R, T1 , T2 , Π1 , Π2 , c, s1 , ...s7 ). Then,
the distribution of the simulator’s output is the same as the distribution of the transcript generated from the protocol execution, which is the uniform distribution over
the set
{(U1 , U2 , R, T1 , T2 , Π1 , Π2 , c, s1 , ...s7 ) |
(U1 , U2 , R, T1 , T2 ∈ G) ∧ (Π1 , Π2 ∈ GT ) ∧ (c, s1 , ...s7 ∈ Zp ) ∧
(T1 = s1 G1 + s2 G2 + s3 H − cR) ∧ (T2 = s4 G1 + s5 G2 + s6 H − s7 R) ∧
(Π1 = e(Q, U1 )−s7 e(Q, H)s4 e(Qpub , H)s1 e(Q, Q)c e(Qpub , U1 )−c ) ∧
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(Π2 = e(P, U2 )−s7 e(P, H)s5 e(Ppub , H)s2 e(P, V )c e(Ppub , U2 )−c )}

2

Proofs of Theorem 4.4.1
Correctness: Completeness of the IAID protocol directly leads to Correctness of the IA1
scheme.
Unconditional Anonymity: Suppose the adversary adaptively queries OExID and OScr
and chooses two pairs of identity/private key (id0 , sid0 ) and (id1 , sid1 ) and a set of other
identities I to query OCha , which returns a challenge transcript. Let D0 denote the
distribution of OCha ’s output when OCha uses (id0 , sid0 ) to generate the challenge transcript, and let D1 denote the distribution of OCha ’s output when OCha uses (id1 , sid1 )
to generate the challenge transcript. Then D0 and D1 are identical, as both of them
are identical to the distribution of the output of the simulator in the proof for the
zero-knowledge property of the IAID protocol in Lemma 4.4.1. So the adversary can
not distinguish D0 and D1 even if he has unlimited computing resources. Therefore,
IA1 provides Unconditional Anonymity.
Soundness: Suppose there is a PPT adversary A that can break the Soundness property of IA1. That means we have the following experiment. The Setup algorithm
is run and the resulting public parameters params = (`, (p, G, GT , e, P ), (P, Ppub =
sP, . . . , sq P ), f, g, G1 , G2 , H, Q, Qpub , u, H) are given to the adversary A. The adversary adaptively sends queries to OExID and OScr . At a point, the adversary returns
a target group of identities {idj }kj=1 with the group public key gpk = V and then
executes the IAID protocol with the honest dealer. The honest dealer outputs accept
with non-negligible probability, and the adversary never sends OExID an identity in
the target group. We show a construction of a PPT adversary B that can break the
q-SDH assumption.
As the IAID protocol provides Soundness, the adversary A knows (id∗ , Rid∗ , W ∗ )
with non-negligible probability satisfying equations e(hid∗ Q + Qpub , Rid∗ ) = e(Q, Q)
and e(hid∗ P + Ppub , W ∗ ) = e(P, V ), where hid∗ = H(id∗ ). We consider two cases.
Case 1: The tuple (id∗ , Rid∗ , W ∗ ) satisfies id∗ ∈ {idj }kj=1 with non-negligible probability. We show that B can break the q-SDH assumption. Suppose a tuple challenge =
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(Q0 , zQ0 , . . . , z q Q0 ) is given, where z ← Z∗p , we show that B can compute (c, 1/(z+c)Q0 ),
where c ∈ Zp , with non-negligible probability by playing the following game. B
simulates an instance of the IA1 for A as follows. It generates an instance of the
accumulator scheme DA1, including functions (f, g) and tuples t = (p, G, GT , e, P )
and t0 = (P, Ppub = sP, . . . , sq P ), where s ← Z∗p is known to B. It also generates
Q
0 0
G1 , G2 , H, Q ← G∗ , u, u0 , h1 , ..., hq−1 ← Z∗p and computes Q = q−1
i=1 (hi + z)u Q and
Q
0 0
Qpub = q−1
i=1 (hi + z)zu Q from the tuple challenge. It simulates a random oracle
H : {0, 1}∗ → Zp whose operation will be shown later. Then, the public parameters are params = (`, t, t0 , f, g, G1 , G2 , H, Q, Qpub , u, H) and the master key mk = z is
unknown to B. B can simulate the oracles as follows.
• OExID : When receiving the j th query id0j from A, B simulates the random oracle
Q
so that hj = H(id0j ). It then returns Rid0j = 1/(H(id0j ) + z)Q = q−1
i=1,i6=j (hi +
z)u0 Q0 , which is computable from the tuple challenge. So as long as the number
of queries to OExID is less than q, B can simulate OExID for A.
• OScr : As the IAID protocol is zero-knowledge, B can simulate and output a valid
transcript of the IAID protocol’s execution, when taking as input an identity of a
user and a set of other identities.
As discussed above, at a point, A returns a target group of identities {idj }kj=1 , successfully executes the IAID protocol and knows (id∗ , Rid∗ , W ∗ ) with non-negligible probability satisfying e(hid∗ Q + Qpub , Rid∗ ) = e(Q, Q), hid∗ = H(id∗ ) and id∗ ∈ {idj }kj=1 .
As A never sends OExID an identity in the group {idj }kj=1 , B can simulate the random oracle in the MakeGPK algorithm so that {H(idj )}kj=1 ∩ {h1 , ..., hq−1 } = ∅. So
Q
0 0
hid∗ ∈
/ {h1 , ..., hq−1 } and Rid∗ = 1/(hid∗ + z)Q. As Q = q−1
i=1 (hi + z)u Q , from the
tuple challenge, Rid∗ , {h1 , ..., hq−1 } and u0 , B can compute 1/(hid∗ + z)Q0 , which mean
the q-SDH assumption has been broken.
Case 2: The tuple (id∗ , Rid∗ , W ∗ ) satisfies id∗ ∈ {idj }kj=1 with negligible probability,
that means the tuple (id∗ , Rid∗ , W ∗ ) satisfies id∗ ∈
/ {idj }kj=1 with non-negligible probability. We now show a PPT adversary B 0 that can break the Collision-Resistance of
the accumulator scheme DA1 and based on Theorem 4.3.1, there is a PPT adversary
B that can break the q-SDH assumption.
Suppose an instance of the accumulator scheme DA1 is given to B 0 as a challenge, including functions (f, g) and tuples t = (p, G, GT , e, P ) and t0 = (P, Ppub = sP, . . . , sq P ),
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where s ← Z∗p is not known to B 0 and q is the upper bound on the number of identities
to be aggregated. B 0 then generates G1 , G2 , H, Q ← G∗ , u, sm ← Z∗p and computes
Qpub = sm Q. B 0 simulates a random oracle H : {0, 1}∗ → Zp and the master key is
mk = sm . Then, the public parameters params = (`, t, t0 , f, g, G1 , G2 , H, Q, Qpub ,
u, H) are given to A. B 0 can simulate the oracles as follows.
• OExID : When receiving a query id0j from A, B 0 returns Rid0j = 1/(H(id0j ) + sm )Q,
as B 0 knows sm .
• OScr : As the IAID protocol is zero-knowledge, B 0 can simulate and output a valid
transcript of the IAID protocol’s execution, when taking as input an identity of a
user and a set of other identities.
As discussed above, at a point, A returns a target group of identities {idj }kj=1 with
the group public key gpk = V = g(f (u, {H(idj )}kj=1 )), successfully executes the IAID
protocol and knows (id∗ , Rid∗ , W ∗ ) with non-negligible probability satisfying e(hid∗ P +
Ppub , W ∗ ) = e(P, V ), hid∗ = H(id∗ ) and id∗ ∈
/ {idj }kj=1 . We have hid∗ ∈
/ {H(idj )}kj=1 ,
and W ∗ is the witness that hid∗ has been accumulated in V . That means B 0 can break
the Collision-Resistance property of DA1.

4.4.3

Constant-size ID-based Ring Signatures

The FiatShamir heuristic can be used to convert the ID-based adhoc anonymous identification scheme IA1 into an ID-based ring signature scheme IR1. The RSetup and
RKeyGen algorithms of the IR1 scheme are the same as the Setup and KeyGen algorithms of the IA1 scheme, respectively. In IR1’s RSign algorithm, the signer executes
the MakeGPK and MakeGSK algorithms and applies the FiatShamir heuristic to the
IAID protocol to obtain an ID-based ring signature. In IR1’s RVerify algorithm, the
verifier executes the MakeGPK algorithm and applies the FiatShamir heuristic to the
IAID protocol to verify an ID-based ring signature. More specifically, each signature
contains (U1 , U2 , R, c, s1 , ... s7 ), where c is computed from a hash function (a random oracle). Both the signer and the verifier only need to perform a computation
proportional to the ring size once, and get some constant-size information (the group
secret key and the group public key, respectively), on which they can produce/verify
many subsequent signatures in constant time. The security of the scheme is stated in
Theorem 4.4.2, which is based on results in Theorem 4.4.1 and Lemma 4.4.1.
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Theorem 4.4.2 In the random oracle model, the ID-based ring signature scheme IR1
provides Correctness and Unconditional Anonymity; and it provides UNF-ID-CMGSA
if the q-Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption holds, where q is the upper bound of the
group size.

Proof: Based on Theorem 2.7.1 and Lemma 4.4.1, the pair (RSign, RVerify) of IR1
in the random oracle model is a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge
(hid , Rid , W ) satisfying equations e(hid Q+Qpub , Rid ) = e(Q, Q) and e(hid P +Ppub , W ) =
e(P, V ). Then the Correctness of IR1 results directly from the Completeness of (RSign,
RVerify). Using the same arguments in the proofs for Unconditional Anonymity and
Soundness of IA1, we can prove that IR1 provides Unconditional Anonymity and
UNF-ID-CMGSA respectively. In these arguments, the oracles OExID , OSign and
OCha of the ID-based ring signature scheme IR1 respectively correspond to the oracles OExID , OScr and OCha of the ID-based ad-hoc anonymous identification scheme

2

IA1.

4.5

Application to Membership Revocation

We show how dynamic accumulators can be used to achieve membership revocation
for group signature, traceable signature, identity escrow and anonymous credential systems. In particular, we provide membership revocation to the identity escrow scheme
proposed in Chapter 3, and prove its security in the formal model above. The scheme
can be easily converted to a group signature scheme (using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic)
or extended to a traceable signature scheme or an anonymous credential system; all of
them provide membership revocation.

4.5.1

Identity Escrow with Membership Revocation

We propose an identity escrow with membership revocation scheme IE1. As defined in
the formal model, our identity escrow scheme involves a trusted party for initial set-up,
two group managers (the issuer and the opener), and users, each with a unique identity
i ∈ Z+ , that may become group members. The scheme is a tuple IE1 =(GKg, UKg,
Join, Iss, IEIDP , IEIDV , Open, Judge, Revoke, Update, CheckArchive) of PT algorithms
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which are defined as follows.
GKg: The trusted party runs this algorithm as follows. Suppose 1` is the input, the
bilinear pairing instance generator BPG (defined in section 2.2) is run to generate a
tuple of bilinear pairing parameters t = (p, G, GT , e, P ) ← BPG(1` ), that is also the
publicly shared parameters. Choose P0 , G, G1 , G2 , H ← G, x, x0 ← Z∗p and compute
0

Ppub = xP , Θ = e(G, G)x .
An instance of the dynamic accumulator DA1 is also generated by choosing Q ← G,
s ← Z∗p , computing Qpub = sQ and defining functions (f, g), corresponding to the
domain Zp \{−s} for elements to be accumulated and the auxiliary information af = s,
as:
f :

Zp × Zp → Zp

and

g:

Zp → G

f : (u, a) 7→ (a + s)u
g : u 7→ uQ
Note that unlike the definition of DA1, the tuple t0 = (Q, sQ, . . . , sq Q) does not need
to be generated here. The reason is that the evaluation of the accumulated value can be
done by the issuer with the knowledge of the auxiliary information s; and the efficient
addition and efficient deletion properties allow witnesses to be updated without the
knowledge of the tuple t0 .
Besides tables reg and upk, there is also a public archive, as a table arc. Each entry j
(row j th ) on the table will have three attributes, the first attribute contains a certificate
part of a user, who was added to or deleted from the group. The second attribute is
just one bit, to indicate whether the user was added (1) or deleted (0). The third
attribute contains the group accumulated value Vj (more description of this value will
be given) after adding or deleting that user.
Initially, the public archive is empty, an u ← Z∗p is generated and the group accumulated
value is set to V0 = uQ. The group public key is gpk =(u, Q, Qpub , P , P0 , Ppub , H, G,
G1 , G2 , Θ), the issuing key is ik = (s, x), and the opening key is ok = x0 .
UKg: This algorithm generates keys that provide authenticity for messages sent by
the user in the (Join, Iss) protocol. This algorithm is the key generation algorithm KS
of any digital signature scheme (KS , Sign, V er) that is unforgeable against chosen
message attacks (UNF-CMA). A user i runs the UKg algorithm that takes as input
a security parameter 1` and outputs a personal public and private signature key pair
(upk[i], usk[i]). Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) can be used here. Although any
UNF-CMA signature scheme can be used, but using schemes whose security is based
on the DBDH or SDH assumptions, will reduce the underlying assumptions of our
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group signature scheme.
(Join, Iss): In this protocol, a user i and the issuer first generate a value xi ∈ Z∗p so that
its randomization is contributed by both parties, but its value is only known by the user.
The issuer then generates (ai , Si ) for the user so that e(ai P +Ppub , Si ) = e(P, xi P +P0 ).
The user uses usk[i] to sign his messages in the protocol. Suppose the current group
accumulated value, which is publicly known, is Vj (there have been j entries on the
table arc), the issuer computes a new group accumulated value Vj+1 = (ai + s)Vj and
appends an entry (ai , 1, Vj+1 ) to the table. Note that the formal model assumes the
communication to be private and authenticated. In case the user i was revoked and
now rejoins the group again (reg[i] has been filled), he and the issuer just need to
perform the steps 8, 9 and 10 of the protocol. The protocol is as follows.
1. user i −→ issuer: I = yP + rH, where y, r ← Z∗p .
2. user i ←− issuer: u, v ← Z∗p .
3. The user computes xi = uy + v, Pi = xi P .
4. user i −→ issuer: Pi and a proof of knowledge of (xi , r0 ) such that Pi = xi P and
vP + uI − Pi = r0 H.
5. The issuer verifies the proof, then chooses ai ← Z∗p different from all corresponding elements previously issued, and computes Si =

1
(Pi
ai +x

+ P0 ).

6. user i ←− issuer: ai , Si .
7. The user computes ∆i = e(P, Si ), verifies if e(ai P + Ppub , Si ) = e(P, xi P + P0 ),
and stores the membership secret key gsk[i] = (xi , ai , Si , ∆i ). Note that only the
user knows xi . The issuer also computes ∆i and makes an entry in the table reg:
reg[i] = (i, ∆i , hJoin, Issi transcript so far).
8. Suppose the current group accumulated value is Vj , the issuer computes a new
group accumulated value Vj+1 = (ai + s)Vj and appends (ai , 1, Vj+1 ) to the table
arc.
9. user i ←− issuer: j + 1, Vj+1
10. The user verifies that e(ai Q + Qpub , Vj ) = e(Q, Vj+1 ), then sets his current membership witness to be (j + 1, Wi,j+1 ) where Wi,j+1 = Vj .
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(IEIDP , IEIDV ): This protocol IEID shows a user i’s knowledge of (ai , Si ) and a
secret xi such that: e(ai P + Ppub , Si ) = e(P, xi P + P0 ) and ai has been accumulated
in the current group accumulated value. The protocol does not reveal any information
about his knowledge to anyone, except for the opener, who can only compute ∆i by
decrypting an encryption of that value. Before the protocol is started, user i checks
the table arc to find the latest group accumulated value Vj and runs Update algorithm
to compute his current membership witness (j, Wi,j ) (or the issuer asks the users to
run Update after changes in the table arc). The protocol is then run between user i
(as IEIDP ) and a verifier IEIDV as follows.
1. IEIDP computes E = tG, Λ = ∆i Θt (∆i is encrypted by El GamalBP 1 public key
(G, Θ)).
2. The following sub-protocol, which we call the Proving protocol, is performed.
(a) IEIDP generates r1 , r2 , r3 , k0 , ..., k8 ← Zp and computes: U1 = Si + r1 H;
U2 = Wi,j + r2 H; R = r1 G1 + r2 G2 + r3 H; T1 = k1 G1 + k2 G2 + k3 H;
T2 = k4 G1 +k5 G2 +k6 H−k7 R; T3 = k8 G; Π1 = e(P, P )k0 e(P, U1 )−k7 e(P, H)k4
e(Ppub , H)k1 ; Π2 = e(Q, U2 )−k7 e(Q, H)k5 e(Qpub , H)k2 ; Π3 = e(P, H)−k1 Θk8
(b) IEIDP −→ IEIDV : E, Λ, U1 , U2 , R, T1 , T2 , T3 , Π1 , Π2 , Π3 .
(c) IEIDP ←− IEIDV : c ← Zp .
(d) IEIDP computes in Zp : s0 = k0 +cxi ; s1 = k1 +cr1 ; s2 = k2 +cr2 ; s3 = k3 +cr3 ;
s4 = k4 + cr1 ai ; s5 = k5 + cr2 ai ; s6 = k6 + cr3 ai ; s7 = k7 + cai ; s8 = k8 + ct
(e) IEIDP −→ IEIDV : s0 , ..., s8 .
?

?

(f) IEIDV verifies that T1 = s1 G1 + s2 G2 + s3 H − cR; T2 = s4 G1 + s5 G2 + s6 H −
?

?

s7 R; T3 = s8 G − cE; Π1 = e(P, P )s0 e(P, U1 )−s7 e(P, H)s4
?

e(Ppub , H)s1 e(P, P0 )c e(Ppub , U1 )−c ; Π2 = e(Q, U2 )−s7 e(Q, H)s5
?

e(Qpub , H)s2 e(Q, Vj )c e(Qpub , U2 )−c ; Π3 = e(P, H)−s1 Θs8 Λ−c e(P, U1 )c .
Open: To open an IEID transcript (E, Λ, ...) to find the prover, the opener computes
0

∆i = Λe(E, G)−x and a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof % of knowledge of x so
0

0

that Θ = e(G, G)x and Λ/∆i = e(E, G)x ; and finds the corresponding entry i in the
table reg. If no entry is found, it returns (0, ∆i , %). Otherwise, it returns (reg[i], %).
Judge: Anyone can run the Judge algorithm as follows. On an output (reg[i], %) by
the Open algorithm for an IEID transcript (E, Λ, ...), it returns reject if verification of
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the proof % rejects. Otherwise, it returns accept. On an output (0, ∆i , %) by Open, it
returns reject if verification of the proof % rejects; otherwise, it returns accept.
Revoke: To remove a user i from the group, the issuer retrieves the user’s ai from
the table reg and the current group accumulated value Vj and computes a new group
accumulated value Vj+1 = (1/(ai + s))Vj . The issuer appends a new entry (ai , 0, Vj+1 )
on the table arc.
Update: Given access to the arc table, which currently has n rows, a user i with a
membership witness (j, Wi,j ) computes a new witness as follows. Its cost is about n − j
scalar multiplications.
for (k = j + 1; k + +; k ≤ n) do
retrieve from row k th of arc the entry (a, b, Vk );
if b = 1, then Wi,k = Vk−1 + (a − ai )Wi,k−1
else Wi,k = (1/(a − ai ))(Wi,k−1 − Vk ) end if;
end for;
return (n, Wi,n );
CheckArchive: Any party, after a change on the public archive, can run this algorithm
as follows.
retrieve from the new row of arc the entry (a, b, Vk );
if (b = 1) then return (e(aQ + Qpub , Vk−1 ) = e(Q, Vk ))
else return (e(aQ + Qpub , Vk ) = e(Q, Vk−1 ));

4.5.2

Correctness and Security

Correctness and Security of the scheme IE1 is stated in Theorems 4.5.1, 4.5.2, 4.5.3
and 4.5.4. Their proofs are provided later in this section.
Theorem 4.5.1 The identity escrow with membership revocation scheme IE1 provides
Correctness.
Theorem 4.5.2 The scheme IE1 provides Anonymity if the Decisional Bilinear DiffieHellman assumption holds.
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Theorem 4.5.3 The scheme IE1 provides Traceability if the q-Strong Diffie-Hellman
assumption holds, where q is the upper bound of the group size.
Theorem 4.5.4 The scheme IE1 provides Non-frameability if the Discrete Logarithm
assumption holds over the group G and the digital signature scheme (KS , Sign, V er)
is UNF-CMA.
These theorems are proved similar to the proof for Theorem 3.3.1 of the group
signature scheme GS2, except for the inclusion of the accumulator DA1 to handle
membership revocation and related oracles RevokeU and Witness. Before proving these
theorems, we first prove the Zero-knowledge property of the Proving protocol in IEID
protocol and the Coalition-Resistance of IE1. Coalition-Resistance intuitively means
that a group of colluding members, with knowledge of the opening key and access to
some oracles (as in the Traceability requirement defined in subsection 4.2.3), should
not be able to generate a new valid pair of a membership secret key and a current
membership witness. We then use these results to prove that IE1 provides Anonymity
(Theorem 4.5.2), Traceability (Theorem 4.5.3) and Non-frameability (Theorem 4.5.4),
under corresponding assumptions.

The Proving protocol is zero-knowledge
Lemma 4.5.1 Under the Discrete Log assumption on G, the Proving protocol in the
IEID protocol is an (honest-verifier) perfect zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of Wi,j ,
(ai , Si ), xi and t such that e(ai Q+Qpub , Wi,j ) = e(Q, Vj ), e(ai P +Ppub , Si ) = e(P, xi P +
P0 ), E = tG and Λ = e(P, Si )Θt .

Proof: Consider an IE1 instance where the group public key is gpk =(u, Q, Qpub , P ,
P0 , Ppub , H, G, G1 , G2 , Θ), the issuing key is ik = (s, x), the opening key is ok = x0
and the current group accumulated value is Vj . We prove that the Proving protocol
provides completeness, soundness and zero-knowledge property as follows.
Completeness: Suppose an honest group member i has a membership secret key gsk[i] =
(xi , ai , Si , ∆i ) and an updated membership witness W such that e(ai P + Ppub , Si ) =
e(P, xi P + P0 ) and e(ai Q + Qpub , W ) = e(Q, Vj ). Suppose i generates t ← Z∗p , computes
E = tG, Λ = ∆i Θt and correctly performs the Proving protocol to a verifier. Then the
verifier outputs accept, as the following equations hold.
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• T1 = k1 G1 + k2 G2 + k3 H = s1 G1 + s2 G2 + s3 H − cR.
• T2 = k4 G1 + k5 G2 + k6 H − k7 R = s4 G1 + s5 G2 + s6 H − s7 R.
• T3 = k8 G = s8 G − cE.
• Π1 = e(P, P )k0 e(P, U1 )−k7 e(P, H)k4 e(Ppub , H)k1 = e(P, P )s0 e(P, U1 )−s7 e(P, H)s4
e(Ppub , H)s1 e(P, P0 )c e(Ppub , U1 )−c .
• Π2 = e(Q, U2 )−k7 e(Q, H)k5 e(Qpub , H)k2 = e(Q, U2 )−s7 e(Q, H)s5 e(Qpub , H)s2
e(Q, Vj )c e(Qpub , U2 )−c .
• Π3 = e(P, H)−k1 Θk8 = e(P, H)−s1 Θs8 Λ−c e(P, U1 )c .
Soundness: If the protocol accepts with non-negligible probability, we show that under
the Discrete Log assumption on G, a PPT prover must have the knowledge of Wi,j ,
(ai , Si ), xi and t with the relations stated in the lemma. Suppose the protocol accepts
for the same commitment (U1 , U2 , R, T1 , T2 , T3 , Π1 , Π2 , Π3 ) with two different pairs of
challenges and responses (c, s0 , ...s8 ) and (c0 , s00 , ..., s08 ). Let fi =

si −s0i
,
c−c0

i = 0, ..., 8, as

the protocol accepts, we have:
• s1 G1 +s2 G2 +s3 H−cR = s01 G1 +s02 G2 +s03 H−c0 R(= T1 ), so R = f1 G1 +f2 G2 +f3 H.
• s4 G1 + s5 G2 + s6 H − s7 R = s04 G1 + s05 G2 + s06 H − s07 R(= T2 ), so f7 R = f4 G1 +
f5 G2 + f6 H.
• s8 G − cE = s08 G − c0 E(= T3 ), so E = f8 G.
• e(P, P )s0 e(P, U1 )−s7 e(P, H)s4 e(Ppub , H)s1 e(P, P0 )c e(Ppub , U1 )−c =
0

0

0

0

0

0

e(P, P )s0 e(P, U1 )−s7 e(P, H)s4 e(Ppub , H)s1 e(P, P0 )c e(Ppub , U1 )−c (= Π1 ), so
e(Ppub , U1 )e(P, P0 )−1 = e(P, P )f0 e(P, U1 )−f7 e(P, H)f4 e(Ppub , H)f1 .
• e(Q, U2 )−s7 e(Q, H)s5 e(Qpub , H)s2 e(Q, Vj )c e(Qpub , U2 )−c =
0

0

0

0

0

e(Q, U2 )−s7 e(Q, H)s5 e(Qpub , H)s2 e(Q, Vj )c e(Qpub , U2 )−c (= Π2 ), so
e(Qpub , U2 )e(Q, Vj )−1 = e(Q, U2 )−f7 e(Q, H)f5 e(Qpub , H)f2 .
0

0

0

0

• e(P, H)−s1 Θs8 Λ−c e(P, U1 )c = e(P, H)−s1 Θs8 Λ−c e(P, U1 )c (= Π3 ), so
Λe(P, U1 )−1 = e(P, H)−f1 Θf8 .
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From the first two equations, the prover has O = (f4 − f7 f1 )G1 + (f5 − f7 f2 )G2 +
(f6 − f7 f3 )H (O is the identity element of G). Under the Discrete Log assumption on
G, it implies that f4 = f7 f1 and f5 = f7 f2 .
Let ai = f7 , Si = U1 − f1 H, xi = f0 , t = f8 and Wi,j = U2 − f2 H, then E = tG,
Λ = e(P, Si )Θt , e(ai P + Ppub , Si ) = e(P, xi P + P0 ) and e(ai Q + Qpub , Wi,j ) = e(Q, Vj ).
So the prover has the knowledge of Wi,j , (ai , Si ), xi and t satisfying these relations.
Zero-knowledge: The simulator chooses c, s0 , ...s8 ← Zp , U1 , U2 , R ← G and computes
T1 = s1 G1 + s2 G2 + s3 H − cR; T2 = s4 G1 + s5 G2 + s6 H − s7 R; T3 = s8 G − cE;
Π1 = e(P, P )s0 e(P, U1 )−s7 e(P, H)s4 e(Ppub , H)s1 e(P, P0 )c e(Ppub , U1 )−c ; Π2 = e(Q, U2 )−s7
e(Q, H)s5 e(Qpub , H)s2 e(Q, Vj )c e(Qpub , U2 )−c ; Π3 = e(P, H)−s1 Θs8 Λ−c e(P, U1 )c . It then
outputs (U1 , U2 , R, T1 , T2 , T3 , Π1 , Π2 , Π3 , c, s0 , ...s8 ). Then, the distribution of the simulator’s output is the same as the distribution of the transcript generated from the
Proving protocol execution, which is the uniform distribution over the set
{(U1 , U2 , R, T1 , T2 , T3 , Π1 , Π2 , Π3 , c, s0 , ...s8 ) |
(U1 , U2 , R, T1 , T2 , T3 ∈ G) ∧ (Π1 , Π2 , Π3 ∈ GT ) ∧
(c, s0 , ...s8 ∈ Zp ) ∧ (T1 = s1 G1 + s2 G2 + s3 H − cR) ∧
(T2 = s4 G1 + s5 G2 + s6 H − s7 R) ∧ (T3 = s8 G − cE) ∧
(Π1 = e(P, P )s0 e(P, U1 )−s7 e(P, H)s4 e(Ppub , H)s1 e(P, P0 )c e(Ppub , U1 )−c ) ∧
(Π2 = e(Q, U2 )−s7 e(Q, H)s5 e(Qpub , H)s2 e(Q, Vj )c e(Qpub , U2 )−c ) ∧
(Π3 = e(P, H)−s1 Θs8 Λ−c e(P, U1 )c )}

2

Coalition-Resistance
We first give a formal definition of Coalition-Resistance for identity escrow with membership revocation schemes and then prove that this property is provided by IE1.
Coalition-Resistance property is not a security requirement for a provably secure identity escrow with membership revocation scheme. We just use it as a step to prove the
Traceability requirement.
In the following Coalition-Resistance definition, there is a PPT adversary A attacking an identity escrow with membership revocation scheme IE. A PPT algorithm
U can determine the validity of a membership secret key and a current membership
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witness, that means U, on input public parameters, a membership secret key and a
current membership witness, outputs 1 if and only if the membership secret key and
the current membership witness are valid with regard to the public parameters. An
experiment is played as follows (the reader can refer to subsection 4.2.3 for explanation
of the following notations, sets, tables and oracles). The experiment first runs GKg
on input 1` to obtain keys gpk, ik, ok that are used by the oracles, and all entries of
the tables upk, reg and arc are assumed to be empty initially. It is also assumed that
the experiment maintains the following sets which are initially empty and manipulated
by the oracles: a set HU of honest users; a set CU of corrupted users. The adversary
with the knowledge of ok can query the oracles CrptU, SndToI, AddU, RReg, USK,
RevokeU and Witness. The adversary finally outputs a membership secret key gsk 0 and
a current membership witness w0 . The adversary is considered successful if (gsk 0 , w0 )
has not been generated before in the experiment and U(gpk, arc, gsk 0 , w0 ) = 1. The
Coalition-Resistance property requires that the probability that the adversary succeeds
is negligible.
Coalition-Resistance. For an identity escrow with membership revocation scheme
IE, given a security parameter ` ∈ N, a PPT adversary A, a PPT algorithm U that
takes as input public parameters, a membership secret key and a membership witness
and returns 0 or 1 (it determines the validity of a pair of a membership secret key and
a current membership witness), the experiment for Coalition-Resistance is defined as
follows.
Experiment Expcoal.re
IE,A,U (`)
(gpk, ik, ok) ← GKg(1` ); CU ← ∅; HU ← ∅
(gsk 0 , w0 ) ← A(gpk, ok : CrptU(·, ·), SndToI(·, ·), AddU(·), RReg(·), USK(·),
RevokeU(·), Witness(·))
If (gsk 0 , w0 ) ∈ {(gsk[i], Update(i))| i ∈ CU ∪ HU} then return 0
else return U(gpk, arc, gsk 0 , w0 )
The scheme IE provides Coalition-Resistance with regard to U if the following function
Adv coal.re (`) is negligible.
IE,A,U

coal.re (`) = Pr[Expcoal.re (`) = 1]
AdvIE,A,U
IE,A,U
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We now prove that IE1 provides Coalition-Resistance, where the algorithm U determines that a membership secret key hxi , ai , Si , ∆i i and a current membership witness
Wi,j are considered valid with regard to a group public key hu, Q, Qpub , P, P0 , Ppub , H, G,
G1 , G2 , Θi and a current group accumulated value Vj if and only if they satisfy e(ai P +
Ppub , Si ) = e(P, xi P + P0 ) and e(ai Q + Qpub , Wi,j ) = e(Q, Vj ).
Lemma 4.5.2 If the q-SDH assumption holds, then the scheme IE1, whose group size
is bounded by q, provides Coalition-Resistance, where the algorithm U is defined as:
U(hu, Q, Qpub , P, P0 , Ppub , H, G, G1 , G2 , Θi, Vj , hxi , ai , Si , ∆i i, Wi,j ) = 1 ⇔
(e(ai P + Ppub , Si ) = e(P, xi P + P0 ) ∧ e(ai Q + Qpub , Wi,j ) = e(Q, Vj )), where Vj is the
latest group accumulated value.

Proof:

We first prove that if there is a PPT adversary A with the capabilities as

specified in the Coalition-Resistance definition, who can, with non-negligible probability, output a new membership secret key (x∗ , a∗ , S ∗ , ∆∗ ), satisfying e(a∗ P + Ppub , S ∗ ) =
e(P, x∗ P + P0 ) and not in the set of membership secret keys {(xi , ai , Si , ∆i )}qi=1 generated during A’s attack, then there is a PPT adversary B that can break the q-SDH
assumption (1).
Suppose a tuple challenge = (R, zR, . . . , z q R) is given, where z ← Z∗p , we show
that B can compute (c, 1/(z + c)R), where c ∈ Zp with non-negligible probability. We
consider two cases.
Case 1: This is a trivial case, where A outputs S ∗ ∈ {S1 , ..., Sq } with non-negligible
probability. In this case, B chooses s, u, x, x0 ← Z∗p and G, G1 , G2 , H, Q ← G, gives A
the group public key (u, Q, Qpub = sQ, P = R, P0 = zR, Ppub = xP, H, G, G1 , G2 , Θ =
0

e(G, G)x ) and the opening key x0 and simulates a set of possible users. Then B
can simulate all oracles A needs to access. Suppose a set of membership secret keys
{(xi , ai , Si , ∆i )}qi=1 is generated and A outputs a new (x∗ , a∗ , S ∗ , ∆∗ ) with non-negligible
probability such that S ∗ ∈ {S1 , ..., Sq }. Suppose S ∗ = Sj , where j ∈ {1, ..., q}. Then
1
(x∗ P
a∗ +x

+ P0 ) =

1
(xj P
aj +x

+ P0 ), and so (aj − a∗ )P0 = (a∗ xj − aj x∗ + xj x − x∗ x)P .

Therefore, from this B can compute z, and hence (c, 1/(z + c)R), for any c ∈ Zp .
Case 2: This is when the Case 1 does not hold and A outputs S ∗ ∈
/ {S1 , ..., Sq } with
non-negligible probability. Then B plays the following game:
1. Generate α, ai , xi ← Z∗p , i = 1, ..., q, where ai s are different from one another. B
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then chooses m ← {1, ..., q}.
2. Let x = z −am , then the following P, Ppub , P0 are computable by B from the tuple
challenge.
q
Y

P =

(z + ai − am )R

i=1,i6=m
q
Y

Ppub = xP = (z − am )

(z + ai − am )R

i=1,i6=m

P0 = α

q
Y

(z + ai − am )R − xm

i=1

q
Y

(z + ai − am )R

i=1,i6=m

3. Generate u, s, x0 ← Z∗p and G, G1 , G2 , H, Q ← G and give A the group public key
0

(u, Q, Qpub = sQ, P, P0 , Ppub , H, G, G1 , G2 , Θ = e(G, G)x ) and the opening key x0
and simulates a set of possible users.
4. As B knows s and x0 and controls the issuer, the opener, the users and the
tables reg, upk and arc, B can simulate oracles CrptU, RReg, USK, RevokeU and
Witness that A needs to access. For oracle AddU, B simulates the addition of an
honest user i by generating a pair (upk[i], usk[i]) for i and simulating the Join,
Iss protocol. As playing both sides of the Join, Iss protocol, B can simulate the
first 4 steps of the protocol as specified and generate ai at the step 5 so that
the prepared ai , xi above are computed in the protocol to be the corresponding
parts of the user i’s private signing key. B then computes Si and completes the
protocol as follows:
• If i = m, then
q
Y
1
Sm =
(xm P + P0 ) = α
(z + ai − am )R
am + x
i=1,i6=m

This is computable from the tuple challenge.
• If i 6= m, then
1
(xi P + P0 )
ai + x
q
q
Y
Y
= (xi − xm )
(z + aj − am )R + α
(z + aj − am )R

Si =

j=1,j6=m,i

This is computable from the tuple challenge.

j=1,j6=i
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For oracle SndToI, B simulates the addition of a corrupted user as follows. Suppose A wants an execution of the Join, Iss protocol between the issuer (controlled
by B) and a user i (controlled by A). As being able to extract information from
A, after receiving the commitment I from A, B can find y, r and generate u, v, ai
at the first 5 steps of the protocol so that the prepared ai , xi above are computed in the protocol to be the corresponding parts of the user i’s keys. B then
completes the protocol by computing Si as shown above for the oracle AddU.
5. Get the output (x∗ , a∗ , S ∗ , ∆∗ ) from A, where
1
(x∗ P + P0 )
a∗ + x
q
Y
1
∗
(αz + x − xm )
(z + ai − am )R
=
z + a∗ − am
i=1,i6=m

S∗ =

We can see that the case αz + x∗ − xm = α(z + a∗ − am ) happens with negligible
probability, as it results in S ∗ = Sm . So the case αz +x∗ −xm 6= α(z +a∗ −am ) happens
with non-negligible probability ². Suppose the probability that a∗ ∈ {a1 , ..., aq } is ε,
then the probability that a∗ ∈
/ {a1 , ..., aq }\{am } is ²− q−1
ε, which is also non-negligible if
q
q is bound by a polynomial of `. When a∗ ∈
/ {a1 , ..., aq }\{am },
∗

from the tuple challenge and S . So B can compute (c,

1
R
z+a∗ −am

1
R),
z+c

is computable

where c = a∗ − am .

So, the statement (1) has been proved. As the dynamic accumulator DA1 provides
collision-resistant against adaptive attacks (Theorems 4.2.1 and 4.3.1), suppose the
q-SDH assumption holds, a PPT adversary can not find a0 ∈
/ {ai | i ∈ CU ∪ HU} and
W 0 with non-negligible probability such that e(a0 Q + Qpub , W 0 ) = e(Q, V ), where V
is the current group accumulated value. This fact and the statement (1) show that
the probability a PPT adversary wins the Coalition-Resistance experiment on IE1 is
negligible if the q-SDH assumption holds. That means Lemma 4.5.2 has been proved.

2

Proof of Theorem 4.5.1.
Consider an IE1 instance where the group public key is gpk =(u, Q, Qpub , P , P0 , Ppub ,
H, G, G1 , G2 , Θ), the issuing key is ik = (s, x), the opening key is ok = x0 and the
current group accumulated value is Vj . Suppose an honest group member i, with a
personal public and private signature key pair (upk[i], usk[i]), a membership secret key
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gsk[i] = (xi , ai , Si , ∆i ) and a current membership witness Wi,j , correctly performs the
IEIDP algorithm with an honest verifier. We show that IEIDV , Open and Judge will
perform as required by the Correctness condition.
Using the same arguments as in the proof for the Completeness of the Proving protocol, as shown in Lemma 4.5.1, we have that IEIDV accepts. The Open algorithm, when
opening (E, Λ, U1 , U2 , R, T1 , T2 , T3 , Π1 , Π2 , Π3 , c, s0 , ...s8 ), computes ∆i = Λe(E, G)−x

0

and finds the corresponding entry i in the table reg. Therefore, it returns the identity
of the user i together with ∆i , hJoin, Issi transcript for i and a proof % of knowledge of
0

0

x0 so that Θ = e(G, G)x and Λ/∆i = e(E, G)x .
Suppose the Judge algorithm takes as input gpk, i, upk[i], (E, Λ, U1 , U2 , R, T1 , T2 , T3 ,
Π1 , Π2 , Π3 , c, s0 , ...s8 ), ∆i , hJoin, Issi transcript for i and the proof %. It will outputs
accept, as the following holds: (i) the proof % is valid; (ii) the hJoin, Issi transcript is
valid with regard to upk[i]; (iii) ∆i = e(P, Si ) where Si is extracted from the hJoin, Issi
transcript.
In short, IEIDV , Open and Judge perform as required by the Correctness condition.
Hence, IE1 provides correctness.

Proof of Theorem 4.5.2.
Suppose there is a PPT adversary A that can break Anonymity property of IE1,
we show a construction of a PPT adversary B that can break IND-CPA property of
El GamalBP 1 . Suppose an El GamalBP 1 public key (G, Θ) is given, B constructs an
instance of IE1 by generating the issuing key ik = (s, x) and the group public key
gpk = (u, Q, Qpub , P, P0 , Ppub , H, G, G1 , G2 , Θ). The opening key ok is the private key
of the El GamalBP 1 public key, and is unknown to B. Let B play the role of the
issuer, simulate the set of possible users and provides A with gpk, ik and access to the
following simulated oracles:
• SndToI(·, ·), SndToU(·, ·), WReg(·, ·), USK(·), CrptU(·, ·), RevokeU(·) and
Witness(·). With the above capabilities, B can easily simulate these oracles.
• Ch(d, ·, ·). When receiving a query (i0 , i1 , m) from A, B finds ∆id and asks for an
El GamalBP 1 challenge encryption cip = (E, Λ) of ∆id . From that, B simulates
c, s0 , ...s8 , U1 , U2 , R, T1 , T2 , T3 and Π1 , Π2 , Π3 as in the Zero-knowledge proof of
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Lemma 4.5.1. Then B returns to A the challenge transcript (E, Λ, U1 , U2 , R, T1 ,
T2 , T3 , Π1 , Π2 , Π3 , c, s0 , ...s8 ).
At last, B outputs the bit returned by A. As A can break Anonymity property, B
outputs the correct bit with non-negligible probability.

Proof of Theorem 4.5.3.
Suppose there is a PPT adversary A that can break Traceability property of IE1, we
show that there exists a PPT adversary B that can break Coalition-Resistance of IE1.
Suppose A can performs the IEID protocol with an honest verifier so that the opener
can not trace the identity of the prover or the opener can find the identity but can not
prove that to the Judge. As the IEID protocol has Soundness (Lemma 4.5.1), B can find
Wi,j , ai , Si , xi and t so that E = tG, Λ = e(P, Si )Θt , e(ai Q + Qpub , Wi,j ) = e(Q, Vj )
and e(ai P + Ppub , Si ) = e(P, xi P + P0 ). So the opener, which is assumed to operate
accurately, should find ∆i = e(P, Si ) from the transcript. The issuer is assumed to
be uncorrupted and no oracle accessible by the adversaries can write on reg table or
overwrite upk[j] of a group member j (CrptU does not apply to group members). So
if ∆i can not be found on reg, B has produced a new valid pair of membership secret
key and witness.

Proof of Theorem 4.5.4.
Suppose there is a PPT adversary A that can break Non-frameability property of
IE1 we show that there exists a PPT adversary B that can break Discrete Logarithm
Assumption over G. Suppose that B is given a challenge (P, P ∗ = zP ), where P ← G∗
and z ← Z∗p , and B needs to compute z. B constructs an instance of IE1 by generating
u, s, x, x0 , d ← Z∗p and G, G1 , G2 , H, Q ← G and give A the group signature public
0

key (u, Q, Qpub , P, P0 = dP, Ppub = xP, H, G, G1 , G2 , Θa = e(G, G)x ), the issuing key
ik = (x, s) and the opening key x0 . B simulates a set of possible users {1, ..., q}, where
q is the upper bound of the group size, chooses i0 ← {1, ..., q} and provides A access
to the following simulated oracles:
• SndToU(i, Min ). If i 6= i0 , B just plays as a honest user i and executes Iss as
specified in Min . If i = i0 , B simulates the Join, Iss protocol so that Pi0 = P ∗
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(by controlling the random oracle, B can simulate the proof of knowledge in the
protocol). Suppose the membership secret key obtained for i0 is (xi0 , ai0 , Si0 , ∆i0 ),
where xi0 = z is unknown to B.
• WReg(·, ·), GSig(·, ·), USK(·), CrptU(·, ·), RevokeU(·) and Witness(·). With the
capabilities above, B can simulate all these oracles, except the case when he gets
a query USK(i0 ). In this case, B fails.
If A succeeds with probability ², then the probability that he can impersonate
i0 in IEID is at least ²/q, as i0 ← {1, ..., q}. As the IEID protocol has Soundness
(Lemma 4.5.1), B can find ai1 , Si1 , xi1 and t so that Ea = tG, Λa = e(P, Si1 )Θta
and e(ai1 P + Ppub , Si1 ) = e(P, xi1 P + P0 ). Then we have ∆i0 = e(P, Si1 ) and so
e(P, Si0 ) = e(P, Si1 ) or Si0 = Si1 . Therefore,

1
(xi0 P
ai0 +x

+ dP ) =

1
(xi1 P
ai1 +x

+ dP ),

from that, B can compute z = xi0 .

4.6

Efficiency

We compare our ID-based ring signature scheme and fully dynamic group signature
scheme, which is converted from the identity escrow with membership revocation system IE1 using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic, with previous corresponding schemes at the
same level of security. Comparisons for the interactive dual schemes (ID-based adhoc anonymous identification scheme and identity escrow with membership revocation
scheme IE1) can be similarly made. Our ID-based ring signature scheme is the first
to provide constant-size signatures. The signature size is also much smaller than that
of the current state-of-the-art normal ring signature scheme DKNS04 [DKNS04]. For
elliptic curve group of 160-bit prime order, the signature size is only about 220 bytes.
The same observation applies to the size of our group signatures in comparison with
those in the best schemes CL02 [CL02], TX03 [TX03], and even the ACJT00 scheme,
which does not have membership revocation. Although arc is long (like the CL02 and
TX03 schemes), but the issuer can remove old entries after all users have updated
their keys. Note that most of pairing operations in IAID and IEID can be precomputed
and published before the executions of the protocol. Besides, some recent papers
[BLS03, SB04, Scott04] have shown rapid improvements in implementing the pairing
operation.
We now make a specific comparison of sizes in our new group signature scheme with
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membership revocation with those in the ACJT00 and CL02 schemes. We assume that
our scheme is implemented using an elliptic curve or a hyperelliptic curve over a finite
field, where p is a 160-bit prime, G is a subgroup of an elliptic curve group or a Jacobian
of a hyperelliptic curve over a finite field with order p and compression techniques are
used. GT is a subgroup of a finite field of size approximately 21024 . A possible choice of
these parameters can be from Boneh et al.’s short signature scheme [BLS01], where G
is derived from the curve E/GF (3ι ) defined by y 2 = x3 − x + 1. In addition, we assume
that system parameters in the ACJT00 and CL02 schemes are ² = 1.1, `p = 512,
k = 160, λ1 = 838, λ2 = 600, γ1 = 1102 and γ2 = 840 (as the CL02 scheme extends
the ACJT00 scheme, these parameters are specified in [ACJT00]). We summarize the
result in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1: Size Comparison of Fully
Signature gpk
ACJT00
1087
768
CL02 scheme
1968
1280
Our scheme
410
329

4.7

Dynamic Group Signature schemes (in Bytes)

gsk
370
370
188

ik
128
256
40

ok Membership Revocation
128
No
128
Yes
20
Yes

Summary

In this chapter, we proposed a new dynamic accumulator scheme from bilinear pairings and a number of its provably secure applications, including an ID-based ad-hoc
anonymous identification scheme, an identity escrow scheme with membership revocation and their non-interactive primitives, an ID-based ring signature scheme and a
fully dynamic group signature scheme. Signature sizes in our schemes are much smaller
than those in previous schemes. The size of our group signatures is only half the size of
the well-known ACJT00 scheme, which does not provide membership revocation. Our
fully dynamic group signature scheme provides trapdoor-freeness, which allows sharing of public parameters among groups and organizations. The dynamic accumulator
scheme can also be used to provide membership revocation for other primitives. We
also provided a generalized model of accumulators and formal models of ID-based adhoc anonymous identification schemes and identity escrow schemes with membership
revocation.

Chapter 5
Dynamic k-Times Anonymous
Authentication

5.1

Introduction

k-times anonymous authentication (k-TAA) schemes allow members of a group to be
anonymously authenticated by application providers for a bounded number of times.
k-TAA has application in e-voting, e-cash, electronic coupons and anonymous trial
browsing of content. In this chapter, we propose a formal security model for dynamic kTAA schemes, based on the formal security model for ordinary k-TAA schemes [TFS04]
presented in subsection 2.10.5. In dynamic k-TAA schemes, there are two new procedures. Granting access procedure allows an application provider (AP) to give users
permission to access the AP’s service. Revoking access procedure allows an AP to stop
users from accessing the AP’s service. Apart from providing properties as in an ordinary scheme, it is also required that a user can only be successfully authenticated by an
AP after being granted access from the AP and without being revoked access from the
AP. There are also four security requirements similar to those in the ordinary case, i.e.
D-Anonymity, D-Detectability, D-Exculpability for users and D-Exculpability for the GM.
However, the definitions of these requirements are more complicated to accommodate
the dynamic property.
We construct an ordinary k-TAA scheme and a dynamic k-TAA scheme from bilinear pairings, and prove security for both of the schemes under the Strong Diffie-Hellman
(SDH) and the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumptions. Besides, we
need to propose a new assumption, (`, m, n)-DBDH, and prove that the DBDH assumption implies the (`, m, n)-DBDH assumption.
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We use the dynamic accumulator proposed in Chapter 4 to provide dynamic property for the scheme, so the costs in our dynamic scheme are not linearly dependent on
the current group size or on the number of members revoked by each AP. The communication costs in our schemes are much smaller than the only known k-TAA scheme
(TFS04) [TFS04]. For instance, at a comparable level of security when the TFS04
scheme uses 1024 bit composite modulus and our schemes use elliptic curve groups of
order 160 bit prime, the sizes of authentication traffic in our two schemes are 60k + 224
bytes and 60k + 304 bytes, whereas that size in the TFS04 scheme is 60k + 1617 bytes,
where k is the access bound. Besides, the interactive protocols in our schemes achieve
honest verifier perfect zero-knowledge whereas those in the TFS04 scheme only provide
honest verifier statistical zero-knowledge. Our schemes can also be used as a dynamic
and an ordinary k-times anonymous signature schemes respectively.
Part of this chapter will appear in the Proceedings of The International Conference
on Applied Cryptography and Network Security (ACNS) 2005 [NS05].

5.2

A Model for Dynamic k-TAA schemes

We propose a formal model for dynamic k-TAA and underline the differences between
this model and the TFS04 model for ordinary k-TAA [TFS04] shown in section 2.10.5.

5.2.1

Entities and Procedures

Entities in the model are the GM, APs and users; the procedures are setup, joining,
bound announcement, granting access, revoking access, authentication and public tracing.
In the setup procedure (SETUP), the GM obtains a group public key/group secret key
pair, and each AP V obtains a pair of public and secret keys (apkV , askV ). AP V also
has an access group AGV , which is the set user identities who can access the AP’s
application, and also some other public information P IV . AGV is initially empty.
The joining procedure (UJOIN −GM , UJOIN −U ) allows a user i to join the group by
obtaining a member public key/member secret key pair (mpki , mski ) and the GM
adds the user’s identification and public key to an identification list LIST. In the bound
announcement procedure (BD-ANN), an AP announces the number of times a group
member can access his application by publishing his identity ID, and the upper bound
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k. An AP V uses the granting access procedure (GRAN-AP) to give selected group members permission to access the his application. He includes the new member in his access
group AGV and updates his public information P IV . Similarly, in the revoking access
procedure (REVO-AP), AP V can stop a group member from accessing his application
by excluding the member from his access group and updating his public information.
The authentication procedure (UAU T H−AP , UAU T H−U ), between a user i and AP V succeeds if and only if user i is currently in V’s access group AGV , and the number of
times user i has been authenticated is less than the allowed number. AP V records
the transcripts of authentication executions in the authentication log LOG. The public
tracing procedure TRACE can be executed by anyone using the public information and
the authentication log. Possible outputs of the procedure are user i’s identity, GM, or
NO-ONE which mean “user i tries to access for more than the prescribed limit”, “the
GM published information is not correct”, and “the public tracing procedure cannot
find any malicious entity”, respectively.
The main difference between this model for dynamic k-TAA and the TFS04 model
shown in section 2.10.5 with regard to procedures is that an AP has a pair of public
and secret keys and maintains his own access group using two new procedures, granting
access and revoking access; and the authentication procedure succeeds only if the user
has been granted access, the access has not been revoked, and he has not accessed the
application over the allowed number of times.

5.2.2

Oracles

The adversary has access to a number of oracles and can query them according to the
description below, to learn about the system and increase his success chance in the
attacks.
Oracles in our model are the list oracle OLIST , the join GM oracle OJOIN −GM , the
join user oracle OJOIN −U , the authentication AP oracle OAU T H−AP , the authentication
user oracle OAU T H−U , the query oracle OQU ERY , the granting user oracle OGRAN −AP ,
the revoking user oracle OREV O−AP and the corrupting AP oracle OCORR−AP . Oracles
OLIST , OJOIN −U , OJOIN −GM and OAU T H−AP are the same as in the TFS04 model and
are described in subsection 2.10.5.
The OQU ERY oracle gives the adversary the challenged authentication transcript
in the D-Anonymity definition and more details can be found in this definition. The
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OQU ERY oracle first checks if input identities i1 and i2 are current members of the
input AP with identity ID; if not, it outputs CHEAT. It then proceeds, as defined in
the TFS04 model, by randomly choosing one of the two identities and executing the
authentication procedure between the chosen identity and the input AP. The OAU T H−U
oracle performs as defined in the TFS04 model, but it takes one more input (ID, k)
to indicate the AP. The formal definitions of OQU ERY and OAU T H−U are presented
below. We assume there is a SCHEDULER algorithm, as described in subsection 2.10.5,
that manages concurrent executions of different algorithms, such as the user joining
algorithm UJOIN −U , the GM joining algorithm UJOIN −GM and the granting access
algorithm GRAN-AP, in different procedures by the adversary.
Oracle OAU T H−U (gpk, (ID, k), (sid, i, M ))
If (∃ (mpk, msk) such that (i, mpk, msk) ∈ SList)
k 0 ← |{(ID, k) is a substring of St0 |(sid0 , i, St0 ) ∈ SAU T H−U }|.
If (k 0 ≥ k) Return OVER.
(m, St) ← SCHEDULER(UAU T H−U , (gpk, mpk, msk, apkID,k ),
SAU T H−U , (sid, i, M )).
Return m.
Return ⊥.
Oracle OQU ERY (b, gpk, (i1 , i2 ), (ID, k), (e, M ))
If (i1 ∈
/ AGID or i2 ∈
/ AGID ) Return CHEAT.
If (e ∈
/ {0, 1}) Return ⊥.
If (@ sid such that (e, sid) ∈ SQU ERY )
Choose a new session identity sid which has never been used.
SQU ERY ← SQU ERY ∪ {(e, sid)}.
Return OAU T H−U (gpk, (ID, k), (sid, i1+(b⊕e) , (ID, k)kM )).
SList is the list of all tuples of an honest user’s identity, his public key and his
secret key and it is updated by the oracle OJOIN −U . OAU T H−U uses the set SAU T H−U
to manage its sessions and the description of the SCHEDULER algorithm in subsection
2.10.5 elaborates the use of this set. OQU ERY uses the set SQU ERY to memorize the
session identities. In the definition of OAU T H−U , the oracle first checks if there is an
honest user i with public/secret key pair (mpk, msk). If there is, the oracle finds the
number of times k 0 the user i has been authenticated by the AP with identity ID. If
k 0 is smaller than the bound k, the authentication procedure between the AP and the
user i is scheduled to perform.
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We introduce three new oracles, i.e. OGRAN −AP , OREV O−AP and OCORR−AP , with
formal definitions presented below. Given an honest AP and a user from the adversary,
the OGRAN −AP oracle executes the granting access procedure GRAN-AP by the AP to
grant access to the user. The OREV O−AP oracle takes as input an honest AP and a
member of the AP’s access group and executes the revoking access procedure REVOAP by the AP to revoke access from the user. OGRAN −AP and OREV O−AP use the sets
SGRAN −AP and SREV O−AP , respectively, to manage their sessions. The description of
the SCHEDULER algorithm in subsection 2.10.5 elaborates the use of these sets. The
OCORR−AP oracle corrupts an AP specified by the adversary and maintains the set
SCORR−AP of corrupted APs.
Oracle OGRAN −AP (gpk, (ID, k), (sid, i, M ))
(m, St) ← SCHEDULER(GRAN-AP, (gpk, apkID,k , askID,k ),
SGRAN −AP , (sid, i, M ))
Return m.
Oracle OREV O−AP (gpk, (ID, k), (sid, i, M ))
(m, St) ← SCHEDULER(REVO-AP, (gpk, apkID,k , askID,k ),
SREV O−AP , (sid, i, M ))
Return m.
Oracle OCORR−AP ((ID, k))
SCORR−AP ← SCORR−AP ∪ {(ID, k)}
Return askID,k .

5.2.3

Correctness Condition and Security Requirements

Security requirements of dynamic k-TAA are D-Correctness, D-Anonymity,
D-Detectability, D-Exculpability for users and D-Exculpability for the GM. These are similar to requirements Correctness, Anonymity, Detectability, Exculpability for users and
Exculpability for the GM defined in the TFS04 model. In the following, we give definitions of these requirements and underline differences with the requirements in the
TFS04 model.
D-Correctness. It requires that if an honest member is in the access group of an
honest AP and they have not performed the authentication procedure for more than
the allowable number of times, the member will be successfully authenticated by the
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AP. The difference with Correctness requirement is that the member is required to be
in the AP’s access group.
D-Anonymity. Intuitively, it means that given two honest group members i1 and i2 ,
who are in the access group of an AP and have not performed authentication with the
AP for more than the limited number of times, it is computationally difficult to distinguish between authentication executions, which are performed by the AP and one of the
two members. The only difference with the Anonymity requirement is the appearance of
the set of AP public information and public keys {(P I, apk)}. In the formal experiment,
the adversary A is allowed to collude with the GM, all APs, and all users except target
users i1 and i2 , and to query oracles OLIST , OJOIN −U , OAU T H−U and OQU ERY . For
e = 0, 1, the adversary is allowed to make a query OQU ERY (b, gpk, (i1 , i2 ), (ID, k), (e, ·))
once only. On receiving such a query, OQU ERY asks OAU T H−U to execute UAU T H−U using the public key/secret key pair of the user i1+b⊕e and the AP’s public key apkID,k .
The adversary must have authenticated user i1 or i2 using (ID, k) for less than k times.
If the adversary can guess b correctly, he wins. The formula of the experiment is as
follows, where H is assumed to be a random oracle.
d−anon−((i1 ,i2 ),(ID,k),b)

Experiment ExpA,H

(κ)

κ

(gpk, {(P I, apk)}, St) ← A(1 )
b0 ← AORACLES (St) where ORACLES = {OLIST ({i1 , i2 }c , ·), OJOIN −U (gpk, ·),
OAU T H−U (gpk, ·, ·), OQU ERY (b, gpk, (i1 , i2 ), (ID, k), (·, ·))}
If (OQU ERY has output OVER or CHEAT) Return ⊥.
Return b0 .
A dynamic k-TAA scheme provides D-Anonymity if the following function
d−anon−((i1 ,i2 ),(ID,k))

AdvA

(κ) is negligible.

d−anon−((i1 ,i2 ),(ID,k))

AdvA

d−anon−((i1 ,i2 ),(ID,k),0)

(κ) = |Pr[ExpA,H

(κ) = 1]

d−anon−((i1 ,i2 ),(ID,k),1)

−Pr[ExpA,H

(κ) = 1]|

D-Detectability. Intuitively, it means that if a subgroup of corrupted members have
been authenticated by the same honest AP for more than the allowed total number
of times, then the public tracing procedure using the AP’s authentication log outputs
NO-ONE with negligible probability. The formal experiment is quite different from the
Detectability experiment in the TFS04 model. There are three more oracles for the adversary, OGRAN −AP , OREV O−AP and OCORR−AP and a set of AP public information and
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public-key/secret-key pairs {(P I, apk, ask)}. The D-Detectability experiment is divided
into two stages, where the second stage is similar to the Detectability experiment.
The adversary A is also allowed to corrupt all members, but the adversary can
query three more oracles: OGRAN −AP , OREV O−AP and OCORR−AP . The experiment
has two stages. In the first stage, the adversary can query the three new oracles, and
OLIST , OJOIN −GM and OAU T H−AP . After that, all authentication logs of all APs are
emptied. Then the adversary continues the experiments, but without access to the
revoking oracle OREV O−AP . The adversary wins if he can be successfully authenticated
by an honest AP with identity ID and access bound k for more than k × |AGID |,
where |AGID | is the number of members in the AP’s access group. The set SAU T H−AP
contains all APs’ information that has been used by OAU T H−AP , and LOGID,k is the
authentication log produced by OAU T H−AP using information of the AP (ID, k). The
formula of the experiment is as follows, where H is assumed to be a random oracle.
Experiment Expd−decis
(κ)
A,H
((gpk, gsk), {(P I, apk, ask)}) ← SET U P (1κ )
St ← AORACLES (1κ ) where ORACLES = {OLIST ({GM }c , ·),
OJOIN −GM (gpk, gsk, ·), OAU T H−AP (gpk, ·, ·),
OGRAN −AP (gpk, ·, ·), OREV O−AP (gpk, ·, ·), OCORR−AP (·)}
Empty all LOGs
AORACLES\{OREV O−AP (gpk,·,·)} (St)
If (∃(ID, k) ∈ SAU T H−AP \ SCORR−AP s.t. |LOGID,k | > k × |AGID,k |)
Return T RACE OLIST (∅,·) (gpk, apkID,k , LOGID,k ).
Return ⊥.
d−decis
A dynamic k-TAA scheme provides D-Detectability if the function AdvA
(κ) is neg-

ligible.
d−decis
(κ) = Pr[Expd−decis
AdvA
(κ) = NO-ONE]
A,H

D-Exculpability for users. It intuitively means that the tracing procedure does not
output the identity of an honest user even if other users, the GM and all APs are
corrupted. The difference with the Exculpability for users requirement is the appearance of the set of AP public information and public keys {(P I, apk)}. In the formal
experiment, the adversary, who wants to frame an honest user i1 , is allowed to corrupt all entities except the user i1 . If the adversary succeeds in computing a set of
authentication logs (each log corresponds to an AP), with which the public tracing
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procedure outputs i1 with non-negligible probability, the adversary wins. The adversary must authenticate user i1 using OAU T H−U within the allowable numbers of times
set by the APs. We use T RACE OLIST (∅,·) (gpk, {(apk, LOG)}) to denote the execution
of the public tracing procedure on all authentication logs, using the public keys of the
corresponding APs. The formula of the experiment is as follows, where H is assumed
to be a random oracle.
d−excul−i1
Experiment ExpA,H
(κ)

(gpk, {(P I, apk)}, St) ← A(1κ )
{LOG} ← AORACLES (St) where ORACLES = {OLIST ({i1 }c , ·),
OJOIN −U (gpk, ·), OAU T H−U (gpk, ·, ·)}
Return T RACE OLIST (∅,·) (gpk, {(apk, LOG)}).
A dynamic k-TAA scheme provides D-Exculpability for users if the following function
d−excul−i1
AdvA
(κ) is negligible.
d−excul−i1
d−excul−i1
AdvA
(κ) = Pr[ExpA,H
(κ) = i1 ]

D-Exculpability for the GM. D-Exculpability for the GM means that the tracing
procedure does not output the honest GM even if all other participants are corrupted.
The difference with the Exculpability for GM requirement is the appearance of the set of
AP public information and public-key/secret-key pairs {(P I, apk, ask)}. In the formal
experiment, the adversary wants to frame the honest GM and he is allowed to corrupt
all users and all APs. If the adversary succeeds in computing a set of authentication
logs (each log corresponds to an AP), with which the public tracing procedure outputs
GM with non-negligible probability, the adversary wins. The formula of the experiment
is as follows, where H is assumed to be a random oracle.
Experiment Expd−excul−GM
(κ)
A,H
((gpk, gsk), {(P I, apk, ask)}) ← SET U P (1κ )
{LOG} ← AORACLES (1κ , {ask}) where ORACLES = {OLIST ({GM }c , ·),
OJOIN −GM (gpk, gsk, ·)}
Return T RACE OLIST (∅,·) (gpk, {(apk, LOG)}).
A dynamic k-TAA scheme provides D-Exculpability for the GM if the following function
d−excul−GM
AdvA
(κ) is negligible.
d−excul−GM
AdvA
(κ) = Pr[Expd−excul−GM
(κ) = GM]
A,H
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A New Dynamic k-TAA scheme
Overview

Our proposed scheme is constructed in cyclic groups with bilinear mapping. Suppose
a bilinear pairing tuple (p, G, GT , e, P ) is given, the GM’s group secret key is γ ← Z∗p
and group public key is (P, Ppub = γP, P0 ← G, H, G1 , G2 ← G, ∆ = e(P, P )). In the
joining procedure, a user obtains a membership public key/secret key pair ((a, S), x)
from the GM such that S =

1
(xP
γ+a

+ P0 ), where x is randomly generated by both

the user and the GM but is only known to the user. The user can be anonymously
authenticated as a group member by proving the knowledge of (a, S, x) such that
e(S, aP + Ppub ) = e(xP + P0 , P ).
An AP publishes k tag bases to be used for up to k times of user access to the AP’s
service. A tag base is a pair (Θi , Θ̌i ) of GT ’s elements. In an authentication execution,
a group member interacts with the AP and constructs a tag (Γ, Γ̌) = (Θxi , (∆` Θ̌i )x )
to be sent to the AP, where ∆ = e(P, P ), and the AP has randomly selected `. The
group member also proves the knowledge of (i, x) satisfying the above equation. If
0

the member uses the same tag base to compute another tag (Γ0 , Γ̌0 ) = (Θxi , (∆` Θ̌i )x ),
anyone can find these from the AP’s authentication log (since Γ = Γ0 ) and use it to
0

compute (Γ̌/Γ̌0 )1/(`−` ) = ∆x , which is published in the joining procedure. However, if
the member does not use the same tag base twice, based on the DBDH assumption
his anonymity is protected. We use the dynamic accumulator scheme proposed in
Chapter 4 to provide the dynamic property. Each AP has a public key/secret key
pair ((Q, Qpub ), s), where Qpub = sQ. To grant access to a member with a public
key (a, S), the AP accumulates the value a of the public key into an accumulated
value V ← (s + a)V , and the member obtains the witness W . The member shows
that the AP has granted access to him by proving the knowledge of (a, W ) such that
e(W, aQ + Qpub ) = e(V, Q). To revoke access from a member, the AP computes a new
accumulated value V ← 1/(s + a)V .
In the following, we denote P K{w : R} a proof of knowledge of w that satisfies the
relation R.
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Description

Setup.
For GM: On input a security parameter 1κ , the Bilinear Pairing Instance Generator generates a tuple (p, G, GT , e, P ). GM selects P0 , H, G1 , G2 ← G, γ ← Z∗p , and
sets Ppub = γP and ∆ = e(P, P ). The group public and secret keys are gpk =
(P, Ppub , P0 , H, G1 , G2 , ∆) and gsk = γ, respectively. The identification list LIST of
group members is initially empty.
For APs: AP V selects Q ← G, s ← Z∗p , Λ, Υ ← GT and V0 ← G, and sets Qpub = sQ.
The public and secret keys for the AP are apk = (Q, Qpub , Λ, Υ, V0 ) and ask = s, respectively. AP maintains an authentication log LOG, an accumulated value, which is
published and updated after granting or revoking a member, and a public archive ARC
(as the other public information P I in the formal model), which is a list of 3-tuples.
The first component of the tuple is an element in the public key of a member, who was
granted or revoked from accessing the AP. The second component is a single bit indicating whether the member was granted (1) or revoked (0). The third component is the
accumulated value after granting or revoking the member. Initially, the accumulated
value is set to V0 , and LOG and ARC are empty.
Joining.
A user Ui can join the group as follows.
1. User Ui selects x0 , r ← Z∗p , and sends a commitment C 0 = x0 P + rH of x0 to the
GM.
2. The GM sends y, y 0 ← Z∗p to Ui .
3. User Ui computes x = y + x0 y 0 and (C, β) = (xP, ∆x ), then adds new data (i, β)
to the identification list LIST. Next, Ui sends (C, β) to the GM with a standard
proof P roof1 = P K{(x, r0 ) : C = xP ∧ yP + y 0 C 0 − C = r0 H} to show that C is
correctly computed from C 0 , y, y 0 and Ui knows x satisfying C = xP .
4. The GM verifies that (i, β) is an element of the LIST, β = e(C, P ) and the
proof is valid. Then, the GM generates a ← Z∗p different from all corresponding
previously generated values, computes S =
Ui .

1
(C
γ+a

+ P0 ), and sends (S, a) to user
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5. User Ui confirms that equation e(S, aP + Ppub ) = e(C + P0 , P ) is satisfied. The
new member Ui ’s secret key is msk = x, and his public key is mpk = (a, S, C, β).
Bound announcement.
An AP publishes his identity ID and a number k as the bound. Let (Θj , Θ̌j ) =
HGT ×GT (ID, k, j) for j = 1, ..., k. We call (Θj , Θ̌j ) the j th tag base of the AP.
Granting access.
An AP grants access to a user Ui with public key mpk = (a, ·, ·, ·), as follows. Suppose
there are j tuples in the AP’s ARC and the AP’s current accumulated value is Vj . The
AP computes a new accumulated value Vj+1 = (s + a)Vj , adds (a, 1, Vj+1 ) to his ARC.
The user Ui can form his access key mak = (j + 1, W ), where W = Vj . The user keeps
a counter ι, which is initially set to 0.
Revoking access.
An AP revokes access from a user Ui with public key mpk = (a, ·, ·, ·), as follows.
Suppose there are j tuples in the AP’s ARC and the AP’s current accumulated value
is Vj . The AP computes a new accumulated value Vj+1 = 1/(s + a)Vj , and adds
(a, 0, Vj+1 ) to ARC.
Authentication.
An AP (ID, k), whose public key and current accumulated value are apk = (Q, Qpub , Λ,
Υ, V0 ) and V respectively, authenticates a member M with public and secret keys
mpk = (a, S, C, β) and msk = x, respectively, as follows.
1. Member M increases counter ι. If value ι > k, then M sends ⊥ to the AP and
stops. Otherwise, M runs the algorithm Update (see subsection 5.3.3 for this
algorithm) to update his access key mak = (j, W ).
2. The AP sends a random integer ` ← Z∗p to M.
3. Member M computes tag (Γ, Γ̌) = (Θxι , (∆` Θ̌ι )x ) using the ιth tag base (Θι , Θ̌ι ),
and sends (Γ, Γ̌) to the AP with a proof P roof2 = P K{(ι, a, S, x, W ) : Γ =
Θxι ∧ Γ̌ = (∆` Θ̌ι )x ∧ e(S, aP + Ppub ) = e(xP + P0 , P ) ∧ e(W, aQ + Qpub ) = e(V, Q)}
(see subsection 5.3.3 for P roof2 ’s description).
4. If the proof is valid and if Γ is different from all corresponding tags in the AP’s
LOG, the AP adds tuple (Γ, Γ̌, l) and the proof to the LOG, and outputs accept. If
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the proof is valid and Γ is already written in the LOG, the AP adds tuple (Γ, Γ̌, l)
and the proof to the LOG, outputs (detect,LOG) and stops. If the proof is invalid,
the AP outputs reject and stops.

Public tracing.
The identity of a malicious user can be traced from an AP’s LOG as follows.
1. Look for two entries (Γ, Γ̌, l, P roof ) and (Γ0 , Γ̌0 , `0 , P roof 0 ) in the LOG, such that
Γ = Γ0 and ` 6= `0 , and that P roof and P roof 0 are valid. If no such entry can be
found, output NO-ONE.
0

0

0

2. Compute β = (Γ̌/Γ̌0 )1/(`−` ) = ((∆` Θ̌)x /(∆` Θ̌0 )x )1/(`−` ) = ∆x , and look for a pair
(i, β) from the LOG. Output member identity i; or if no such (i, β) can be found,
conclude that the GM has deleted some data from the LOG, and output GM.

5.3.3

Details

Proof2 in the Authentication procedure.
The member M computes the proof as follows:
1. Select v ← Z∗p , and compute the perfect commitment Ω = Λx Υv of x.
2. Publish Ω and proofs of knowledge of the following:
• P roof2a = P K{(ι, x, v) : Γ = Θxι ∧ Γ̌ = (∆` Θ̌ι )x ∧ Ω = Λx Υv }.
• P roof2b = P K{(a, S, x, W, v) : e(S, aP + Ppub ) = e(xP + P0 , P ) ∧ e(W, aQ +
Qpub ) = e(V, Q) ∧ Ω = Λx Υv }.
The P roof2a can be constructed the same as proof 1 in the TFS04 scheme [TFS04]
using the standard techniques [CDS94]. We describe P roof2b as follows. Most of the
pairing operations can be pre-computed.
1. Generate r1 , r2 , r3 , k0 , ..., k8 ← Zp and compute U1 = S + r1 H; U2 = W + r2 H;
R = r1 G1 + r2 G2 + r3 H; T1 = k1 G1 + k2 G2 + k3 H; T2 = k4 G1 + k5 G2 + k6 H − k7 R;
Π1 = e(P, P )k0 e(U1 , P )−k7 e(H, P )k4 e(H, Ppub )k1 ;
Π2 = e(U2 , Q)−k7 e(H, Q)k5 e(H, Qpub )k2 ; Π3 = Λk0 Υk8
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2. Compute c = HZp (gpk, apk, Ω, ID, k, l, V, U1 , U2 , R, T1 , T2 , Π1 , Π2 , Π3 )
3. Compute in Zp : s0 = k0 + cx; s1 = k1 + cr1 ; s2 = k2 + cr2 ; s3 = k3 + cr3 ;
s4 = k4 + cr1 a; s5 = k5 + cr2 a; s6 = k6 + cr3 a; s7 = k7 + ca; s8 = k8 + cv
4. Output (U1 , U2 , R, c, s0 , ..., s8 )
Verification of P roof2b . Checking the following equation
?

c = HZp (gpk, apk, Ω, ID, k, l,
V, U1 , U2 , R, s1 G1 + s2 G2 + s3 H − cR, s4 G1 + s5 G2 + s6 H − s7 R,
e(P, P )s0 e(U1 , P )−s7 e(H, P )s4 e(H, Ppub )s1 e(P0 , P )c e(U1 , Ppub )−c ,
e(U2 , Q)−s7 e(H, Q)s5 e(H, Qpub )s2 e(V, Q)c e(U2 , Qpub )−c , Λs0 Υs8 Ω−c ).
Update.
Suppose the AP’s ARC currently has n tuples, the member M with the public key
(a, ·, ·, ·) and the access key (j, Wj ) computes a new access key as follows.
for (k = j + 1; k + +; k ≤ n) do
retrieve from ARC the k th tuple (u, b, Vk );
if b = 1, then Wk = Vk−1 + (u − a)Wk−1
else Wk = (1/(u − a))(Wk−1 − Vk ) end if;
end for;
return (n, Wn );
Public Inspection.
Any party can run this algorithm to assure the correctness of an AP’s public archive
ARC. With such an algorithm, we can assume that ARC is always updated correctly.
Any party, after a change on ARC, can retrieve the new tuple (u, b, Vk ). If (b = 1) then
?

?

he checks if e(Vk−1 , aQ + Qpub ) = e(Vk , Q); otherwise, he checks if e(Vk , aQ + Qpub ) =
e(Vk−1 , Q).

5.3.4

Correctness and Security

Correctness and Security of our scheme is stated in Theorems 5.3.1, 5.3.2, 5.3.3, 5.3.4
and 5.3.5. Their proofs are provided later in this section.
Theorem 5.3.1 The dynamic k-TAA scheme provides D-Correctness in the list oracle
model.
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Theorem 5.3.2 The dynamic k-TAA scheme provides D-Anonymity in the list oracle
model under the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption and the random oracle
assumption.
Theorem 5.3.3 The dynamic k-TAA scheme provides D-Detectability in the list oracle model under the q-Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption, where q is the upper bound
of the group size, and the random oracle assumption.
Theorem 5.3.4 The dynamic k-TAA scheme provides D-Exculpability for users in
the list oracle model under the Discrete Logarithm assumption on G, and the random
oracle assumption.
Theorem 5.3.5 The dynamic k-TAA scheme provides D-Exculpability for the GM in
the list oracle model under the q-Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption, where q is the
upper bound of the group size, and the random oracle assumption.
The proofs of these theorems are based on the following lemmas, definition and
theorem. Lemma 5.3.1 indicates that P roof2 is a zero-knowledge proof system and
Lemma 5.3.2 is used to prove Theorems 5.3.3 and 5.3.5. Definition 5.3.1, which defines the (`, m, n)-Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman ((`, m, n)-DBDH) assumption, and
Theorem 5.3.6, which states that the DBDH assumption implies the (`, m, n)-DBDH
assumption, are used to prove Theorem 5.3.2.
Lemma 5.3.1 Under the Discrete Log assumption on G, the interactive protocol corresponding to P roof2 by the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [FS86] is an honest verifier perfect
zero-knowledge proof system.

Proof: Ω is a perfect commitment of x and so if the interactive protocols of P roof2a
and P roof2b are honest verifier perfect zero-knowledge, then the interactive protocol
of P roof2 is honest verifier perfect zero-knowledge. P roof2a has been proved [TFS04]
to be honest verifier perfect zero-knowledge and we only need to prove that P roof2b
has the same property. The completeness proof for P roof2b is straightforward and so
we only present the Soundness and Zero-knowledgeness proofs of P roof2b .
Soundness: If the protocol accepts with non-negligible probability, we show that under the Discrete Log assumption on G, a PPT prover must have the knowledge of
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(a, S), x, W and v with the relations stated in P roof2b . Suppose the protocol accepts for the same commitment (U1 , U2 , R, T1 , T2 , Π1 , Π2 , Π3 ) two different pairs of
challenges and responses (c, s0 , ...s8 ) and (c0 , s00 , ..., s08 ). Let fi =

si −s0i
,
c−c0

i = 0, ..., 8,

then R = f1 G1 + f2 G2 + f3 H; f7 R = f4 G1 + f5 G2 + f6 H; e(U1 , Ppub )e(P0 , P )−1 =
e(P, P )f0 e(U1 , P )−f7 e(H, P )f4 e(H, Ppub )f1 ; e(U2 , Qpub )e(V, Q)−1 = e(U2 , Q)−f7 e(H, Q)f5
e(H, Qpub )f2 ; Ω = Λf0 Υf8 .
From the first two equations, the prover has O = (f4 − f7 f1 )G1 + (f5 − f7 f2 )G2 +
(f6 − f7 f3 )H (O is the identity element of G). Under the Discrete Log assumption on
G, it implies that f4 = f7 f1 and f5 = f7 f2 .
Let a = f7 , S = U1 −f1 H, x = f0 , v = f8 and W = U2 −f2 H, then e(S, aP +Ppub ) =
e(xP + P0 , P ), e(W, aQ + Qpub ) = e(V, Q) and Ω = Λx Υv . So the prover has the
knowledge of (a, S), x, W and v satisfying these relations.
Zero-knowledge: The simulator chooses c, s0 , ...s8 ← Zp , U1 , U2 , R ← G and computes
T1 = s1 G1 +s2 G2 +s3 H −cR; T2 = s4 G1 +s5 G2 +s6 H −s7 R; Π1 = e(P, P )s0 e(U1 , P )−s7
e(H, P )s4 e(H, Ppub )s1 e(P0 , P )c e(U1 , Ppub )−c ; Π2 = e(U2 , Q)−s7 e(H, Q)s5 e(H, Qpub )s2
e(V, Q)c e(U2 , Qpub )−c ; Π3 = Λs0 Υs8 Ω−c . The simulator then outputs (U1 , U2 , R, T1 , T2 ,
Π1 , Π2 , Π3 , c, s0 , ...s8 ). Then, the distribution of the simulator’s output is the same as
the distribution of the transcript generated from the proof system’s execution, which
is the uniform distribution over the set
{(U1 , U2 , R, T1 , T2 , Π1 , Π2 , Π3 , c, s0 , ...s8 ) |
(U1 , U2 , R, T1 , T2 ∈ G) ∧ (Π1 , Π2 , Π3 ∈ GT ) ∧ (c, s0 , ...s8 ∈ Zp ) ∧
(T1 = s1 G1 + s2 G2 + s3 H − cR) ∧ (T2 = s4 G1 + s5 G2 + s6 H − s7 R) ∧
(Π1 = e(P, P )s0 e(U1 , P )−s7 e(H, P )s4 e(H, Ppub )s1 e(P0 , P )c e(U1 , Ppub )−c ) ∧
(Π2 = e(U2 , Q)−s7 e(H, Q)s5 e(H, Qpub )s2 e(V, Q)c e(U2 , Qpub )−c ) ∧
(Π3 = Λs0 Υs8 Ω−c )}

2
Lemma 5.3.2 Suppose a PPT adversary can corrupt all APs and all users and can
query the oracle OJOIN −GM . Let S = {((ai , Si , ·, ·), xi )}qi=1 be the set of public key/secret
key pairs of all member which are obtained by the adversary using OJOIN −GM . If the
adversary can output a new valid member public key/secret key pair ((a∗ , S ∗ , ·, ·), x∗ ) ∈
/
S, then the q-SDH assumption does not hold.
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Proof: Suppose there is a PPT adversary A that, from a set S = {((ai , Si , ·, ·), xi )}qi=1
of public key/secret key pairs of all members obtained by OJOIN −GM , can generate a
valid public key/secret key pair ((a∗ , S ∗ , ·, ·), x∗ ) ∈
/ S of a new member. We show a
construction of a PPT adversary B that can break the q-SDH assumption. Suppose
a tuple challenge = (Q, zQ, . . . , z q Q) is given, where z ← Z∗p , we show that B can
compute (c, 1/(z + c)Q), where c ∈ Zp with non-negligible probability. We consider
two cases.
Case 1: This is a trivial case, where A outputs S ∗ ∈ {S1 , ..., Sq } with non-negligible
probability. In this case, B chooses γ ← Z∗p and H, G1 , G2 ← G, gives A the group
public key (P = Q, Ppub = γP, P0 = zQ, H, G1 , G2 , ∆ = e(P, P )), simulates a GM and
a set of possible users, and simulates a set of possible APs with their public/secret key
pairs. Then B can simulate the oracle OJOIN −GM that A needs to access. Suppose a
set of keys S = {((ai , Si , ·, ·), xi )}qi=1 is generated and A outputs a new ((a∗ , S ∗ , ·, ·), x∗ )
with non-negligible probability such that S ∗ ∈ {S1 , ..., Sq }. Suppose S ∗ = Sj , where
j ∈ {1, ..., q}, then

1
(x∗ P
a∗ +γ

+ P0 ) =

1
(xj P
aj +γ

+ P0 ), so (aj − a∗ )P0 = (a∗ xj − aj x∗ +

xj γ − x∗ γ)P . Therefore, z is computable by B from this, and so is (c, 1/(z + c)Q), for
any c ∈ Zp .
Case 2: This is when the first case does not hold. That means A outputs S ∗ ∈
/
{S1 , ..., Sq } with non-negligible probability. Then B plays the following game:
1. Generate α, ai , xi ← Z∗p , i = 1, ..., q, where ai s are different from one another,
and choose m ← {1, ..., q}.
2. Suppose γ = z − am (B does not know γ). Then B can compute the following
P, Ppub , P0 from the tuple challenge.
q
Y

P =

(z + ai − am )Q

i=1,i6=m

Ppub = γP = (z − am )

q
Y

(z + ai − am )Q

i=1,i6=m
q

P0 = α

Y

(z + ai − am )Q − xm

i=1

q
Y

(z + ai − am )Q

i=1,i6=m

3. Generate H, G1 , G2 ← G and give A the group public key (P, Ppub , P0 , H, G1 , G2 ,
∆ = e(P, P )). Simulate a GM, a set of possible users and a set of possible APs
with their public/secret key pairs.
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4. B can simulate the oracle OJOIN −GM that A needs to access as follows. Suppose
A wants an execution of the joining procedure between the GM (controlled by
B) and a user (controlled by A). As being able to extract information from A,
after receiving the commitment C 0 from A, B can find x0 , r and generate y, y 0 , a
in the joining procedure so that the prepared ai , xi above are computed in the
protocol to be the corresponding parts of the user i’s keys. B can compute Si as
follows:
• If i = m, then
q
Y
1
Sm =
(xm P + P0 ) = α
(z + ai − am )Q
am + γ
i=1,i6=m

This is computable from the tuple challenge.
• If i 6= m, then
1
(xi P + P0 )
ai + γ
q
q
Y
Y
= (xi − xm )
(z + aj − am )Q + α
(z + aj − am )Q

Si =

j=1,j6=m,i

j=1,j6=i

This is computable from the tuple challenge.
5. Get the output ((a∗ , S ∗ , ·, ·), x∗ ) from A, where
q
Y
1
1
∗
∗
S = ∗
(z + ai − am )Q
(x P + P0 ) =
(αz + x − xm )
a +γ
z + a∗ − am
i=1,i6=m
∗

We can see that the case αz + x∗ − xm = α(z + a∗ − am ) happens with negligible
probability, as it results in S ∗ = Sm . So the case αz + x∗ − xm 6= α(z + a∗ − am )
happens with non-negligible probability ²1 . Suppose in this case, the probability that
a∗ ∈ {a1 , ..., aq } is ²2 . Then the probability that a∗ ∈
/ {a1 , ..., aq }\{am } is ²1 −

q−1
²
q 2

(as m ← {1, ..., q}), which is also non-negligible if q is bound by a polynomial of `. If
αz +x∗ −xm 6= α(z +a∗ −am ) and a∗ ∈
/ {a1 , ..., aq }\{am }, then
from the tuple challenge and S ∗ and so B can compute (c,

1
Q
z+a∗ −am

1
Q),
z+c

is computable

where c = a∗ − am .

2

Relationship between DBDH and (`, m, n)-DBDH assumptions
We now present the (`, m, n)-Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption and show
that it is weaker than the DBDH assumption in Theorem 5.3.6.
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Definition 5.3.1 (`, m, n)-Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Assumption.
(`,m,n)−DBDH

For every PPT algorithm A, the following function AdvA
(`,m,n)−DBDH

AdvA

(κ) is negligible.

(`,m,n)

(κ) = |Pr[A(t, {xu P }`u=0 , {e(P, P )xu yv zw }(u,v,w)=(0,1,1) ) = 1]
(`,m,n)

−Pr[A(t, {Pu }`u=0 , {Γuvw }(u,v,w)=(0,1,1) ) = 1]|
where t = (p, G, GT , e, P ) ← G(1κ ) and xu , yv , zw ← Z∗p , Pu ← G, Γu,v,w ← GT , for
(u, v, w) = (0, 1, 1)...(`, m, n).
Theorem 5.3.6 If the DBDH assumption holds then the (`, m, n)-DBDH assumption
also holds.

Proof: We first prove that if the DBDH assumption holds, then the (1, 1, 1)-DBDH
assumption holds. We show that if a PPT algorithm A has non-negligible
(1,1,1)−DBDH

AdvA

(κ) (i.e. the (1, 1, 1)-DBDH assumption does not hold), then we can
build a PPT algorithm B that has non-negligible AdvBDBDH (κ) (i.e. the DBDH assumption does not hold). Suppose a, b, c ∈ Z∗p and Γ ∈ G∗T , we observe that if a
and b are uniformly distributed in Z∗p , then x = ab is also uniformly distributed
in Z∗p and if Γ is uniformly distributed in G∗T , then s is also uniformly distributed
in Z∗p , where Γ = e(P, P )s . So to distinguish between (aP, bP, cP, e(P, P )abc ) and
(aP, bP, cP, Γ), the algorithm B can choose an uniformly random d ∈ Z∗p and simply
return the output by A when it takes as input (t, {dP, dcP }, {e(aP, bP )d , e(P, P )abcd })
or (t, {dP, dcP }, {e(aP, bP )d , Γd }).
We now prove that if the (`, m, n)-DBDH assumption and the (1, 1, 1)-DBDH assumption hold, then the (` + 1, m, n)-DBDH assumption holds. We show that if a PPT
(`+1,m,n)−DBDH

algorithm A has non-negligible AdvA

(κ) (i.e. the (` + 1, m, n)-DBDH as-

sumption does not hold), then we can build a PPT algorithm B that has non-negligible
(`,m,n)−DBDH

AdvB

negligible

(κ) (i.e. the (`, m, n)-DBDH assumption does not hold) or has non-

(1,1,1)−DBDH
AdvB
(κ)

(i.e. the (1, 1, 1)-DBDH assumption does not hold). We

define the following sets
(`+1,m,n)

xu yv zw
}(u,v,w)=(0,1,1) ) | xu , yv , zw ← Z∗p }
S1 = {({xu P }`+1
u=0 , {e(P, P )
(`+1,m,n)

S2 = {({Pu }`+1
u=0 , {Γuvw }(u,v,w)=(0,1,1) ) | Pu ← G; Γu,v,w ← GT ;
r ← Z∗p ; P`+1 = rP` ; Γ(`+1)vw = Γr`vw }
(`+1,m,n)

S3 = {({Pu }`+1
u=0 , {Γuvw }(u,v,w)=(0,1,1) ) | Pu ← G; Γu,v,w ← GT }
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(κ) means that A can distinguish between a random

element of S1 and a random element of S3 . It means A can distinguish either between
a random element of S1 and a random element of S2 or between a random element of
S2 and a random element of S3 . We consider these 2 cases:
• We show that if A can distinguish between a random element of S1 and a random element of S2 , then we can build an algorithm B that has non-negligible
(`,m,n)−DBDH

AdvB

(`,m,n)

(κ). Suppose B’s input is (t, {Pu0 }`u=0 , {Γ0uvw }(u,v,w)=(0,1,1) ), B

0
= xP`0 and Γ0(`+1)vw = Γ0x
chooses an uniformly random x and computes P`+1
`vw ,

for v = 1, ..., m and w = 1, ..., n. B then return the output from A when it takes
(`+1,m,n)

0
as input (t, {Pu0 }`+1
u=0 , {Γuvw }(u,v,w)=(0,1,1) ).

• We show that if A can distinguish between a random element of S2 and a random element of S3 , then we can build an algorithm B that has non-negligible
(1,1,1)−DBDH

AdvB

0
(κ). Suppose B’s input is (t, {P`0 , P`+1
}, {Γ0`mn , Γ0(`+1)mn }). B

chooses Pu0 ← G, Γ0u,v,w ← GT , for (u, v, w) = (0, 1, 1)...(` − 1, m, n). B then
(`+1,m,n)

0
return the output from A when it takes as input (t, {Pu0 }`+1
u=0 , {Γuvw }(u,v,w)=(0,1,1) ).
(`+1,m,n)−DBDH

Therefore, if the PPT algorithm A has non-negligible AdvA
algorithm B has either non-negligible

(`,m,n)−DBDH
AdvB
(κ)

(κ), then the

or non-negligible

(1,1,1)−DBDH
(κ).
AdvB

It can be similarly proved that if the (`, m, n)-DBDH assumption and the (1, 1, 1)DBDH assumption hold, then the (`, m+1, n)-DBDH assumption and the (`, m, n+1)DBDH assumption hold. Therefore, by induction, Theorem 5.3.6 has been proved. 2

Proof of Theorem 5.3.1
Suppose a member M tries to be authenticated by an AP with identity ID and bound
k for the ιth time where ι ≤ k, and M has an updated access key. The AP sends
a random integer ` ← Z∗p to M. M then computes tag (Γ, Γ̌) = (Θxι , (∆` Θ̌ι )x ) using
the ιth tag base (Θι , Θ̌ι ) of the AP, and sends (Γ, Γ̌) to the AP with a proof P roof2 =
P K{(ι, a, S, x, W ) : Γ = Θxι ∧ Γ̌ = (∆` Θ̌ι )x ∧e(S, aP +Ppub ) = e(xP +P0 , P )∧e(W, aQ+
Qpub ) = e(V, Q)}. Based on the completeness of P roof2 as proved in Lemma 5.3.1,
the AP verifies that the proof is valid. As ι ≤ k, Γ is different from all corresponding
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tags in the AP’s LOG. Hence, the AP adds tuple (Γ, Γ̌, l) and the proof to its LOG, and
outputs accept. That means the dynamic k-TAA scheme provides D-Correctness.

Proof of Theorem 5.3.2
This proof is similar to the proof of Anonymity for the TFS04 scheme [TFS04], but
it is based on the DBDH assumption whereas the other proof is based on the DDH
assumption and the Separation Lemma (proposed in [TFS04]). It is briefly presented
as follows. Suppose there is a PPT adversary A that can break the D-Anonymity
property of our scheme, we show a construction of a PPT adversary B that can break
the (2, m, n)-DBDH assumption. Then, from Theorem 5.3.6, Theorem 5.3.2 is proved.
Suppose an instance ξ = ({Ṕu }, {Γ́uvw }) of the (2, m, n)-DBDH problem is given, B
runs the experiment of D-Anonymity by constructing an instance of the dynamic kTAA scheme as follows. It sets P = η Ṕ0 , where η ← Z∗p , and generates group public
key gpk = (P, Ppub , P0 , H, G1 , G2 , ∆), group secret key and APs’ keys as in the setup
procedure. Let i1 and i2 be identities of the two input users in the experiment, B
simulates the oracles and procedures as follows.
• OJOIN −U (gpk, ·): Since users i1 or i2 are the only honest users in the experiment,
we only need to discuss the case when i1 or i2 is an input to the oracle. Suppose
iu (u = 1 or 2) is the input, A plays the role of the GM and B plays the role of
iu . By simulating the random oracle and controlling the group secret key, B can
simulate the proof P roof1 and send appropriate messages so that the public key
of the user iu is (au , Su , η Ṕu , βu ), where Ṕu is taken from ξ, βu = e(η Ṕu , P ).
• In the bound announcement procedure, if A (playing as the v th AP) sends a query
(IDv , kv , w) to the random oracle, which is simulated by B, B can set the tag
η ťvw
vw
∗
base as (Θvw , Θ̌vw ) = (Γ́ηt
0vw , Γ́0vw ), where tvw , ťvw ← Zp .

• OAU T H−U (gpk, ·, ·): Since users i1 or i2 are the only honest users in the experiment, we only need to discuss the case when i1 or i2 is an input to the oracle.
Suppose iu (u = 1 or 2) is the input, the AP v th is the authenticator and this
is the wth authentication execution between the AP and iu . A plays the role of
the AP and B plays the role of iu . If A sends `iu vw ← Z∗p in the second step,
`iu vw η ťvw
vw
Γ́uvw ). By simulating
B computes the tag (Γiu vw , Γ̌iu vw ) = (Γ́ηt
uvw , e(η Ṕu , P )

the random oracle, B can simulate the proof P roof2 , which is zero-knowledge
according to Lemma 5.3.1.
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• OQU ERY (b, gpk, (i1 , i2 ), (ID, k), (·, ·)): B behaves as in the definition of this oracle,
except that when OAU T H−U is called (inside OQU ERY ), B performs as specified
in the simulation of OAU T H−U above.
(2,m,n)−DBDH

At last, B outputs the bit returned by the experiment. Then AdvB
d−anon−((i1 ,i2 ),(ID,k))
AdvA
(κ). In the following, a tuple
(`,m,n)
({xu P }`u=0 , {e(P, P )xu yv zw }(u,v,w)=(0,1,1) ) is called a (`, m, n)-DBDH

(κ) =

tuple. We consider

3 cases:
• (i) The oracles engage honestly in the experiment.
• (ii) B controls the oracles and ξ is a (2, m, n)-DBDH tuple in the experiment.
• (iii) B controls the oracles and ξ is not a (2, m, n)-DBDH tuple in the experiment.
We observe that the distributions of messages sent to A by the oracles in cases (i)
and (ii) are perfectly indistinguishable from each other.
If A can computationally distinguish between the distributions of messages sent to
A by the oracles in cases (ii) and (iii), then B can computationally decide whether a
tuple is a (2, m, n)-DBDH tuple and break the (2, m, n)-DBDH assumption. Otherwise, the distributions of messages sent to A by the oracles in cases (ii) and (iii) are
computationally indistinguishable from each other. Then the probability that A and
d−anon−((i1 ,i2 ),(ID,k))

B fail to output is negligible. In case (iii), AdvA

0. In case (i), as A can break the D-Anonymity property,
(2,m,n)−DBDH

non-negligible. Then, we have AdvB

(κ) is exactly equal to

d−anon−((i1 ,i2 ),(ID,k))
AdvA
(κ)

is

(κ) is non-negligible. Therefore, we can

conclude that the scheme provides D-Anonymity under the (2, m, n)-DBDH assumption.
From Theorem 5.3.6, Theorem 5.3.2 is proved.

Proof of Theorem 5.3.3
This proof is similar to the proof of Detectability for the TFS04 scheme [TFS04],
but it is based on the SDH assumption whereas the other proof is based on the
SRSA assumption. It is briefly presented as follows. We prove that if there is a
PPT adversary A that can break the D-Detectability property of our scheme, then
there is a PPT adversary B that can break the SDH assumption. Suppose a tuple
challenge = (R, zR, . . . , z q R) of the SDH assumption is given, where z ← Z∗p , we show
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that B can compute (c, 1/(z + c)R), where c ∈ Zp with non-negligible probability.
B simulates the GM, the users, the APs and randomly chooses an AP (ID, k). He
then performs the setup procedure to get a group public key/group secret key pair
(gpk, gsk) = ((P, Ppub , P0 , H, G1 , G2 , ∆), γ) and public key/secret key pairs for all APs,
except for the AP (ID, k). For this AP, B selects t ← Z∗p , Λ, Υ ← GT , and sets Q = R,
Qpub = zR, V0 = tR. The public key of (ID, k) is apk = (Q, Qpub , Λ, Υ, V0 ), the initial
accumulated value is V0 and B does not know (ID, k)’s secret key ask = z.
With these capabilities, B can easily provide A access to simulations of the oracles
OJOIN −GM , OAU T H−AP , OGRAN −AP , OREV O−AP and OCORR−AP , except when A uses
OCORR−AP to corrupt the AP (ID, k), B fails and stops. Note that when A uses
OGRAN −AP or OREV O−AP to ask (ID, k) to grant access to or revoke access from a
user, B can always use the tuple challenge to compute the new accumulated value, as
long as the number of group members is less than q.
As B randomly chooses the AP (ID, k), if the PPT adversary A can break the
D-Detectability property, then with non-negligible probability, at the end of the experiment, (ID, k) is not in SCORR−AP , |LOGID | > k × |AGID | and T RACE OLIST (∅,·) (gpk,
apkID , LOGID ) returns NO-ONE. By applying the General forking lemma (see subsection 2.6.3 for this lemma) to each execution of P roof2b in LOGID , where B and P roof2b
represent P and the triplet x in the lemma definition, and then extracting witnesses
as in Soundness’s proof of P roof2b , A must have the knowledge of all member secret
keys, which are used to produce all executions of P roof2b in LOGID . As T RACE
returns NO-ONE, each member secret key can not be used for more than k times. As
|LOGID | > k × |AGID |, there are more than |AGID | different member secret keys used
by A to produce LOGID . There are two possible cases:
• A can produce a new member public key/secret key pair ((a, S 0 , ·, ·), x0 ) from the
member public key/secret key pairs {((a, S, ·, ·), x)} of some members of AGID .
However, based on Lemma 5.3.2, if A can do this, then the q-SDH assumption
does not hold.
• A can produce a witness W for a group member, who is not in AGID and has
a public key (a, ·, ·, ·). Suppose the public keys of all members in AGID are
Qm
{(ai , ·, ·, ·)}m
i=1 , then the current accumulated value of the AP is V = t
i=1 (ai +
Qm
z)R, therefore W = t i=1 (ai + z)/(a + z)R. From W and the tuple challenge,
B can compute 1/(a + z)R and thereby breaking the SDH assumption.
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Proof of Theorem 5.3.4
This proof is similar to the proof of ‘Exculpability for users’ for the TFS04 scheme
[TFS04], but it is based on the DL assumption whereas the other proof is based on
the DL and SRSA assumptions. It is briefly presented as follows. Suppose there is a
PPT adversary A that can break D-Exculpability for users in our scheme, we show that
there exists a PPT adversary B that can break the Discrete Logarithm assumption
over G. Suppose that B is given a challenge (P̄ , C̄ = z P̄ ), where P̄ ← G∗ and z ← Z∗p ,
and B needs to compute z. B sets Ṕ0 = P̄ and Ṕ1 = C̄, randomly chooses {cv }m
v=1
and {dw }nw=1 of elements of Z∗p and computes Γ́uvw = e(Ṕu , P̄ )cv dw for u = 0, 1. With
the (1, m, n)-DBDH tuple ξ = ({Ṕu }, {Γ́uvw }), B simulates an instance of the dynamic
k-TAA scheme and the oracles in the same way as simulations in the experiment of
D-Anonymity proof, except that there is only one input user i1 and a (1, m, n)-DBDH
tuple is used. Therefore, we omit the description of simulations.
If A can break D-Exculpability for users, then T RACE outputs i1 at the end of the
experiment. That means there exist (Γ, Γ̌, l, P roof ) and (Γ0 , Γ̌0 , `0 , P roof 0 ) in an AP’s
0

log such that Γ = Γ0 , (Γ̌/Γ̌0 )1/(`−` ) = β1 , and P roof and P roof 0 are valid. As A can
only use OAU T H−U within the allowable numbers of times, not both (Γ, Γ̌, l, P roof )
and (Γ0 , Γ̌0 , `0 , P roof 0 ) are created by B using the oracle.
Consider the case that neither of them is created by B using the oracle OAU T H−U .
By applying the General forking lemma, where B, P roof and P roof 0 represent P
and triplets in the lemma definition, and then extracting witnesses as in Soundness’s
proof of P roof2 , B must have the knowledge of (x, v, w) and (x0 , v 0 , w0 ) such that
ηt

η ť

η ťvw
vw
x
`
x
0
0
0
0x
v 0 w0
v 0 w0
(Θ, Θ̌) = (Γ́ηt
0vw , Γ́0vw ), Γ = Θ , Γ̌ = (∆ Θ̌) , (Θ , Θ̌ ) = (Γ́0v 0 w0 , Γ́0v 0 w0 ), Γ = Θ ,
0

0

0

Γ̌0 = (∆` Θ̌0 )x . We have the following.
0

(Γ̌/Γ̌0 )1/(`−` ) = β1
0

0

0

0

−η ť

0 0

x0

0

ťvw x
Γ́0v0 wv00 w0 )1/(`−` )
(Γ̌/Γ̌0 )1/(`−` ) = ((∆` Θ̌)x /(∆` Θ̌0 )x )1/(`−` ) = (e(P, P )`x−` x Γ́η0vw
0 0

0

0

= e(P̄ , P̄ )(ηη(`x−` x )+cv dw ηťvw x−cv0 dw0 ηťv0 w0 x )/(`−` )
β1 = e(η Ṕ1 , P ) = e(η C̄, η P̄ ) = e(P̄ , P̄ )zηη
From these equations, B can compute the discrete log z.
Consider the case that one of (Γ, Γ̌, l, P roof ) or (Γ0 , Γ̌0 , `0 , P roof 0 ) is created by B
using the oracle OAU T H−U . Suppose (Γ0 , Γ̌0 , `0 , P roof 0 ) is created by B using OAU T H−U .
By applying the General forking lemma, where B and P roof represent P and a triplet in
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the lemma definition, and then extracting witnesses as in Soundness’s proof of P roof2 ,
η ťvw
vw
x
B must have the knowledge of (x, v, w) such that (Θ, Θ̌) = (Γ́ηt
0vw , Γ́0vw ), Γ = Θ ,

Γ̌ = (∆` Θ̌)x . Since (Γ0 , Γ̌0 , `0 , P roof 0 ) is created by B, as shown in the experiment
vw
`i1 vw η ťvw
Γ́1vw ). We have the
of D-Anonymity proof, then B has (Γ0 , Γ̌0 ) = (Γ́ηt
1vw , e(η Ṕ1 , P )

following.
0

(Γ̌/Γ̌0 )1/(`−` ) = β1
0

0

0

η ťvw x
ťvw 1/(`−` )
(Γ̌/Γ̌0 )1/(`−` ) = ((∆` Θ̌)x /Γ̌0 )1/(`−` ) = (e(P, P )`x Γ́0vw
/e(η Ṕ1 , P )`i1 vw Γ́η1vw
)
0

= e(P̄ , P̄ )(ηη`x+cv dw ηťvw x−z(ηη`i1 vw +ηcv dw ťvw ))/(`−` )
β1 = e(η Ṕ1 , P ) = e(η C̄, η P̄ ) = e(P̄ , P̄ )zηη
From these equations, B can compute the discrete log z.

Proof of Theorem 5.3.5
This proof is similar to the proof of ‘Exculpability for the GM’ for the TFS04 scheme
[TFS04], but it is based on the SDH assumption whereas the other proof is based on
the SRSA assumption. It is briefly presented as follows. We prove that if there is a
PPT adversary A that can break D-Exculpability for the GM in our scheme, then the
q-SDH assumption does not hold. We construct a PPT adversary B that can extract
a new valid member public key/secret key pair, which is different from the pairs of all
registered group members (let the set of these pairs be K = {((ai , Si , ·, ·), xi )}). Then,
Theorem 5.3.5 follows, based on Lemma 5.3.2.
Consider an instance of the dynamic k-TAA scheme, where the group public and
secret keys are gpk = (P, Ppub , P0 , H, G1 , G2 , ∆) and gsk = γ, respectively. As A can
break D-Exculpability for the GM, T RACE outputs GM at the end of the experiment.
That means there exist (Γ, Γ̌, l, P roof ) and (Γ0 , Γ̌0 , `0 , P roof 0 ) in the log of an AP such
0

that Γ = Γ0 , (Γ̌/Γ̌0 )1/(`−` ) ∈
/ LIST and P roof and P roof 0 are valid. By applying the
General forking lemma, where B, P roof and P roof 0 represent P and triplets in the
lemma definition, and then extracting witnesses as in Soundness’s proof of P roof2 , B
0

must have the knowledge of (a, S, x, Θ, Θ̌) and (a0 , S 0 , x0 , Θ0 , Θ̌0 ) such that Θx = Θ0x ,
and ((a, S, xP, e(xP, P )), x) and ((a0 , S 0 , x0 P, e(x0 P, P )), x0 ) are valid member public
key/secret key pairs.
If Θ 6= Θ0 , then x 6= x0 . As Θ and Θ0 can be randomly chosen, the probability there
exist i and i0 such that Θxi = Θ0xi0 is negligible. Then, with non-negligible probability,
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either x or x0 is different from all xi in K. That means a new valid member public
key/secret key pair has been created.
0

If Θ = Θ0 , then x = x0 , thus (Γ̌/Γ̌0 )1/(`−` ) = ∆x . As the tracing procedure outputs
GM, we have ∆x ∈
/ LIST , so ∆x is different from all ∆xi . That also means a new valid
member public key/secret key pair has been created.

5.4

A New k-TAA scheme

A dynamic k-TAA scheme can be converted into an ordinary k-TAA as follows. The
setup procedure remains the same, except that the APs do not obtain any key, do not
maintain any access group and other public information. The joining, the bound announcement and the public tracing procedures remain the same. The granting access and
revoking access procedures are removed. In the authentication procedure for dynamic
k-TAA, a user needs to prove to an AP three conditions: (i) he has been registered as
a group member; (ii) he is in the access group of the AP; and (iii) he has not accessed
the AP more than the allowable number of times. For ordinary k-TAA, the user does
not have to prove condition (ii) and just needs to prove two conditions (i) and (iii).
Using the above approach we can construct a k-TAA scheme from the proposed
dynamic scheme. The k-TAA scheme has the following differences with the dynamic
one. In the setup procedure, the for APs part is removed and only the part for GM
is performed. The joining, the bound announcement and the public tracing procedures
remain the same. There is no granting access or revoking access procedure. In the
authentication procedure, a different P roof2b is used and there is no Update or Public
Inspection algorithm. The authentication procedure is provided as follows.

5.4.1

Authentication Procedure

Authentication.
An AP (ID, k) can authenticate a member M, whose public key and secret key are
mpk = (a, S, C, β) and msk = x respectively, as follows.
1. Member M increases counter ι. If value ι > k, then M sends ⊥ to the AP and
stops.
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2. The AP sends a random integer ` ← Z∗p to M.
3. Member M computes tag (Γ, Γ̌) = (Θxι , (∆` Θ̌ι )x ) using the ιth tag base (Θι , Θ̌ι ),
and sends (Γ, Γ̌) to the AP with a proof P roof20 = P K{(ι, a, S, x) : Γ = Θxι ∧ Γ̌ =
(∆` Θ̌ι )x ∧ e(S, aP + Ppub ) = e(xP + P0 , P )}.
4. If the proof is valid and if Γ is different from all corresponding tags in the AP’s
LOG, the AP adds tuple (Γ, Γ̌, l) and the proof to the LOG, and outputs accept. If
the proof is valid and Γ is already written in the LOG, the AP adds tuple (Γ, Γ̌, l)
and the proof to the LOG, outputs (detect,LOG) and stops. If the proof is invalid,
the AP outputs reject and stops.
Proof2 ’.
The member M computes the proof as follows:
1. Select v ← Z∗p , and compute the perfect commitment Ω = Λx Υv of x.
2. Publish Ω and proofs of knowledge of the following:
0
• P roof2a
= P K{(ι, x, v) : Γ = Θxι ∧ Γ̌ = (∆` Θ̌ι )x ∧ Ω = Λx Υv }.
0
• P roof2b
= P K{(a, S, x, v) : e(S, aP + Ppub ) = e(xP + P0 , P ) ∧ Ω = Λx Υv }.
0
The P roof2a
can be constructed the same as P roof2a and proof 1 in [TFS04] using
0
the standard techniques [CDS94]. We describe P roof2b
as follows. Most of the pairing

operations can be pre-computed.
1. Generate r, r0 , k0 , ..., k6 ← Zp and compute U = S + rH; R = rG + r0 H; T1 =
k1 G+k2 H; T2 = k3 G+k4 H−k5 R; Π1 = e(P, P )k0 e(U, P )−k5 e(H, P )k3 e(H, Ppub )k1 ;
Π2 = Λk0 Υk6
2. Compute c = HZp (gpk, Ω, ID, k, l, U, R, T1 , T2 , Π1 , Π2 )
3. Compute in Zp : s0 = k0 + cx; s1 = k1 + cr; s2 = k2 + cr0 ; s3 = k3 + cra;
s4 = k4 + cr0 a; s5 = k5 + ca; s6 = k6 + cv
4. Output (U, R, c, s0 , ..., s6 )
0
Verification of P roof2b
. Checking the following equation
?

c = HZp (gpk, Ω, ID, k, l, U, R,
s1 G + s2 H − cR, s3 G + s4 H − s5 R,
e(P, P )s0 e(U, P )−s5 e(H, P )s3 e(H, Ppub )s1 e(P0 , P )c e(U, Ppub )−c , Λs0 Υs6 Ω−c ).
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Correctness and Security

Correctness and Security of the ordinary scheme is stated in Theorem 5.4.1, whose
proof is similar to the proofs of Theorems 5.3.1, 5.3.2, 5.3.3, 5.3.4 and 5.3.5.
Theorem 5.4.1 In the random oracle model and the list oracle model, our k-TAA
scheme provides (i) Correctness; (ii) Anonymity under the Decisional Bilinear DiffieHellman assumption; (iii) Detectability under the q-Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption,
where q is the upper bound of the group size; (iv) Exculpability for users under the
Discrete Logarithm assumption on G; (v) Exculpability for the GM under the q-Strong
Diffie-Hellman assumption, where q is the upper bound of the group size.
It is also possible to construct a combined scheme, where some of the APs have the
dynamic property and other APs do not. This means some APs can determine users
who are allowed to access their services, whereas other APs rely on the GM to decide
who can access their services.

5.5

Efficiency

Our schemes have the same desirable features of the TFS04 scheme. The sizes of a
group member’s keys do not depend on the group size and the GM can add new members to the group without modifying the public key or secret key of group members.
After being registered into the group, a user does not need to contact the GM. Each
AP can independently determine his bound. In the dynamic scheme, each AP can
independently decide which members are allowed to access his services. Without considering the Update algorithm, the computational cost of the authentication procedure
depends only on the bound of the AP.
Our schemes have much more efficient communication compared to the TFS04
scheme. For instance, assume the scheme is implemented by an elliptic curve or a
hyperelliptic curve over a finite field, where p is a 160-bit prime, G is a subgroup
of an elliptic curve group or a Jacobian of a hyperelliptic curve over a finite field of
order p. GT is a subgroup of a finite field of size approximately 21024 . Techniques
in [GPS04] can be used to compress elements of GT by a factor of three. A possible
choice for the parameters can be from Boneh et al. [BLS01]: G is derived from the
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curve E/GF (3ι ) defined by y 2 = x3 − x + 1. In addition, we assume that system
parameters in the TFS04 scheme are ν = 1024, ε = µ = κ = 160. We summarize the
comparison of communication costs, which are measured by the number of bytes sent,
for authentication procedures in the following table.

Table 5.1: Comparison of Communication Costs for k-TAA schemes (Bytes sent)
Bytes sent by AP Bytes sent by User Dynamic
The TFS04 scheme
40
60 k+ 1617
No
Our ordinary scheme
20
60 k+ 224
No
Our dynamic scheme
20
60 k+ 304
Yes

5.6

Summary

In this chapter, we discussed about constructing dynamic k-TAA schemes, where each
application provider can individually grant or revoke users. We extended the TFS04
model for ordinary k-TAA schemes [TFS04] to a formal security model for dynamic
k-TAA schemes. We then proposed a dynamic and an ordinary k-times anonymous
authentication schemes from bilinear pairings, and proved their security. Our schemes
have communication costs much smaller than the TFS04 scheme’s communication
cost.

Chapter 6
A Security Model for Verifiable Shuffles

6.1

Introduction

In this chapter, we propose a formal security model for verifiable shuffles and a construction of robust mix-nets with public verifiability from verifiable shuffles. This is the
first complete security model for verifiable shuffles with active adversary. The model
defines a verifiable shuffle as a tuple of three elements: a public-key encryption scheme
with a re-encryption algorithm, a PPT algorithm for shuffling and a proof system.
The shuffling algorithm takes a list of ciphertexts of the public-key encryption scheme
and outputs a permuted list of their re-encryptions. The proof system proves that the
output is really a permutation of the re-encryptions of input ciphertexts.
The model also specifies two security requirements for verifiable shuffles, privacy
and verifiability. Privacy requires an honest shuffle to protect its secret permutation
whereas verifiability requires that any attempt by a malicious shuffle to produce an
incorrect output must be detectable. The definition of privacy is based on the similarity between a shuffle hiding the permutation and an encryption system hiding the
input message. Attacks are modelled by an active adversary that uses a chosen permutation attack (CPAS ) (similar to chosen plaintext attacks) or a chosen transcript
attack (CTAS ) (similar to chosen ciphertext attacks). For CPAS , the adversary can
obtain transcripts of the shuffle executions corresponding to the permutations that the
adversary chooses. For CTAS , the adversary obtains permutations that correspond to
the valid shuffle transcripts that it chooses. A difference between this model and the
model of an encryption system is that in this case the adversary does not only specify
the distribution of the challenge permutation (i.e. plaintext) but also the list of input
ciphertexts and corresponding plaintexts. We allow the adversary to choose this input
160
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ciphertext list and also know the corresponding plaintext list. Using this approach, notions of privacy can be defined in line with semantic security and indistinguishability.
Semantic privacy (SP) formalizes the intuition that whatever is computable about the
permutation from a shuffle execution transcript must be also computable without the
transcript. Indistinguishability (IND) means that it is infeasible to distinguish transcripts of two shuffle executions that correspond to two permutations of the same size.
We prove that these two notions of privacy are equivalent and can be interchangeably
used.
The definition of verifiability mainly depends on the proof system of the verifiable
shuffle. The proof system proves that the output of the shuffle is a permutation of the
re-encryptions of the input ciphertexts. The proof system should satisfy two conditions,
completeness and soundness. The completeness condition states that if the shuffle’s
output is truly a permutation of the re-encryptions of the shuffle’s input, then the proof
system accepts with overwhelming probability. The soundness condition means that
if the proof system accepts with overwhelming probability, then the shuffle’s output is
truly a permutation of the re-encryptions of the shuffle’s input.
Part of this chapter appeared in the Proceedings of The International Conference on
Applied Cryptography and Network Security (ACNS) 2004 [NSK04a] and will appear
in the Journal of Universal Computer Science [NSK04b].

6.2
6.2.1

Description of the Model
Notations and Terminology

More notations are defined for this chapter. For a list L, |L| denotes the size of the
list, L[i] denotes the ith element of the list and π(L) denotes the list of elements in L
permuted by a permutation π. Let Tn denote the set of all permutations on {1, ..., n}.
Let poly(n) refer to some fixed but unspecified polynomial and Un denote a random
variable uniformly distributed over {0, 1}n . When a PPT algorithm M takes an input x
x,y
and produces an output y, we denote CM
the probabilistic input (sequence of internal

random coin tosses) of M . For example, if Paillier ciphertext g = rN (1 + mN ), then
(N,m),g

CE

(pk,m),c

= r. We can abuse this notation by writing CEm,c
instead of CE
pk

for an

encryption algorithm E and similar for a decryption algorithm Dsk and a re-encryption
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algorithm Rpk . We use CMx
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to denote the list of probabilistic inputs of M where the

ith element of the list is the probabilistic input that takes the ith element of the list
Lx to the ith element of the list Ly . The set of possible outputs of M on input x is
denoted by [M (x)].

6.2.2

Syntax of Shuffles

First, we define a language to describe that a list of ciphertexts is a permuted and
re-encrypted version of another ciphertext list.
Definition 6.2.1 Suppose RP = (G, E, D, R) is a public-key encryption scheme with
a re-encryption algorithm. Define a language LRP of tuples (pk, L1 , L2 ) such that pk
is a public key generated by G and L2 is a permutation of re-encryptions of ciphertexts
in L1 produced by Rpk . The witness w(pk, L1 , L2 ) includes the permutation and the list
of probabilistic inputs of Rpk .
LRP = {(pk, L1 , L2 ) | (|L1 | = |L2 |) ∧
(∃π ∈ T|L1 | , ∀i ∈ {1, ..., |L1 |} : L2 [π(i)] ∈ [Rpk (L1 [i])])}
π(L ),L2

w(pk, L1 , L2 ) = (π, CRpk 1

)

A shuffle takes a list of ciphertexts and outputs a permuted list of their reencryptions. If being verifiable, it then runs a proof system to prove that the output is really
a permutation of the re-encryptions of the input ciphertexts. This can be formally
defined as follows.
Definition 6.2.2 A shuffle is a pair, (RP, S), such that:
• RP is a public-key encryption scheme with a reencryption algorithm (G, E, D, R).
Suppose the key generation algorithm G generates a pair (pk, sk).
• The PPT algorithm S takes as input a public key pk, a list of n input ciphertexts
Lin and a random permutation π ∈ Tn , and outputs a list of n output ciphertexts
Lout . S performs correctly if Lout is a list of re-encryptions of ciphertexts in Lin
permuted by π.
Definition 6.2.3 A verifiable shuffle is a tuple, (RP, S, (P, V)), such that:
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• RP and S are defined as in Definition 6.2.2.
• The proof system (P, V) takes input pk, Lin and Lout from S and proves that
(pk, Lin , Lout ) ∈ LRP . The private input to P includes only the witness w(pk, Lin ,
Lout ) and does not include the private key sk.

6.2.3

Security Definitions

There are 2 security requirements. Privacy requires an honest shuffle to protect its
secret permutation whereas verifiability requires that any attempt by a malicious shuffle
to produce an incorrect output must be detectable.
We assume an honest verifier for the proof system (P, V).

Verifiability
The proof system proves that the output of the shuffle is a permutation of the reencryptions of the input ciphertexts. In other words, it is a proof system for the
language LRP . The proof system should satisfy two conditions, completeness and
soundness. The completeness condition states that for all x ∈ LRP , the proof system
accepts with overwhelming probability. The soundness condition means that for all
x∈
/ LRP , the proof system accepts with negligible probability.
The private input y of the prover does not include the private key sk but may
(p)

(p)

include information about the lists of plaintexts Lin and Lout and the corresponding
(p)
Lin ,Lin
Epk

probabilistic inputs C

L

(p)

out
and CEpk

,Lout

. The following definition is for interactive

proof systems but can be easily modified for non-interactive proof systems.
Definition 6.2.4 A shuffle (RP, S, (P, V)) is verifiable if its proof system (P, V) has
a polynomial-time V and satisfies two conditions:
• Completeness: For every PPT algorithm A and every positive number α, there
exists a positive integer `0 such that for every integer ` > `0 , it holds that


hP(y), Vi(pk, Lin , Lout ) = 1 given (pk, Lin , Lout ) ∈ LRP



 where (pk, sk) ← G(1` ),
 > 1 − `−α

Pr 

(L
,
L
)
←
A(pk),


in
out
y ← w(pk, Lin , Lout )
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• Soundness: For every interactive machine B, every PPT algorithm A and every
positive number α, there exists a positive integer `0 such that for every integer
` > `0 , it holds that

hB(y), Vi(pk, Lin , Lout ) = 1 given (pk, Lin , Lout ) ∈
/ LRP

 where (pk, sk) ← G(1` ),

Pr 

(π, Lin , Lout ) ← A(pk),

(p)
(p)
Lin ,Lin
Lout ,Lout
(p)
(p)
, Lout , CEpk
)
y ← (π, Lin , CEpk





 < `−α



Privacy
First assume the algorithm S performs correctly and the aim is to model concealment of
the permutation. The shuffle is a public key transformation that hides the permutation
through re-encryption. This can be viewed as ‘encryption’ of permutation through the
process of re-encryption hence using notions of ‘concealment’ of plaintexts in encryption
systems to model privacy. We consider 2 types of attacks by active adversaries. Chosen
permutation attack (CPAS ) is similar to chosen plaintext attacks and the adversary
can obtain transcripts of the shuffle executions corresponding to permutations that the
adversary chooses. Chosen transcript attack (CTAS ) is similar to chosen ciphertext
attacks and the adversary can obtain permutations that correspond to valid shuffle
transcripts that the adversary chooses. The transcript of a verifiable shuffle’s execution
consists of the lists of input ciphertexts and output ciphertexts and the transcript of
the proof system. An attack has 4 steps.
• Key generation: A trusted party generates the keys (pk, sk) ← G(1` ). The adversary
is given (1` , pk). (sk is used for decryption and is not given to the shuffle.)
• Oracle queries: The adversary uses the information obtained so far to make queries
to some oracles. Different sets of oracles determine different types of attacks (CPAS
and CTAS ). After making a number of such queries, the adversary moves to the next
stage.
• Challenge generation: Using the information obtained so far, the adversary specifies
a challenge template, according to which an actual challenge will be generated.
• Additional oracle queries: Based on the information obtained so far, the adversary
makes additional queries as in Step 2 and then, produces an output and halts.
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The adversary’s strategy consists of two stages, each represented by a PPT oracle
machine, and corresponding to its action before and after generation of the actual
challenge. The first part, denoted by A1 , captures the adversary’s behavior during Step
2 and 3. A1 is given the public key pk, and its output is a pair (τ, δ), where τ is the
challenge template generated at the beginning of Step 3 and δ is the state information
passed to the second part of the adversary. The second part of the adversary, denoted by
A2 , captures the adversary’s behavior during Step 4. A2 is given the state information δ
and the actual challenge o generated in Step 3, and produces the adversary’s output v.
It suffices to give the public key pk to only the first machine as A1 can pass this input to
the second machine as part of the state information δ. We write (τ, δ) ← AOracles
(pk),
1
and v ← AOracles
(δ, o), where Oracles specify oracles that are available to the adversary.
2
Notions of Privacy: We consider two notions of privacy. Semantic privacy formalizes the intuition that whatever is computable about the permutation from a shuffle
execution’s transcript must be also computable without the transcript. In formalising
this notion under CPAS and CTAS , we consider the following challenge templates. The
challenge template includes a PPT algorithm Πn , two polynomially bounded functions
(p)

hn and fn , a list of n ciphertexts Lin , the list of n corresponding plaintexts Lin and
(p)

L

in
the list of probabilistic inputs CEpk

,Lin

. Πn specifies a distribution on the set Tn (of all

permutations on {1, ..., n}): it takes a poly(`)-bit input (` is the security parameter)
and outputs a permutation π ∈ Tn . The information regarding the permutation that
the adversary tries to obtain is captured by fn , whereas the a-priori partial information about the permutation is captured by hn . The actual challenge includes the list
of output ciphertexts Lout , the transcript of the proof system V iewVP (pk, Lin , Lout ), the
(p)

list of n input ciphertexts Lin , the list of n corresponding plaintexts Lin , the list of
L

(p)

in
probabilistic inputs CEpk

L

(p)

in
and CEpk

,Lin

,Lin

(p)

and the partial information hn (π). The inclusion of Lin

models the fact that the adversary can somehow know all the plaintexts

of the input ciphertexts to the shuffle. The adversary’s goal is to guess fn (π).
The second notion of privacy is indistinguishability and means that it is infeasible
to distinguish transcripts of two shuffle executions that correspond to two permutations of the same size. In the definitions of IND-CPAS and IND-CTAS , the challenge
template consists of a pair of permutations π(1) , π(2) ∈ Tn , a list of n ciphertexts Lin ,
(p)

L

(p)

in
the list of n corresponding plaintexts Lin and the list of probabilistic inputs CEpk

,Lin

.

The actual challenge is the transcript of the shuffle execution corresponding to one of
the permutations and consists of the list of output ciphertexts Lout , the transcript of

6.2. Description of the Model

166

the proof system V iewVP (pk, Lin , Lout ), the lists of input ciphertexts Lin and the corre(p)

L

(p)

in
sponding plaintexts Lin , and the probabilistic inputs CEpk

,Lin

of the input ciphertexts.

The adversary’s goal is to distinguish the two possible cases.
Attacks: We consider two attacks.
(Chosen permutation attack) The adversary has access to two oracles. The first oracle
OS takes a permutation and a list of input ciphertexts and produces a ciphertext list
output by the algorithm S and corresponding to the input list, and the transcript of
the proof system (P, V) when the shuffle interacts with an honest verifier. The second
oracle OE takes a plaintext and returns the ciphertext encrypted by algorithm Epk
corresponding to plaintext. The adversary chooses queries by taking the results of all
previous queries into account. We note that in CPAS the adversary can compute all
answers of the queries to OS and OE using public information however using these
oracles provides consistency in our presentation. We provide the definitions of SPCPAS and IND-CPAS as follows.
Definition 6.2.5 A verifiable shuffle (RP, S, (P, V)) is said to provide semantic privacy under chosen permutation attacks (SP-CPAS ) if for every pair of PPT oracle machines, A1 and A2 , there exists a pair of PPT algorithms, A01 and A02 , such that the
following two conditions hold:
1. For every positive number α, there exists a positive integer `0 such that for every
integer ` > `0 , it holds that

v = fn (π) where


(pk, sk) ← G(1` ),

(p)

Lin ,Lin
(p)

((Π
,
h
,
f
,
L
,
L
,
C
), δ) ← A1OS ,OE (pk),
n
n n
in
in
Epk
Pr 

Lout ← S(pk, Lin , π) where π ← Πn (Upoly(`) ),


(p)
Lin ,Lin
(p)

P
o
←
(L
,
V
iew
(pk,
L
,
L
),
L
,
L
,
C
, hn (π)),
out
in
out
in

V
in
Epk
S ,OE
v ← AO
(δ, o)
2


v = fn (π) where



((Πn , hn , fn ), δ) ← A01 (1` ), 
 + `−α

< Pr 

π ← Πn (Upoly(`) ),


n
0
v ← A2 (δ, 1 , hn (π))














2. For every ` above, the parts (Πn , hn , fn ) generated from A1OS ,OE (pk) and A01 (1` )
are identically distributed.
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Definition 6.2.6 A verifiable shuffle (RP, S, (P, V)) is said to provide indistinguishability under chosen permutation attacks (IND-CPAS ) if for every pair of PPT oracle
machines, A1 and A2 , for every positive number α, there exists a positive integer `0
such that for every integer ` > `0 , it holds that
(1)

(2)

|p` − p` | < `−α
where


(i)

p`






4
= Pr 








v = 1 where




(p)

Lin ,Lin
(p)
OS ,OE

((π(1) , π(2) , Lin , Lin , CEpk
), δ) ← A1
(pk),


Lout ← S(pk, Lin , π(i) ),


(p)
Lin ,Lin
(p)
), 
o(i) ← (Lout , V iewVP (pk, Lin , Lout ), Lin , Lin , CEpk

OS ,OE
(δ, o(i) )
v ← A2
(pk, sk) ← G(1` ),

where π(1) , π(2) ∈ Tn .
The following theorem shows the equivalence of SP-CPAS and IND-CPAS . The
proof is similar to the proof of the equivalence of SS-CPA and IND-CPA [Goldreich03]
and is outlined below.
Theorem 6.2.1 A verifiable shuffle (RP, S, (P, V)) provides SP-CPAS if and only if
it provides IND-CPAS .

Proof:
IND-CPAS implies SP-CPAS . Suppose that (RP, S, (P, V)) provides IND-CPAS . We
will show that (RP, S, (P, V)) provides SP-CPAS by constructing, for every pair of
PPT oracle machines A1 and A2 , a pair of PPT algorithms A01 and A02 , such that the
two conditions stated in Definition 6.2.5 hold. Specifically, A01 and A02 are constructed
as follows:
1. A01 (1` ) returns ((Πn , hn , fn ), δ 0 ), where ((Πn , hn , fn ), δ 0 ) is generated as follows.
First, A01 generates an instance of the shuffle scheme by letting (pk, sk) ←
G(1` ). Next, A01 invokes A1 , while simulating the oracles OS and OE , and
(p)

L

(p)

in
gets ((Πn , hn , fn , Lin , Lin , CEpk

(p)

L

(p)

in
(pk, Lin , Lin , CEpk

,Lin

, δ).

,Lin

), δ) ← A1OS ,OE (pk). Finally, A01 sets δ 0 =
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Note that the generation of the key pair by A01 should not be confused with the
generation of the key pair in the experiment referring to the algorithms A1 and
A2 . In particular, the generated public key pk allows A01 to simulate the oracles
(p)

L

(p)

in
OS and OE . Furthermore, A01 outputs the public key pk and (Lin , Lin , CEpk

,Lin

)

as part of the state δ 0 passed to A02 , whereas A1 does not do so. This will allow
A02 too to simulate the oracles OS and OE and A02 can also simulate a transcript
of the proof system (P, V).
L

(p)

(p)

in
2. On input ((pk, Lin , Lin , CEpk

,Lin

, δ), 1n , γ) where γ = hn (π) for some permuta-

tion π ∈ Tn , A02 generates output as follows. It selects some fixed permutation
π0 ∈ Tn , simulates the shuffle algorithm S by generating a list L0out of re-encrypted
ciphertexts in Lin permuted by π0 . It then simulates an execution of the proof system (P, V) on input (pk, Lin , L0out ) and gets the transcript V iewVP (pk, Lin , L0out ).
(p)

L

(p)

in
Let o0 ← (L0out , V iewVP (pk, Lin , L0out ), Lin , Lin , CEpk

,Lin

, γ), A02 outputs the value

S ,OE
(δ, o0 ).
returned by AO
2

Since A01 merely simulates the generation of a key pair and the actions of A1 with
respect to such a pair, the equal distribution condition (i.e., Item 2 in Definition 6.2.5)
holds. Using the (corresponding) IND-CPAS property, we show that (even in the
presence of the oracles OS and OE ) the distributions (δ, o0 ) and (δ, o) are computation(p)

L

(p)

in
ally indistinguishable, where (pk, sk) ← G(1` ); ((Πn , hn , fn , Lin , Lin , CEpk
S ,OE
(pk); π ← Πn (Upoly(`) );
AO
1
(p)
Lin ,Lin
(p)
Lin , Lin , CEpk
, hn (π)); L0out

(p)

L

(p)

in
Lin , Lin , CEpk

,Lin

Lout ← S(pk, Lin , π); o ← (Lout , V

,Lin

), δ) ←

iewVP (pk, Lin , Lout ),

← S(pk, Lin , π0 ) and o0 ← (L0out , V iewVP (pk, Lin , L0out ),

, hn (π)).

• Details: Suppose that given (Πn , hn , fn ) generated by A1OS ,OE (pk) and oracle
access to OS and OE , there exists a PPT algorithm to distinguish between (δ, o0 )
and (δ, o), where o and o0 are generated as above. Then we obtain a distinguisher
as in Definition 6.2.6 as follows. The first part of the distinguisher invokes A1
(while answering its oracle queries by forwarding these queries to its own oracles
(p)

L

(p)

in
OS and OE ), and obtains ((Πn , hn , fn , Lin , Lin , CEpk

,Lin

), δ) ← A1OS ,OE (pk). It

sets π(1) ← Πn (Upoly(`) ) and π(2) = π0 , and outputs
(p)

L

(p)

in
((π(1) , π(2) , Lin , Lin , CEpk

,Lin

(p)

L

(p)

in
), (δ, hn (π(1) ))). That is, (π(1) , π(2) , Lin , Lin , CEpk

,Lin

)

is the challenge template, and a challenge o(i) is generated as in Definition 6.2.6,
where i is either 1 or 2. The second part of the new distinguisher, gets as input the
challenge o(i) and the state generated by the first part (δ, hn (π(1) )), and invokes
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the distinguisher of the contradiction hypothesis with input (δ, (o(i) , hn (π(1) ))),
while answering its oracle queries by forwarding these queries to its own oracles
OS and OE . Thus, the new distinguisher violates the condition in Definition 6.2.6,
in contradiction to the hypothesis that (RP, S, (P, V)) provides IND-CPAS .
It follows that IND-CPAS (as in Definition 6.2.6) implies SP-CPAS (as in Definition
6.2.5).
SP-CPAS implies IND-CPAS . We now turn to the opposite direction. Suppose that
(RP, S, (P, V)) provides SP-CPAS but does not provide IND-CPAS . Consider the chal(p)

(p)

L

in
lenge template (π(1) , π(2) , Lin , Lin , CEpk

,Lin

) produced by the distinguishing adversary

and o(1) and o(2) are generated as in Definition 6.2.6. We construct a SP-CPAS adver(p)

L

(p)

in
sary by generating a corresponding challenge template (Πn , hn , fn , Lin , Lin , CEpk

,Lin

)

such that.
• Πn uniformly outputs either π(1) or π(2) .
• The function fn satisfies fn (π(1) ) = 1 and fn (π(2) ) = 0.
• The function hn is defined arbitrarily subject to hn (π(1) ) = hn (π(2) ).
Note that when the SP-CPAS adversary invokes the distinguishing adversary, the former uses its own oracles to answer the queries made by the latter. We can see that
the SP-CPAS adversary has a noticeable advantage in guessing fn (Πn (Upoly(`) )) (by
using the distinguishing gap between o(1) and o(2) , whereas no algorithm that only gets
hn (Πn (Upoly(`) )) can have any advantage in such a guess. We derive a contradiction to
the hypothesis that (RP, S, (P, V)) provides SP-CPAS as in Definition 6.2.5, and the
theorem follows.

2

(Chosen transcript attack) In this attack, in addition to two oracles described before,
the adversary has access to another oracle OT , that takes a transcript of a shuffle
execution and returns the corresponding permutation if the transcript is valid, and
an error symbol, otherwise. We assume that in step 4, the adversary can not use the
transcript in the actual challenge as a query to OT .
We note that for shuffles without proof systems, i.e. not providing verifiability,
the adversary with access to OT can always learn the permutation. This is because
the shuffle transcript consists of an input ciphertext list and an output ciphertext list
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and the adversary can use re-encryption to generate another input ciphertext list and
another output ciphertext list that he can present to OT and obtain the permutation.
For verifiable shuffles, the attack can be prevented by using the verifiability proof
systems. For example, informally, by adding proofs of knowledge to the proof system,
construction of new valid transcripts from old ones could be prevented. Definitions of
SP-CTAS and IND-CTAS are given as follows.
Definition 6.2.7 A verifiable shuffle (RP, S, (P, V)) is said to provide semantic privacy under chosen transcript attacks (SP-CTAS ) if for every pair of PPT oracle machines,
A1 and A2 , there exists a pair of PPT algorithms, A01 and A02 , such that the following
two conditions hold:
1. For every positive number α, there exists a positive integer `0 such that for every
integer ` > `0 , it

v = fn (π)







Pr 







holds that

where




(p)

Lin ,Lin
(p)
OS ,OE ,OT

((Πn , hn , fn , Lin , Lin , CEpk
(pk),
), δ) ← A1



Lout ← S(pk, Lin , π) where π ← Πn (Upoly(`) ),

(p)

L
,L
(p)
in
P
in
o ← (Lout , V iewV (pk, Lin , Lout ), Lin , Lin , CEpk
, hn (π)), 


S ,OE ,OT
(δ, o)
v ← AO
2

(A2 must not send (Lout , V iewVP (pk, Lin , Lout ), Lin ) to OT )
(pk, sk) ← G(1` ),




< Pr 



v = fn (π) where




((Πn , hn , fn ), δ) ← A01 (1` ), 
 + `−α

π ← Πn (Upoly(`) ),

0
n
v ← A2 (δ, 1 , hn (π))

2. For every ` and t above, the parts (Πn , hn , fn ) generated from A1OS ,OE ,OT (pk) and
A01 (1` ) are identically distributed.
Definition 6.2.8 A verifiable shuffle (RP, S, (P, V)) is said to provide indistinguishability under chosen transcript attacks (IND-CTAS ) if for every pair of PPT oracle machines, A1 and A2 , for every positive number α, there exists a positive integer `0 such
that for every integer ` > `0 , it holds that
(1)

(2)

|p` − p` | < `−α
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4
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v = 1 where
(pk, sk) ← G(1` ),
L

(p)

(p)

in
((π(1) , π(2) , Lin , Lin , CEpk

,Lin

), δ) ← A1OS ,OE ,OT (pk),

Lout ← S(pk, Lin , π(i) ),
(p)

(p)

L

in
o(i) ← (Lout , V iewVP (pk, Lin , Lout ), Lin , Lin , CEpk

v←

,Lin

),

S ,OE ,OT
AO
(δ, o(i) )
2
















(A2 must not send (Lout , V iewVP (pk, Lin , Lout ), Lin ) to OT )
where π(1) , π(2) ∈ Tn .
The following theorem shows the equivalence of SP-CTAS and IND-CTAS . The
proof is similar to the proof of the equivalence of SS-CCA2 and IND-CCA2
[Goldreich03] and is outlined below.
Theorem 6.2.2 A verifiable shuffle (RP, S, (P, V)) provides SP-CTAS if and only if
it provides IND-CTAS .
Proof: This theorem can be proved similar to the proof of Theorem 6.2.1. In order
to show that IND-CTAS implies SP-CTAS , given an adversary (A1 , A2 ) we construct
the following matching algorithm (A01 , A02 ):
1. A01 (1` ) returns ((Πn , hn , fn ), δ 0 ), where ((Πn , hn , fn ), δ 0 ) is generated as follows.
First, A01 generates an instance of the shuffle scheme by letting (pk, sk) ← G(1` ).
Next, A01 invokes A1 , while simulating the oracles OS , OE and OT (as A01 knows
(p)

L

(p)

in
(pk, sk)), and gets ((Πn , hn , fn , Lin , Lin , CEpk

L

(p)

(p)

in
A01 sets δ 0 = (pk, Lin , Lin , CEpk

(p)

L

(p)

in
2. On input ((pk, Lin , Lin , CEpk

,Lin

,Lin

,Lin

), δ) ← A1OS ,OE ,OT (pk). Finally,

, δ).

, δ), 1n , γ) where γ = hn (π) for some permutation

π ∈ Tn , A02 generates output as follows. It selects some fixed permutation π0 ∈ Tn ,
simulates the shuffle algorithm S by generating a list L0out of re-encrypted ciphertexts in Lin permuted by π0 . It then simulates an execution of the proof system
(P, V) on input (pk, Lin , L0out ) and gets the transcript V iewVP (pk, Lin , L0out ). Let
(p)

L

(p)

in
o0 ← (L0out , V iewVP (pk, Lin , L0out ), Lin , Lin , CEpk

,Lin

, γ), A02 outputs the value re-

S ,OE ,OT
turned by AO
(δ, o0 ). The generated key pair (pk, sk) allows A02 to simulate
2

the oracles OS , OE and OT .
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Again, since A01 merely simulates the generation of a key pair and the actions of A1
with respect to such a pair, the equal distribution condition (i.e. the second item in
Definition 6.2.7) holds. Using the (corresponding) IND-CTAS property, we show that
(even in the presence of the oracles OS , OE and OT ) the distributions (δ, o0 ) and (δ, o)
(p)

L

(p)

in
are indistinguishable, where (pk, sk) ← G(1` ); ((Πn , hn , fn , Lin , Lin , CEpk
S ,OE ,OT
AO
(pk); π ← Πn (Upoly(`) ); Lout ← S(pk, Lin , π); o ←
1
(p)
Lin ,Lin
(p)
, hn (π)); L0out ← S(pk, Lin , π0 ) and o0 ←
Lin , Lin , CEpk

(p)

Lin , Lin , C

(p)
Lin ,Lin
Epk

(Lout , V

,Lin

), δ) ←

iewVP (pk, Lin , Lout ),

(L0out , V iewVP (pk, Lin , L0out ),

, hn (π)). The main thing to notice is that the oracle queries made by

a possible distinguisher of the above distributions can be handled by a distinguisher of
transcripts (as in Definition 6.2.8), by passing these queries to its own oracles. It follows
that IND-CTAS (as in Definition 6.2.8) implies SP-CTAS (as in Definition 6.2.7).
We now turn to the opposite direction. Here the construction of a challenge template (as in Definition 6.2.7) is exactly as the corresponding construction in the proof of
Theorem 6.2.1. Again, the thing to notice is that the oracle queries made by a possible
distinguisher of transcripts (as in Definition 6.2.8) can be handled by the SP-CTAS
adversary, by passing these queries to its own oracles. We derive a contradiction to the
hypothesis that (RP, S, (P, V)) satisfies Definition 6.2.7, and the theorem follows. 2

6.3

A General Construction of Robust Mix-nets
from Verifiable Shuffles

6.3.1

Overview

The main motivation for analysing and constructing verifiable shuffles is constructing
robust mix-nets that consist of the following polynomially bounded participants. Users
send ciphertexts to the mix-net. Each mix-server (also mix-centre) is implemented as
a verifiable shuffle. It takes as input a list of ciphertexts and outputs a permuted list of
the re-encrypted ciphertexts to the next mix server. Decryption servers collaboratively
decrypt the list of ciphertexts output by the last mix-server. A verifier verifies correctness of the operation of the mix-net. The verifier can be replaced by a collaboration
of all servers, where each verification result is decided by a majority vote of all servers
and each random challenge is jointly generated by all servers. All communication is
assumed accessible by all servers.
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Robustness ensures that the probability of producing correct output is close to 1.
If mix-centres are implemented as verifiable shuffles, correctness of their outputs can
be verified and in the case that the proof does not succeed, the mix-centre is excluded
from the mix-net operation. For example a mix-centre A that receives the output
of a corrupted mix-centre B, will instead use B’s input list as its input, effectively
disregarding B. This is possible because a mix-net uses broadcast channels and all
communication is assumed accessible by all mix-centres. Privacy of the mix-net can
be concluded from our proposed definitions for privacy of shuffles. Formalising these
notions and providing proofs for the above statements are future extension of our work.
Inputs to a mix-net must be encrypted by an encryption scheme with nonmalleability against chosen ciphertext attacks (NM-CCA2) [Jakobsson98]. In a non-malleable
encryption scheme, given a ciphertext it is computationally infeasible to generate a different ciphertext such that the corresponding plaintexts are related in a known manner.
If the encryption scheme of the mix-net is malleable, an adversary can trace an input
ciphertext ci, by creating a ciphertext ci0 whose plaintext is related to ci’s plaintext
in a known manner and in the output check for the plaintexts that satisfy the relationship. An example of this attack is shown in [Pfitzmann94] against the mix-net in
[PIK93]. It is also desirable to distribute the decryption ability, so that a minimum
number of decryption servers, the threshold, is needed to decrypt the ciphertexts. The
decryption process should also be robust which means that the corrupted decryption
servers should not be able to prevent uncorrupt ones from correctly decrypting the
ciphertexts. In short, an NM-CCA2 robust threshold encryption scheme is required.
Examples of NM-CCA2 robust threshold encryption schemes are presented in [FP01],
as extensions of the El Gamal and Paillier encryption schemes.

6.3.2

Description

(Set up) There are t mix servers, S1 , · · · , St , one or more decryption servers and a
verifier V. Each mix server is implemented by a verifiable shuffle that shuffles its input
list and proves the correctness of its operation. If the proof succeeds, the output of the
shuffle will be used as the input of the next shuffle. Otherwise, the next shuffle uses
the input of the previous shuffles. All verifiable shuffles of the mix servers share the
same public key.
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Suppose the verifiable shuffle scheme uses an encryption scheme RP with reencryption algorithm, such as the El Gamal or Paillier schemes. The input ciphertexts to
the mix-net are encrypted by an NM-CCA2 robust threshold version of the encryption
scheme RP, such as schemes proposed in [FP01]. A ciphertext encrypted using this
scheme has the form (e, aux), where e is the normal RP ciphertext and aux allows the
ciphertext to be NM-CCA2-robust-threshold.
(Operations)
1. The key generation algorithm of the NM-CCA2 robust threshold encryption
scheme generates a public key and a set of secret keys and each decryption server
is given a secret key. After that, several mix sessions can be executed and each
mix session can be described as follows.
2. Users send the first mix-server ciphertexts encrypted by the public key of the mixnet. An input ciphertext (e, aux) needs to pass NM-CCA2 test by the verifier
before sub-ciphertext e is taken to the first mix-server. Suppose L0 = (c1 , · · · , cn )
is a list of those sub-ciphertexts taken to the first mix-server.
3. Each Si in turn computes a randomly permuted and re-encrypted list Li =
(a0τi (1) , · · · , a0τi (n) ) from Li−1 = (a1 , · · · , an ), where a0i is a re-encryption of ai and
τi is a secret random permutation on {1, · · · , n}, and then outputs Li . Si runs
a proof system (P, V) to prove that Li is a permutation of re-encryptions of elements in Li−1 .
In case that the proof does not succeed, Si is excluded from the mix-net operation. If i 6= t, the mix-centre Si+1 that receives the output of the corrupted
mix-centre Si , will instead use Si ’s input list as its input, effectively disregarding
Si . If i = t, Si ’s input list will be sent to the decryption servers.
4. The decryption servers jointly decrypt ciphertexts, which are sent from the mixcentres, in a robust way and output a list of messages Lout = (mφ(1) , · · · , mφ(n) ),
where φ = τt · · · τ1 and mi is a plaintext of ci .

6.3.3

Security

Extending our formal security model for verifiable shuffles to a formal security model for
robust mix-nets would require significant efforts. First, verifiable shuffles are mainly
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used for one type of robust mix-nets, where each mix server behaves as a verifiable
shuffle, whereas there are other types of mix-nets. There are mix-nets where each
input element is a multiple-layer encryption of a message and each mix-server decrypts
one layer of encryption. There are hybrid mix-nets, which use both asymmetric and
symmetric encryptions. Second, in the type of mix-nets where verifiable shuffles are
applicable, there are multiple mix-servers and decryption servers. Corruption among
these servers would be much more complicated than just a single malicious shuffle. A
formal security model for mix-nets has been proposed [AI03] but no robust mix-net
scheme has been proved secure in this model and proving our mix-net construction
secure in this model would not be easy. Therefore, providing a formal security model
for mix-nets and proving our mix-net construction secure in a formal security model
remain to be our future work.
At present, we can only informally state the security of our mix-net in the following
Statement. Robustness and public verifiability of the mix-net depends on verifiability
of its shuffles (mix-centres). As any honest party can be the verifier, the mix-net
achieves public verifiability. The privacy of the mix-net can be concluded from the
SP-CPAS of the shuffle.
Statement. The mix-net achieves privacy, robustness and public verifiability if the
verifiable shuffle scheme provides verifiability and SP-CPAS , and the threshold encryption scheme is NM-CCA2 and robust.

6.3.4

NM-CCA2 robust threshold encryption schemes

To improve efficiency of the NM-CCA2 robust threshold encryption scheme, instead
of using twin-encryption paradigm as in [FP01], we may combine encryption and the
proof of knowledge to provide NM-CCA2. However, there is no known scheme that
combines encryption and proof of knowledge for the Paillier system to provide NMCCA2 (even in the random oracle model). A combination of El Gamal encryption and
a proof of knowledge of the plaintext has been proved to provide NM-CCA2 in the
random oracle model but the proof requires either another strong assumption [TY98]
or is in the generic model [SJ00]. Abe [Abe04] showed a way of combining encryption
and proof of knowledge to achieve NM-CCA2, but the construction does not preserve
homomorphic property which is essential for application to mix-nets. For robustness
and threshold property of the encryption scheme, the same method in [FP01] can be
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used.
Many mix-net schemes use the combination of El Gamal encryption and a proof
of knowledge of the plaintext, which can be described as follows [Abe99]. Let p and
q be two large primes such that p = 2kq + 1, where k is a positive integer and g is
a generator of the subgroup Gq of order q in Z∗p . The private key is x ∈ Zq and the
public key is (y, g) where y = g x mod p. A ciphertext of message m ∈ Gq is (α, β, c, z)
where α = my s mod p, β = g s mod p, c = HZq (α, β, g w ) mod q (HZq is a hash function
HZq : {0, 1}∗ → Zq ), z = w − cs mod q, and s, w ← Zq . Validity of a ciphertext can be
?

verified by checking whether c = HZq (α, β, g z β c ) and α, β ∈ Gq . Intuitively, the proof
is used to show that the ciphertext must have been encrypted by someone with the
knowledge of s. The plaintext is computed as m := α/β x mod p.
The following alteration of the Paillier scheme combines encryption with a proof of
knowledge system and maintains the homomorphic property. Suppose the public key
N is generated as in the description of the Paillier encryption scheme in subsection
2.8.5. The ciphertext of a message m ∈ ZN is (e, c, s, rs ), where e = rN (1 + mN ), c =
HZN (e, rwN (1 + wN )), s = mc + w mod N , rs = rc rw mod N , and w ← ZN , r, rw ← Z∗N .
?

Validity of a ciphertext can be verified by checking whether c = HZN (e, rsN (1+sN )/ec ).
Intuitively, e is the normal ciphertext and c, s and rs show that the ciphertext has been
encrypted by someone with the knowledge of r and m. However, proving that these
combinations can achieve NM-CCA2 remains a challenge.

6.4

Summary

We proposed a formal model for security of verifiable shuffles. Two security requirements, privacy and verifiability, were defined in the model with respect to an active
adversary. Our definition of shuffle privacy is motivated by observing the similarity
between a shuffle hiding the permutation, and an encryption system hiding the input
message. We considered attacks by an active adversary that uses a chosen permutation
attack (CPAS ) and a chosen transcript attack (CTAS ). The notions of privacy were
defined in line with semantic security and indistinguishability. We proved that these
two notions of privacy are equivalent and can be interchangeably used. The definition
of verifiability is based on the notion of completeness and soundness of the proof system. The model is general, so it provides a direction for a formal model of mix-nets.

6.4. Summary

We also showed how to construct a robust mix-net using verifiable shuffles.
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Chapter 7
New Verifiable Shuffle Schemes

7.1

Introduction

This chapter presents two new verifiable shuffle schemes with efficiency analysis and
provable security in the formal security model proposed in Chapter 6. The first scheme
(VS1) uses a SS-CPA public-key encryption scheme with a re-encryption algorithm
that was proposed by Paillier [Paillier99]. VS1 also utilizes properties of permutation
matrices as in the FS01 shuffle but has computations over a composite modulus which
complicate security proofs (We have to prove Theorem 7.2.1 and Theorem 7.2.4). Compared to FS01 and Groth03 (when using the El Gamal encryption scheme), this scheme
has a more efficient initialisation phase and similar to the Groth03 shuffle (when using
the Paillier encryption scheme), does not require the message space to be prime (a
product of two primes instead).
For the second verifiable shuffle scheme (VS2), we propose an efficient variant of the
Paillier public-key system and use it to construct the shuffle. The variant scheme also
provides SS-CPA but it has more efficient encryption, re-encryption and decryption.
The decryption method of our proposed variant is the same as that of the variant
proposed in Paillier’s original paper [Paillier99], however as we will note in subsection
7.3.1, the original variant is insecure for his suggested selection of parameters and
we show how this problem can be corrected. The efficiency of the verifiable shuffle
scheme VS2 is not only due to the efficiency of the encryption system but also because
it becomes possible (Theorem 7.3.4) to use smaller size exponents (challenges in the
proof system) and so reduce the cost of exponentiation. Overall, VS2 has the smallest
numbers of rounds and exponentiations. (Note that exponentiations in our case is in
modulo N 2 which is more expensive than modulo p and so the number of bit operations
178
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in the Groth03 shuffle is smaller.) Also, similar to Groth03 (when using the Paillier
encryption scheme) and VS1, VS2 does not require the message space to be prime (a
product of two primes instead).
Part of this chapter appeared in the Proceedings of The International Conference on
Applied Cryptography and Network Security (ACNS) 2004 [NSK04a] and will appear
in the Journal of Universal Computer Science [NSK04b].

7.2

Paillier-based Verifiable Shuffle scheme

We propose a new efficient verifiable shuffle system VS1 based on the Paillier encryption
scheme and prove its security in our proposed formal model.

7.2.1

Description

The verifiable shuffle scheme VS1 is a tuple (RP, S, (P, V)), where the public-key
encryption scheme with a re-encryption algorithm RP is the Paillier scheme (presented
in subsection 2.8.5). The public key is pk = N , where N = pq with primes p and q,
and the secret key is sk = λ, where λ = lcm(p − 1, q − 1). The algorithm S takes pk,
a list of Paillier ciphertexts g1 , ..., gn ∈ Z∗N 2 and a permutation π and outputs another
list of Paillier ciphertexts g10 , ..., gn0 ∈ Z∗N 2 . The proof system (P, V), which is described
below, must prove the existence of a permutation π and r1 , ..., rn ∈ Z∗N such that
gi0 = riN gπ−1 (i) mod N 2 , i = 1, ..., n. Hereafter in this section, unless stated otherwise,
we assume all modular computations are in modulo N 2 .

Outline of the proof system
The proof system is based on ideas underlying the FS01 proof system [FS01], which
is presented in subsection 2.10.6. A permutation is also represented as a permutation
matrix, which is defined in Definition 2.10.1.
Representing the permutation π used in the shuffle as a permutation matrix, the
shuffle’s proof system, which proves the correctness of the shuffle, must show the knowledge of a permutation matrix modulo N (Aij )n×n and {ri |i = 1, ..., n} satisfying the
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following relationship between input and output items:
gi0

=

riN

n
Y

A

gj ji , i = 1, ..., n

(7.1)

j=1

Theorem 7.2.1 states conditions to achieve a permutation matrix modulo N . Then
the proof system needs to prove the knowledge of a matrix (Aij )n×n and {ri |i = 1, ..., n}
satisfying equation 7.1 and the conditions on the matrix, as stated in Theorem 7.2.1.
Theorem 7.2.1 is similar to Theorem 2.10.1 for a permutation matrix modulo prime in
the FS01 scheme. As Theorem 7.2.1 is for a permutation matrix modulo composite N ,
it has one more condition “gcd(Aij , N ) is different from p and q”.
Theorem 7.2.1 A matrix (Aij )n×n is a permutation matrix modulo N , where N = pq
with primes p and q, if for all i, j and k, gcd(Aij , N ) is different from p and q and
both of the following equations hold:
n
X

(
A`i A`j =

`=1
n
X

A`i A`j A`k =

`=1

Proof:

(

1 mod N if i = j
0 mod N otherwise
1 mod N if i = j = k
0 mod N otherwise

(7.2)
(7.3)

Suppose a matrix (Aij ) satisfies equations (7.2) and (7.3) and for all i and

j, gcd(Aij , N ) is different from p and q. As (Aij ) satisfies equations (7.2) and (7.3),
based on Theorem 2.10.1, (Aij ) is a permutation matrix mod p and also a permutation
matrix mod q. Thus, there exists a permutation π such that for all i and j:
(
1 mod q if π(i) = j
Aij =
0 mod q otherwise
We now show that for all i and j, if Aij = 1 (or 0, respectively) mod q, then Aij = 1
(or 0, respectively) mod N .
Suppose there exist i0 and j 0 such that Ai0 j 0 = 1 mod q but Ai0 j 0 6= 1 mod N . As
(Aij ) is a permutation matrix mod p, Ai0 j 0 = 0 or 1 mod p. But Ai0 j 0 = 1 mod q and
Ai0 j 0 6= 1 mod N , so Ai0 j 0 = 0 mod p. That means gcd(Ai0 j 0 , N ) = p, which contradicts
the condition “gcd(Aij , N ) is different from p and q”.
Suppose there exist i0 and j 0 such that Ai0 j 0 = 0 mod q but Ai0 j 0 6= 0 mod N . As
(Aij ) is a permutation matrix mod p, Ai0 j 0 = 0 or 1 mod p. But Ai0 j 0 = 0 mod q and
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Ai0 j 0 6= 0 mod N , so Ai0 j 0 = 1 mod p. That means gcd(Ai0 j 0 , N ) = q, which contradicts
the condition “gcd(Aij , N ) is different from p and q”.
Therefore, for all i and j, if Aij = 1 (or 0, respectively) mod q, then Aij = 1 (or 0,
respectively) mod N . That means (Aij )n×n is a permutation matrix modulo N .

2

In the proof system, based on the CCR assumption presented in subsection 2.4.3, it
is computationally difficult for the prover to compute p and q. Hence, for any matrix
(Aij )n×n the prover can generate, “gcd(Aij , N ) is different from p and q”. Therefore,
based on Theorem 7.2.1, the proof system needs to prove the following statements:
• Given {gi } and {gi0 }, {gi0 } can be expressed as equation (7.1) using {ri } and a
matrix that satisfies equation (7.2).
• Given {gi } and {gi0 }, {gi0 } can be expressed as equation (7.1) using {ri } and a
matrix that satisfies equation (7.3).
• The matrix and {ri } in the above two statements are the same.

Proof System
The proof system (P, V) proves that the prover P knows permutation π and r1 , ..., rn ∈
Z∗N such that gi0 = riN gπ−1 (i) , i = 1, ..., n. The input to the proof system is N, {gi }, {gi0 },
i = 1, ..., n. Suppose there is a publicly known set, {g˜i }ni=1 , of elements uniformly
generated from Z∗N 2 . Let the permutation π be represented by a permutation matrix
modulo N (Aij )n×n . The protocol is as follows:
1. P generates: αi ← ZN and α, r˜i , α̃, δi , ρ, ρi , τ, τi ← Z∗N , i = 1, ..., n.
2. P computes:
0

g˜i = r˜i
0

g̃ = α̃

N

N

n
Y

j=1
n
Y

g˜j Aji , i = 1, ..., n
αj

0

g˜j ; g = α

j=1

t˙i = δiN (1 + N

N

n
Y

α

gj j

j=1
n
X
j=1

3αj Aji ); v̇i =

ρN
i (1

+N

n
X
j=1

3αj2 Aji ), i = 1, ..., n
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τiN (1

+N

N

v̇ = ρ (1 + N

n
X
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2αj Aji ), i = 1, ..., n

j=1
n
X

αj3 );

N

ẇ = τ (1 + N

j=1

n
X

αj2 )

j=1

3. P −→ V: {g˜i 0 }, g̃ 0 , g 0 , {t˙i }, {v̇i }, v̇, {ẇi }, ẇ, i = 1, ..., n
4. P ←− V: challenge {ci }, ci ← ZN , i = 1, ..., n
5. P −→ V: the following responses
si =

n
X

Aij cj + αi mod N, i = 1, ..., n

j=1
n
Y

s̃ = α̃
s=α

i=1
n
Y

r˜i ci g˜i di mod N
rici gidi

mod N ; u = ρ

i=1

where di = (

(7.4)

Pn
j=1

n
Y

c2
ρci i δi i

mod N ; v = τ

i=1

n
Y

τici mod N

i=1

Aij cj + αi − si )/N, i = 1, ..., n (so di can only be 0 or 1)

6. V verifies:
N

s̃

n
Y

g˜j

j=1
n
Y
N

s

j=1

sj

s

= g̃

0

gj j = g 0

n
Y
j=1
n
Y

g˜j 0cj

(7.5)

0c

(7.6)

gj j

j=1

n
n
X
Y
c2
N
3
3
u (1 + N
(sj − cj )) = v̇
v˙j cj t˙j j
j=1

j=1

n
n
X
Y
N
2
2
v (1 + N
(sj − cj )) = ẇ
ẇj cj
j=1

7.2.2

(7.7)
(7.8)

j=1

Security

Theorem 7.2.2 and Theorem 7.2.3 show that the proposed shuffle provides Verifiability
under the Computational Composite Residuosity (CCR) assumption, and SP-CPAS
under the Decisional Composite Residuosity (DCR) assumption. These two assumptions are presented in subsection 2.4.3.
Theorem 7.2.2 The shuffle achieves Verifiability if the CCR assumption holds.
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Theorem 7.2.3 The shuffle achieves SP-CPAS if the DCR assumption holds.
Proofs of these theorems are shown in the following.

Proof of Theorem 7.2.2 for Verifiability
To prove Theorem 7.2.2, we need Theorem 7.2.1 and Theorem 7.2.4, which are not required in the proofs for the FS01 scheme. We observe that knowledge of Ai0 j 0 satisfying
gcd(Ai0 j 0 , N ) = p or q allows factorization of N and reveals the secret key λ. So, from
Theorem 7.2.1, the objective of the proof system can be re-stated as follows.
The common input to the proof system includes N, {gi }, {gi0 }, i = 1, ..., n. The
auxiliary input to the prover P includes permutation π and r1 , ..., rn ∈ Z∗N satisfying
gi0 = riN gπ−1 (i) and does not include the secret key sk = λ. The proof system (P, V)
proves P knows a matrix (Aij )n×n and r1 , ..., rn ∈ Z∗N such that equations (7.2) and
(7.3) hold and
gi0 = riN

n
Y

A

gj ji , i = 1, ..., n

(7.9)

j=1

Based on Definition 6.2.4 of Verifiability, Theorem 7.2.2 can be concluded from Theorem 7.2.5 and Theorem 7.2.6, which state the Completeness and Soundness properties
of the proof system. The role of Theorem 7.2.4 will be explained in the proof of
Theorem 7.2.6. Theorems 7.2.4, 7.2.5 and 7.2.6 are presented and proved as follows.
Theorem 7.2.4 For a set of vectors S, let hSik denote the vector space spanned by S
over Zk (so the coordinates of a vector in hSik are in Zk ). Let |S| denote the number of
elements in S. Consider a set of vectors Sn = {(1, c1 , ..., cn ) | (c1 , ..., cn ∈ ZN )∧(@Qn ⊆
)} (that means Sn is the set of vectors
∧ hQn iq = Zn+1
Sn : |Qn | = n + 1 ∧ hQn ip = Zn+1
q
p
(1, c1 , ..., cn ), where c1 , ..., cn ∈ ZN and there does not exist any subset Qn ⊆ Sn of size
). Then |Sn | ≤ (p + q)N n−1 .
and Zn+1
n + 1 such that Qn spans Zn+1
q
p

Proof: This is proved by induction.
• n = 1: Consider a set of vectors S1 ⊆ {(1, c)|c ∈ ZN } satisfying |S1 | > (p + q);
and a vector (1, c1 ) ∈ S1 . Consider a set R1 = {(1, c1 + kp mod N )|k ∈ Zq } ∪
{(1, c1 + kq mod N )|k ∈ Zp }. As |R1 | = p + q − 1, there exists c01 ∈ ZN such
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that (1, c01 ) ∈ S1 but (1, c01 ) ∈
/ R1 . Then Q1 = {(1, c1 ), (1, c01 )} satisfies |Q1 | =
2 ∧ hQ1 ip = Z2p ∧ hQ1 iq = Z2q .
• Suppose the theorem holds for n. We prove it is also true for n + 1. Let a set
Sn+1 = {(1, c1 , ..., cn+1 )|(c1 , ..., cn+1 ∈ ZN ) ∧ (@Qn+1 ⊆ Sn+1 : |Qn+1 | = n + 2 ∧
hQn+1 ip = Zn+2
∧ hQn+1 iq = Zn+2
)}. Consider Sn0 = {(1, c1 , ..., cn )|∃cn+1 ∈ ZN :
p
q
(1, c1 , ..., cn , cn+1 ) ∈ Sn+1 }, there are two possibilities:
1. If @Q0n ⊆ Sn0 : |Q0n | = n + 1 ∧ hQ0n ip = Zn+1
∧ hQ0n iq = Zn+1
, then |Sn0 | ≤
p
q
(p + q)N n−1 , as the theorem holds for n. So |Sn+1 | ≤ |Sn0 |N ≤ (p + q)N n .
2. If ∃Q0n ⊆ Sn0 : |Q0n | = n + 1 ∧ hQ0n ip = Zn+1
∧ hQ0n iq = Zn+1
, select a
p
q
set T of n + 1 vectors (1, ci1 , ..., ci(n+1) ) ∈ Sn+1 , i = 1, ..., n + 1 such that
Q0n = {(1, ci1 , ..., cin )}

1
c11
...
c1n

Let d = det 
..
..
..
 ..
1 c(n+1)1 ... c(n+1)n
mod N exists.



 mod N , then gcd(d, N ) = 1, so d−1


For each vector x = (1, x1 , ..., xn+1 ) ∈ Sn+1 (including those in T ), let


1

c11

...

c1(n+1)


 ..
..
..
..
dx = det 

 1 c(n+1)1 ... c(n+1)(n+1)
1
x1
...
xn+1




 = dxn+1 − F (x1 , ..., xn ) mod N



for some function F. The conditions of Sn+1 lead to either dx = 0 mod p or
dx = 0 mod q.
Suppose dx = 0 mod p, then xn+1 = d−1 F (x1 , ..., xn ) mod p, so the number
of possible vectors x = (1, x1 , ..., xn+1 ) is no more than qN n . Similar for the
case dx = 0 mod q, the number of possible vectors x = (1, x1 , ..., xn+1 ) is no
more than pN n . So |Sn+1 | ≤ (p + q)N n .

2
Before presenting Theorems 7.2.5 and 7.2.6, it is necessary to recall properties of
the Paillier public-key system.
Properties of the Paillier encryption scheme: The security proofs need the following
properties of the Paillier cryptosystem. For w ∈ Z∗N 2 , we call N -th residuosity class of
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w the unique integer x ∈ ZN for which there exists y ∈ Z∗N such that w = y N (1 + xN )
[Paillier99]. The class of w is denoted c(w). Note that the plaintext of a Paillier
ciphertext is the class of that ciphertext. We have the following properties.
• c(w) = 0 ⇔ w is a N -th residue mod N 2 (N -th residues mod N 2 are defined in
Definition 2.4.7)
• c(w1 w2 ) = c(w1 ) + c(w2 ) mod N
• c(w1 ) = c(w2 ) ⇔ ∃r ∈ Z∗N : w1 = w2 rN
Theorem 7.2.5 (Completeness) If P knows a matrix (Aij ) and r1 , ..., rn ∈ Z∗N satisfying (7.2), (7.3) and (7.9), and performs correctly in the protocol, then V always
accepts.

Proof: Suppose P knows a matrix (Aij ) and r1 , ..., rn ∈ Z∗N satisfying equations (7.2),
(7.3) and (7.9); and {g˜i 0 }, g̃ 0 , g 0 , {t˙i }, {v̇i }, v̇, {ẇi }, ẇ, {ci }, {si }, s̃, s, u, v for i = 1, ..., n
are generated as specified in the protocol. Then the verifier outputs accept, as the
following equations hold.
• s̃N
=

Qn

Pn
Q
Q
sj
= (α̃ ni=1 r˜i ci g˜i di )N nj=1 g˜j i=1 Aji ci +αj
j=1 g˜j
Q
Q
Q
Q
(α̃N nj=1 g˜j αj ) nj=1 (r˜j N ni=1 g˜i Aij )cj = g̃ 0 nj=1 g˜j 0cj

Pn
Qn ci di N Qn
sj
i=1 Aji ci +αj
g
=
(α
r
g
)
g
j=1 j
i=1 i i
j=1 j
Q
Q
Q
α Q
A
0c
= (αN nj=1 gj j ) nj=1 (rjN ni=1 gi ij )cj = g 0 nj=1 gj j .

• sN

Qn

Qn ci c2i N
Pn
Pn
3
3
3
3
j=1 (sj −cj )) = (ρ
i=1 ρi δi ) (1+N
j=1 ((
i=1 Aji ci +αj ) −cj )) =
P
Q
Pn
Qn
Pn
c2j
2
N
cj
ρN (1+N nj=1 αj3 ) nj=1 (ρN
j (1+N
i=1 3αi Aij ))
j=1 (δj (1+N
i=1 3αi Aij ))
Q
c2
= v̇ nj=1 v˙j cj t˙j j .

• uN (1+N

Pn

• v N (1 + N

Pn
Pn
Q n ci N
2
2
2
i=1 Aji ci + αj )
j=1 ((
i=1 τi ) (1 + N
j=1 (sj − cj )) = (τ
Q
P
Q
Pn
n
n
n
cj
cj
N
2
j=1 ẇj .
i=1 2αi Aij )) = ẇ
j=1 (τj (1 + N
j=1 αj )

Pn

= τ N (1 + N

− c2j ))

2
Theorem 7.2.6 (Soundness) Under the CCR assumption, if V accepts with nonnegligible probability, then P knows a matrix (Aij ) satisfying equations (7.2), (7.3) and the
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following equation with overwhelming probability.
c(gi0 ) = c(

n
Y

A

gj ji ), i = 1, ..., n

(7.10)

j=1

Proof: This is proved using Theorem 7.2.4 and the following lemmas.
• Lemma 7.2.1 shows that if the CCR assumption holds, then it is computationally
Q
difficult for P to obtain {ai } ⊂ ZN such that c( ni=1 g˜i ai ) = 0 and at least one
element of {ai } is not 0.
• Lemma 7.2.2 and Theorem 7.2.4 show that if V accepts with non-negligible probability, then P knows a matrix {Aij } satisfying
n
Y
c(g̃i ) = c( g˜j Aji ), i = 1, ..., n
0

j=1

• Lemmas 7.2.3 and 7.2.4 show that either this matrix {Aij } satisfies equation (7.2)
Q
or P can compute {ai } ⊂ ZN such that c( ni=1 g˜i ai ) = 0 and at least one element
of {ai } is not 0.
• Lemmas 7.2.3 and 7.2.5 show that either this matrix {Aij } satisfies equation (7.3)
Q
or P can compute {ai } ⊂ ZN such that c( ni=1 g˜i ai ) = 0 and at least one element
of {ai } is not 0.
• Lemma 7.2.6 shows that this matrix {Aij } satisfies equation 7.10.
So these lemmas and Theorem 7.2.4 show that if the CCR assumption holds and V
accepts with non-negligible probability, then P knows a matrix (Aij ) satisfying equations (7.2), (7.3) and (7.10) with overwhelming probability.

2

Lemma 7.2.1 If the CCR assumption holds, then it is computationally difficult for P
Q
to obtain {ai } ⊂ ZN such that c( ni=1 g˜i ai ) = 0 and at least one element of {ai } is not
0.

Proof: Suppose, with non-negligible probability, P can compute {ai } ⊂ ZN such
Q
that c( ni=1 g˜i ai ) = 0 and at least one element of {ai } is not 0. We construct a PPT
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algorithm A that can break the CCR assumption as follows. Suppose A is given a
product N of two [l/2]-bit primes and z ← Z∗N 2 , we show that A can compute x ∈ ZN
with non-negligible probability such that there exists r ∈ Z∗N satisfying rN (1+xN ) = z
mod N 2 , or in other words, c(z) = x.
A simulates an instance of the VS1 scheme, where the public key is pk = N . A then
generates {g˜i }ni=1 as follows. A chooses i0 ← {1, ..., n} and generates ri0 ← Z∗N , x0i ← ZN
for i = 1, ..., n. Then for i = 1, ..., n and i 6= i0 , A computes g̃i = ri0N (1 + x0i N ). A
(1 + x0i0 N )z. The set {g˜i }ni=1 is then given to P. As the distribution
computes g˜i0 = ri0N
0
of {g˜i }ni=1 is the same as the distribution of a set of n elements uniformly generated
Q
from Z∗N 2 , P can compute {ai } ⊂ ZN such that c( ni=1 g˜i ai ) = 0 and at least one
element of {ai } is not 0, with non-negligible probability ². As i0 is chosen uniformly
from {1, ..., n}, the probability that ai0 6= 0 is ²/n.
Q
P
As c( ni=1 g˜i ai ) = 0, we have ai0 x + ni=1 ai x0i = 0 mod N . So A can compute
Pn
0
x = −a−1
2
i0
i=1 ai xi mod N and breaks the CCR assumption.
Lemma 7.2.2 If V accepts with non-negligible probability, then P knows a matrix
{Aij } and {αi } satisfying
n
Y
c(g̃i ) = c( g˜j Aji ), i = 1, ..., n
0

j=1
n
Y

c(g̃ 0 ) = c(

g˜j αj )

(7.11)
(7.12)

j=1

Proof: Consider the set Sn of all vectors (1, c1 , ..., cn ) constructed from all the challenges {ci } generated by V, for which P can compute responses {si } such that V accepts.
As V accepts with non-negligible probability, we have |Sn |/|ZnN | is non-negligible, that
means |Sn | > (p + q)N n−1 . Based on Theorem 7.2.4, P can find a set Qn of n + 1
. Then P can oband < Qn >q = Zn+1
vectors so that Qn ⊆ Sn , < Qn >p = Zn+1
q
p
tain {Aij }ni,j=1 ⊂ ZN and {αi }ni=1 ⊂ ZN , such that for every (1, c1 , ..., cn ) ∈ Qn and
corresponding response {si }, we have:
n
X
si =
Aij cj + αi mod N, i = 1, ..., n
j=1

Replace these values of si into equation (7.5), we have:
n
n
Y
Y
Pn
c( g˜i j=1 Aij cj +αi ) = c(g̃ 0
g˜j 0cj ) mod N, ∀(1, c1 , ..., cn ) ∈ Qn
i=1

j=1
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⇒ c(

j=1 g˜j
g̃ 0

αj

)+

n
X

Qn
j=1

ci c(

g˜j Aji

g˜i 0

i=1
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) = 0 mod N, ∀(1, c1 , ..., cn ) ∈ Qn

2

So equations (7.11) and (7.12) hold.

Lemma 7.2.3 Assume that P knows {Aij } and {αi } satisfying equations (7.11) and
(7.12). If P knows {si } and s̃ which satisfy equation (7.5), then either equations (7.4)
Q
hold, or P can generate {ai } with overwhelming probability such that c( ni=1 g˜i ai ) = 0
and at least one element of {ai } is not 0.

Proof:

Consider the case when P knows {si } and s̃ satisfying equation (7.5); and
P
there exists i0 ∈ {1, ..., n} satisfying si0 6= nj=1 Ai0 j cj + αi0 mod N . Then P can find
P
Q
ai = nj=1 Aij cj + αi − si mod N , i = 1, ..., n such that c( ni=1 g˜i ai ) = 0 and ai0 6= 0.
This can be shown by replacing the values of c(g˜i 0 ) and c(g̃ 0 ) from equations (7.11) and
Q
P
(7.12) into equation c( nj=1 g˜j sj ) = c(g̃ 0 ) + nj=1 cj c(g˜j 0 ) mod N , which is a result of
equation (7.5).
Consider the other case when P knows {si } and s̃ satisfying equation (7.5); and
P
every i ∈ {1, ..., n} satisfies si = nj=1 Aij cj + αi mod N . In this case, equations (7.4)

2

hold.

Lemma 7.2.4 Assume that P knows {Aij } and {αi } satisfying equations (7.11) and
(7.12). If equations (7.5) and (7.8) hold with non-negligible probability, then either
equation (7.2) holds, or P can generate {ai } with overwhelming probability such that
Q
c( ni=1 g˜i ai ) = 0 and at least one element of {ai } is not 0.

Proof: As in Lemma 7.2.3, if equation (7.5) hold, then either equations (7.4) hold, or
Q
P can generate non-trivial {ai } satisfying c( ni=1 g˜i ai ) = 0 with overwhelming probability. For the former case, replace the values of si from equations (7.4) into (7.8) and
we have:
n X
n X
n
n X
n
X
X
(
Ahi Ahj − δij )ci cj +
(
2αj Aji − c(ẇi ))ci
i=1 j=1 h=1
n
X
+(
αj2 − c(ẇ))
j=1

i=1 j=1

= 0 mod N
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1 mod N if i = j
0 mod N otherwise

So if equation (7.2) does not hold for some i and j, then the probability that equation

2

(7.8) holds is negligible.

Lemma 7.2.5 Assume that P knows {Aij } and {αi } satisfying equations (7.11) and
(7.12). If equations (7.5) and (7.7) hold with non-negligible probability, then either
equation (7.3) holds, or P can generate {ai } with overwhelming probability such that
Q
c( ni=1 g˜i ai ) = 0 and at least one element of {ai } is not 0.
Proof: As in Lemma 7.2.3, if equation (7.5) hold, then either equations (7.4) hold, or
Q
P can generate non-trivial {ai } satisfying c( ni=1 g˜i ai ) = 0 with overwhelming probability. For the former case, replace the values of si from equations (7.4) into (7.7) and
we have:
n X
n
n
n X
n X
n X
X
X
Ahi Ahj Ahk − δijk )ci cj ck +
(
3αj A2ji − c(t˙i ))c2i +
(
i=1 j=1 k=1 h=1
n X
n
X
(
3αj2 Aji −
i=1 j=1

i=1 j=1

c(v̇i ))ci + (

where

αj3 − c(v̇)) = 0 mod N

j=1

(
δijk =

n
X

1 mod N if i = j = k
0 mod N otherwise

So if equation (7.3) does not hold for some i and j, then the probability that equation

2

(7.7) holds is negligible.

Lemma 7.2.6 Assume that P knows {Aij } and {αi } satisfying equations (7.11) and
(7.12), and {si } and s̃ satisfying equation (7.5). If equation (7.6) holds with nonnegligible probability, then either the equations
c(gi0 )

= c(

n
Y

A

(7.13)

α

(7.14)

gj ji ), i = 1, ..., n

j=1

c(g 0 ) = c(

n
Y

gj j )

j=1

Q
hold or P can generate {ai } with overwhelming probability such that c( ni=1 g˜i ai ) = 0
and at least one element of {ai } is not 0.
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Proof:

As in Lemma 7.2.3, if equation (7.5) hold, then either equations (7.4) hold,
Q
or P can generate non-trivial {ai } satisfying c( ni=1 g˜i ai ) = 0 with overwhelming probability. For the former case, replace the values of si from equations (7.4) into (7.6), we
have:
c(

n
Y

Pn

gi

j=1

Aij cj +αi

) = c(g 0

i=1

⇒ c(

0c

gj j ) mod N

j=1

Qn

αj
j=1 gj
g0

n
Y

)+

n
X
i=1

Qn
ci c(

Aji
j=1 gj
)
gi0

= 0 mod N

So equations (7.13) and (7.14) hold.

2

Proof of Theorem 7.2.3 for Privacy
Based on Theorem 6.2.1, proving Theorem 7.2.3 is equivalent to proving Theorem 7.2.7
below. We need Definition 7.2.1 and Lemma 7.2.7 to prove Theorem 7.2.7.
Definition 7.2.1 Let Rm be the set of m-element tuples where all elements are in
Z∗N 2 and let Dm ⊂ Rm be the set of m-element tuples where all elements are N -th
residues modulo N 2 . The DCRm problem is defined as the problem of distinguishing
instances uniformly chosen from Rm and those uniformly chosen from Dm . The DCRm
assumption states that the DCRm problem is computationally difficult.
Lemma 7.2.7 For any m ≥ 1, the DCRm assumption holds if the DCR assumption
holds.

Proof: We prove the lemma by induction. We prove that if either the DCR assumption holds or the DCRm−1 assumption holds, then the DCRm assumption holds.
We define the subset Mm of Rm to be the set of tuples I = (x1 , ..., xm ) such that
x1 , ..., xm−1 are N -th residues modulo N 2 and xm ∈ Z∗N 2 . Hence, Dm is a subset of
Mm .
If the DCRm problem is easy, then we can either distinguish between instances
chosen uniformly from Rm and Mm or distinguish between instances chosen uniformly
from Mm and Dm . In the former case, it means that the DCRm−1 problem is easy. In
the following, we show that in the latter case, the DCR problem is easy.
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N
For any I1 = (x) ∈ R1 , we generate a tuple Im ∈ Rm as Im = (r1N , r2N , ..., rm−1
, x)

where ri ← Z∗N . If I1 is chosen uniformly from D1 , then Im is distributed uniformly
in Dm . If I1 is chosen uniformly from R1 , then Im is distributed uniformly in Mm .

2

Therefore, if Dm and Mm are distinguishable, then the DCR problem is easy.
Theorem 7.2.7 The shuffle provides IND-CPAS if the DCR assumption holds.
Proof:

The reader can refer to subsection 6.2.3 for definitions of IND-CPAS and

explanations of the notations in this proof.
Suppose there is a publicly known set, {g˜i }ni=1 , of elements uniformly generated
from Z∗N 2 . Suppose the challenge template includes two permutations π(1) , π(2) ∈ Tn ,
(p)

a list of ciphertexts Lin = (g1 , ..., gn ), the list of corresponding plaintexts Lin and
the corresponding probabilistic inputs C

(p)
Lin ,Lin
Epk

. The actual challenge oπ(k) , which is

randomly generated by using π(k) (k = 1 or 2) and is given to the adversary, includes
(p)

L

(p)

in
Lin , Lin , CEpk

,Lin

, a list of re-encrypted ciphertexts Lout = (g10 , ..., gn0 ) and

V iewVP (pk, Lin , Lout ) = ({g˜i }, {g˜i 0 }, g̃ 0 , g 0 , {t˙i }, {v̇i }, {ẇi }, v̇, ẇ, {ci }, {si }, s̃, s, u, v)
Let Oπ(k) be the set of all possible oπ(k) .
(p)

L

(p)

,L

in
in
Let Og be the set of all tuples og , each of which includes Lin , Lin , CEpk
, a list
of random ciphertexts Lout = (g10 , ..., gn0 ), the set {g˜i }, a tuple ({g˜i 0 }ni=1 , {t˙i }ni=1 , {v̇i }ni=1 ,

{ẇi }ni=1 ) of randomly generated elements of Z∗N 2 , a tuple ({ci }ni=1 , {si }ni=1 ) of randomly
generated elements of ZN , a tuple (s̃, s, u, v) of randomly generated elements of Z∗N
and g̃ 0 , g 0 , v̇, ẇ satisfying:
g̃

0

N

= s̃

n
Y

g˜j sj g˜j 0−cj

(7.15)

j=1

g 0 = sN

n
Y

s

0−cj

gj j gj

(7.16)

j=1

v̇ = uN (1 + N

n
n
Y
X
−c2
v˙j −cj t˙j j
(s3j − c3j ))
j=1

j=1

n
n
Y
X
ẇj −cj
ẇ = v N (1 + N
(s2j − c2j ))
j=1

(7.17)
(7.18)

j=1

We first prove that if the DCR5n assumption holds, then the actual challenge oπ(k)
uniformly chosen from Oπ(k) is computationally indistinguishable from a tuple og uniformly chosen from Og .
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We show that from an element I = (h1 , .., hn , h˜1 , .., h˜n , t1 , .., tn , v1 , .., vn , w1 , .., wn )
of D5n or R5n (see Definition 7.2.1), we can generate a random element or of Oπ(1) or
Og as follows. Choose {ci }ni=1 and {si }ni=1 uniformly from ZN and s̃, s, u, v uniformly
from Z∗N . Compute
αi = si − cπ(1) (i) mod N , i = 1, ..., n
gi0 = hi gπ−1 (i) , i = 1, ..., n
(1)

g˜i

0

= h̃i g̃π−1 (i) , i = 1, ..., n
(1)

t˙i = ti (1 + N 3απ−1 (i) ), i = 1, ..., n
(1)

v̇i = vi (1 +

N 3απ2 −1 (i) ),
(1)

i = 1, ..., n

ẇi = wi (1 + N 2απ−1 (i) ), i = 1, ..., n
(1)

Compute g̃ 0 , g 0 , v̇, ẇ as in Equations (7.15), (7.16), (7.17) and (7.18). We have or =(Lin ,
(p)
L ,L
(p)
Lin , CE in in , (g10 , ..., gn0 ), ({g˜i }, {g˜i 0 }, g̃ 0 , g 0 , {t˙i }, {v̇i }, {ẇi }, v̇, ẇ, {ci }, {si }, s̃, s, u, v)).
pk

Then or ∈ Oπ(1) if and only if I ∈ D5n , and or ∈ Og if and only if I ∈ R5n . So,
if the DCR5n assumption holds, then a random element of Oπ(1) is computationally
indistinguishable from a random element of Og , and so is from a random element of
Oπ(2) .
Therefore, if the DCR5n assumption holds, then a challenge generated from π(1) ,
which is a random element of Oπ(1) , is computationally indistinguishable from a challenge generated from π(2) , which is a random element of Oπ(2) (as both are computationally indistinguishable from a random element of Og ). Based on Lemma 7.2.7, if
the DCR assumption holds, then the shuffle achieves IND-CPAS .

7.3

2

Modified-Paillier Verifiable Shuffle scheme

We first propose a variant of the Paillier cryptosystem that improves efficiency in
encryption, re-encryption and decryption operations while preserving the homomorphic
property. We then use this variant to construct a new verifiable shuffle system and prove
its security. We show that the new shuffle system has the least number of rounds and
exponentiations compared to all known shuffles.
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Modified-Paillier Public-key System

In the Paillier encryption scheme, encryption and re-encryption requires an exponentiation to power N . The following modification of the Paillier scheme allows encryption and re-encryption operation to use exponentiation of a fixed base to a random
power much smaller than N . Because of the fixed base, we can use “fixed-based comb
method” [MvOV96] which improves efficiency for multiple exponentiations where the
base is fixed and the exponent varies. The scheme preserves the homomorphic property but requires a new assumption, the Decisional Fixed Base (DFB) assumption,
which is stronger than the DCR assumption. It has an efficient decryption algorithm
that uses the same technique as used in Paillier’s efficient-decryption variant scheme
in [Paillier99]. We will also show that the originally proposed parameter selection
for Paillier’s variant scheme will make it insecure and propose a parameter selection
method that results in a secure system. Our proposed modification is more efficient
than Paillier’s original one because each encryption costs only about an exponentiation
of a fixed base to a random power much smaller than N .

Description of the Modified-Paillier public-key system
Key generation: Let `N and `η be security parameters. Suppose p and q are distinct
`N /2-bit strong primes and p0 and q 0 are distinct `η /2-bit primes, such that p0 is a
divisor of p − 1 but not a divisor of q − 1 and q 0 is a divisor of q − 1 but not a divisor
of p − 1. Suppose N = pq, η = p0 q 0 , θ has order ηN in modulo N 2 and γ = θN . The
public key is pk = (N, θ, γ) and the secret key is sk = η.
Encryption: Plaintext m ∈ ZN can be encrypted by choosing an r ← {0, 1}`η and
computing the ciphertext e = γ r (1 + mN ).
Re-encryption: A Modified-Paillier ciphertext e can be re-encrypted as another cipher0

text e0 = e × γ r of the same plaintext m, where r0 ← {0, 1}`η .
Decryption: Ciphertext e ∈ Z∗N 2 can be decrypted as m = L(eη mod N 2 )/η mod
N , where the function L takes its input from the set {u ∈ ZN 2 |u = 1 mod N } and
is defined as L(u) = (u − 1)/N . This can be done very efficiently using the Chinese
Remainder Theorem [Paillier99]. Note that a Modified-Paillier ciphertext is also a valid
Paillier ciphertext, so the decryption can also be performed using λ = lcm(p − 1, q − 1),
as in the original Paillier encryption scheme.
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New complexity assumptions
Before proving security of the Modified-Paillier public-key system, we present new
complexity assumptions underlying security of the Modified-Paillier public-key system.
Computational Fixed Base (CFB) Assumption: Suppose N , θ and γ are generated as in the
key generation algorithm. Let CN,γ be the set {γ r (1+xN ) ∈ Z∗N 2 | r ← {0, 1}`η , x ← ZN }
(which is the set of Modified-Paillier ciphertexts). The Computational Fix Based problem is defined to be the problem: given (N, θ, γ) and z ← CN,γ , compute x ∈ ZN such
that there exists r ∈ {0, 1}`η satisfying z = γ r (1+xN ) mod N 2 . The Computational Fix
Based assumption states that the Computational Fix Based problem is computationally
difficult.
The relationship between the CFB assumption and the CCR assumption is stated
in Lemma 7.3.1.
Lemma 7.3.1 If the CFB assumption holds, then the CCR assumption holds.
Proof:

To prove that the CFB assumption leads to the CCR assumption, we show

that if a PPT algorithm A can break the CCR assumption, then a PPT algorithm B,
which solves the CFB problem, can be constructed as follows. If B is given (N, θ, γ, z)
where z ← CN,γ , B generates r ← Z∗N and gives (N, zrN ) to A.
We observe that if z is uniformly distributed in CN,γ , then zrN is uniformly distributed in the set Z∗N 2 . Therefore, if A can compute x ∈ ZN such that there exists
r0 ∈ Z∗N satisfying zrN = r0N (1 + xN ) mod N 2 , then B can compute x ∈ ZN such that
there exists r” ∈ {0, 1}`η satisfying z = γ r” (1 + xN ) mod N 2 . In other words, if A can
break the CCR assumption, then B can solve the CFB problem.

2

The semantic security of the Modified-Paillier public-key system relies on the Decisional Fixed Base Assumption, which is presented as follows.
Decisional Fixed Base (DFB) Assumption: Suppose N , θ and γ are generated as in
0
the key generation algorithm, and CN,γ is defined as above. Let CN,γ
be the set {γ r |

r ← {0, 1}`η }, which is a subset of CN,γ . The Decisional Fix Based problem is defined
to be the problem: given (N, θ, γ), distinguish between a uniform distribution on the set
0
CN,γ
and a uniform distribution on the set CN,γ . The Decisional Fix Based assumption

states that the Decisional Fix Based problem is computationally difficult.
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The relationship between the DFB assumption and the DCR assumption is stated
in Lemma 7.3.2.
Lemma 7.3.2 If the DFB assumption holds, then the DCR assumption holds.
Proof:

To prove the lemma, we show that if a PPT algorithm A can break the

DCR assumption, then a PPT algorithm B, which solves the DFB problem, can be
constructed as follows. To decide if a value z is uniformly chosen from CN,γ or from
0
, B generates r ← Z∗N and gives zrN to A.
CN,γ
0
We observe that if z is uniformly distributed in CN,γ
, then zrN is uniformly dis-

tributed in the set SN of N -th residues modulo N 2 ; and if z is uniformly distributed in
CN,γ , then zrN is uniformly distributed in the set Z∗N 2 . Therefore, if A can distinguish
between a uniform distribution on the set SN and a uniform distribution on the set
0
Z∗N 2 , then B can distinguish between a uniform distribution on the set CN,γ
and a uni-

form distribution on the set CN,γ . In other words, if A can break the DCR assumption,
then B can solve the DFB problem.

2

Security of the Modified-Paillier public-key system
Security of the Modified-Paillier public-key system is stated in Theorem 7.3.1.
Theorem 7.3.1 The Modified-Paillier encryption scheme has SS-CPA if and only if
the DFB assumption holds.
Proof:

Assume that m0 and m1 are two known plaintexts and e is the Modified-

Paillier ciphertext of either m0 or m1 . Then e is the ciphertext of m0 if and only
if e(1 + m0 N )−1 is an exponentiation of γ. Therefore, if a party can distinguish an
exponentiation of γ, he can break SS-CPA of the Modified-Paillier encryption scheme,
and vice versa.

2

Parameter Selection in Paillier’s Variant Scheme
Paillier proposed a decryption-efficient variant [Paillier99] of his public-key cryptosystem. In this variant, the public key includes g of order αN (modulo N 2 ). Paillier
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recommended the secret key α to be a prime. However, if α is a prime, then the
knowledge of g allows factorization of N = pq or finding the secret α, as shown in the
following. Since g is of order αN (modulo N 2 ), α is a prime and g λN = 1 mod N 2
where λ = lcm(p − 1, q − 1), α is a divisor of λ. This means that α must divide p − 1
or q − 1, or both. If it divides both p − 1 and q − 1, then it divides N − 1 and can be
recovered from factoring N − 1. If α divides p − 1 but not q − 1, then let h = g (N −1)N
mod N 2 . It can be seen that h = 1 mod q and h 6= 1 mod p, so we can compute
q = gcd(h − 1, N ) and hence N can be factored.
The flaw can be fixed by choosing g of order ηN modulo N 2 instead, where η is
computed as in our Modified-Paillier Public-key System.
Our proposed modification shares the decryption algorithm of this scheme but has
a more efficient encryption algorithm because each encryption in our scheme costs only
about one exponentiation of a fixed base to a random power much smaller than N . In
Paillier’s variant scheme, each encryption costs either one exponentiation to a power
very much larger than N or two exponentiations.

7.3.2

Description of the verifiable shuffle scheme

We construct a verifiable shuffle scheme VS2 that uses our proposed Modified-Paillier
public-key scheme. Let the public key for the system be pk = (N, θ, γ), where N =
pq with primes p and q, and let the secret key be sk = η, as generated in the key
generation algorithm of the Modified-Paillier public-key scheme. The shuffle takes pk,
a list of Modified-Paillier ciphertexts e1 , ..., en ∈ CN,γ and a permutation π and outputs
another list of Modified-Paillier ciphertexts e01 , ..., e0n ∈ CN,γ , where CN,γ is defined in
the definition of the CFB assumption. The proof system (P, V), which is described
below, must prove the existence of a permutation π and r1 , ..., rn ∈ {0, 1}`η such that
e0i = γ ri eπ−1 (i) .
Outline of the proof system
Observing that a Modified-Paillier ciphertext is also a Paillier ciphertext, VS2’s proof
system is very similar to VS1’s proof system, with efficiency improvements for the
prover. Both proof systems are based on the same intuition, where a permutation is
represented as a permutation matrix, as defined in Definition 2.10.1. They also rely on
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Theorem 7.2.1, which states conditions to achieve a permutation matrix modulo N .
Both proof systems are 3-round: the prover sends the verifier a commitment ({g˜i 0 },
g̃ 0 , g 0 , {t˙i }, {v̇i }, v̇, {ẇi }, ẇ); then the verifier sends the prover a challenge {ci }; and the
prover finally sends the verifier a response ({si }, s̃, s, u, v). In both proof systems, the
verifier needs to check the same equations, i.e. equations (7.5), (7.6), (7.7) and (7.8).
The only difference between the two verifiers is that VS1’s verifier generates the
challenge ci ← ZN whereas VS2’s verifier generates the challenge ci ← ZM . As M can
be much smaller than N , the exponentiations with exponents ci (in equations (7.5),
(7.6), (7.7) and (7.8)) is cheaper in VS2. Theorem 7.3.4, which is the generalization of
Theorem 7.2.4, can be used to prove that generation of ci from ZM is good enough to
provide soundness for the proof system.
The difference between the two provers can be seen when they generate commitments. Intuitively, in VS1’s proof system, given the public key pk = N , the prover
generates r ← Z∗N and computes rN ; whereas in VS2’s proof system, given the public
key pk = (N, θ, γ), the prover generates r ← {0, 1}`η and computes γ r . For example,
Q
in VS1’s proof system, the prover computes g̃ 0 = α̃N nj=1 g˜j αj ; whereas in VS2’s proof
Q
system, the prover computes g̃ 0 = γ α̃ nj=1 g˜j αj .
Proof System
The proof system (P, V) proves that the prover P knows a permutation π such that
there exist r1 , ..., rn ∈ {0, 1}`η satisfying e0i = γ ri eπ−1 (i) . The input to the proof system
is N, θ, γ, {ei }, {e0i }, i = 1, ..., n. Suppose there is a publicly known set, {g˜i }ni=1 , of
elements uniformly generated from CN,γ . Choose M ∈ ZN such that (p + q)/M is
negligible. Let the permutation π be represented by a permutation matrix modulo N
(Aij )n×n . The protocol is as follows:
1. P generates: αi ← ZN and α, r˜i , α̃, δi , ρ, ρi , τ, τi ← {0, 1}`η , i = 1, ..., n.
2. P computes in mod N 2 :
g˜i

0

= γ

r˜i

g̃ 0 = γ α̃

n
Y
j=1
n
Y
j=1

g˜j Aji , i = 1, ..., n
g˜j αj
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0

= γ

α

n
Y
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α

ej j

j=1

t˙i = γ δi (1 + N
v̇i = γ ρi (1 + N
v̇ = γ ρ (1 + N
ẇi = γ τi (1 + N

n
X
j=1
n
X
j=1
n
X

3αj Aji ), i = 1, ..., n
3αj2 Aji ), i = 1, ..., n

αj3 )

j=1
n
X

2αj Aji ), i = 1, ..., n

j=1

ẇ = γ τ (1 + N

n
X

αj2 )

j=1

3. P −→ V: {g˜i 0 }, g̃ 0 , g 0 , {t˙i }, {v̇i }, v̇, {ẇi }, ẇ, i = 1, ..., n
4. P ←− V: challenges {ci }(i=1,...,n) , ci ← ZM
5. P −→ V:
si =

n
X

Aij cj + αi mod N, i = 1, ..., n

j=1

s̃ = θ

Pn

n
Y

Pn

n
Y

i=1 r˜i ci +α̃

g˜i di mod N

i=1

s = θ
u = θ
v = θ
where di = (

Pn
j=1

i=1 ri ci +α

edi i mod N

i=1
Pn
2
ρ
c
+
i=1 i i
i=1 δi ci +ρ

Pn
Pn

i=1 τi ci +τ

mod N

mod N

Aij cj + αi − si )/N, i = 1, ..., n (so di can only be 0 or 1)

6. V verifies in mod N 2 :
s̃N

n
Y

g˜j sj = g̃ 0

j=1
n
Y
s
sN
ej j
j=1

uN (1 + N

= g0

n
Y
j=1
n
Y

n
X

j=1
n
Y

j=1

j=1

(s3j − c3j )) = v̇

g˜j 0cj
0c

ej j

v˙j cj t˙j

c2j
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n
n
X
Y
2
2
v (1 + N
(sj − cj )) = ẇ
ẇj cj
N

j=1

7.3.3

j=1

Security of the verifiable shuffle scheme

The proposed shuffle VS2 provides Verifiability and SP-CPAS as defined in Chapter
6. Proofs are based on security proofs of the verifiable shuffle scheme VS1. The CFB
assumption and the DFB assumption are presented in subsection 7.3.1.
Theorem 7.3.2 The shuffle achieves Verifiability if the CFB assumption holds and
output and input consist of valid Modified-Paillier ciphertexts.
Theorem 7.3.3 The shuffle achieves SP-CPAS if the DFB assumption holds.

Proof of Theorem 7.3.2 for Verifiability
In VS2’s proof system, based on the CFB assumption, it is computationally difficult
for the prover to compute p and q. Hence, for any matrix (Aij )n×n the prover can
generate, gcd(Aij , N ) is different from p and q. Therefore, based on Theorem 7.2.1, the
objective of the proof system can be re-stated as follows. The common input to the
proof system includes N, θ, γ, {ei }, {e0i }, i = 1, ..., n. The auxiliary input to the prover
P includes permutation π and r1 , ..., rn ∈ {0, 1}`η satisfying e0i = γ ri eπ−1 (i) and does not
include the secret key sk = η. The proof system (P, V) proves that P knows a matrix
(Aij )n×n such that equations (7.2) and (7.3) hold and there exist r1 , ..., rn ∈ {0, 1}`η
satisfying
e0i = γ ri

n
Y

A

ej ji , i = 1, ..., n

(7.19)

j=1

Based on Definition 6.2.4 of Verifiability, Theorem 7.3.2 can be concluded from
Theorem 7.3.5 and Theorem 7.3.6, which state the Completeness and Soundness properties of the proof system. We also need Theorem 7.3.4, which is the generalization of
Theorem 7.2.4, to prove Theorem 7.3.6. Theorems 7.3.4, 7.3.5 and 7.3.6 are presented
and proved as follows.
Theorem 7.3.4 Let U be a subset of ZN . Consider a set of vectors Sn = {(1, c1 , ..., cn )
)} (that
∧ hQn iq = Zn+1
| (c1 , ..., cn ∈ U ) ∧ (@Qn ⊆ Sn : |Qn | = n + 1 ∧ hQn ip = Zn+1
q
p
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means Sn is the set of vectors (1, c1 , ..., cn ), where c1 , ..., cn ∈ U and there does not
exist any subset Qn ⊆ Sn of size n + 1 such that Qn spans Zn+1
and Zn+1
). Then
p
q
|Sn | ≤ (p + q)|U |n−1 .

Proof: This proof is the same as the proof of Theorem 7.2.4, except that ‘ZN ’ in the
proof of Theorem 7.2.4 is replaced by ‘U ’ in this proof. The proof is shown as follows.
The theorem is proved by induction.
• n = 1: Consider a set of vectors S1 ⊆ {(1, c)|c ∈ U } satisfying |S1 | > (p + q);
and a vector (1, c1 ) ∈ S1 . Consider a set R1 = {(1, c1 + kp mod N )|k ∈ Zq } ∪
{(1, c1 + kq mod N )|k ∈ Zp }. As |R1 | = p + q − 1, there exists c01 ∈ U such
that (1, c01 ) ∈ S1 but (1, c01 ) ∈
/ R1 . Then Q1 = {(1, c1 ), (1, c01 )} satisfies (|Q1 | =
2) ∧ (hQ1 ip = Z2p ) ∧ (hQ1 iq = Z2q ).
• Suppose the theorem holds for n. We prove it is also true for n + 1. Let a set
Sn+1 = {(1, c1 , ..., cn+1 )|(c1 , ..., cn+1 ∈ U ) ∧ (@Qn+1 ⊆ Sn+1 : |Qn+1 | = n + 2 ∧
hQn+1 ip = Zn+2
∧ hQn+1 iq = Zn+2
)}. Consider Sn0 = {(1, c1 , ..., cn )|∃cn+1 ∈ U :
p
q
(1, c1 , ..., cn , cn+1 ) ∈ Sn+1 }, there are two possibilities:
1. If @Q0n ⊆ Sn0 : |Q0n | = n + 1 ∧ hQ0n ip = Zn+1
∧ hQ0n iq = Zn+1
, then |Sn0 | ≤
p
q
(p + q)|U |n−1 , as the theorem holds for n. So |Sn+1 | ≤ |Sn0 ||U | ≤ (p + q)|U |n .
2. If ∃Q0n ⊆ Sn0 : |Q0n | = n + 1 ∧ hQ0n ip = Zn+1
∧ hQ0n iq = Zn+1
, select a
p
q
set T of n + 1 vectors (1, ci1 , ..., ci(n+1) ) ∈ Sn+1 , i = 1, ..., n + 1 such that
Q0n = {(1, ci1 , ..., cin )}

1
c11
...
c1n

Let d = det 
..
..
..
 ..
1 c(n+1)1 ... c(n+1)n
mod N exists.



 mod N , then gcd(d, N ) = 1, so d−1


For each vector x = (1, x1 , ..., xn+1 ) ∈ Sn+1 (including those in T ), let


1
c11
...
c1(n+1)



 ..
..
..
..
 = dxn+1 − F (x1 , ..., xn ) mod N
dx = det 

 1 c

(n+1)1 ... c(n+1)(n+1) 
1
x1
...
xn+1
for some function F. The conditions of Sn+1 lead to either dx = 0 mod p or
dx = 0 mod q.
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Suppose dx = 0 mod p, then xn+1 = d−1 F (x1 , ..., xn ) mod p, so the number
of possible vectors x = (1, x1 , ..., xn+1 ) is no more than q|U |n . Similarly for
the case dx = 0 mod q, the number of possible vectors x = (1, x1 , ..., xn+1 )
is no more than p|U |n and so |Sn+1 | ≤ (p + q)|U |n .

2
Theorem 7.3.5 (Completeness) If P knows a matrix (Aij ) such that there exist r1 , ...,
rn ∈ {0, 1}`η satisfying equations (7.2), (7.3) and (7.19), and P also performs correctly
in the protocol, then V always accepts.

Proof: Suppose P knows a matrix (Aij ) such that there exist r1 , ..., rn ∈ {0, 1}`η satisfying equations (7.2), (7.3) and (7.19); and {g˜i 0 }, g̃ 0 , g 0 , {t˙i }, {v̇i }, v̇, {ẇi }, ẇ, {ci }, {si }, s̃,
s, u, v for i = 1, ..., n are generated as specified in the protocol. Then the verifier outputs accept, as the following equations hold.
• s̃N
=

Qn

Pn
Q
sj
= (θ i=1 r˜i ci +α̃ ni=1 g˜i di )N
j=1 g˜j
Q
Q
Q
(γ α̃ nj=1 g˜j αj ) ni=1 (γ r˜i nj=1 g˜j Aji )ci

Qn

Pn

j=1 g˜j
Q
= g̃ 0 ni=1

i=1

Aji ci +αj

g˜i 0ci .

Pn
Qn di N Qn Pni=1 Aji ci +αj
sj
i=1 ri ci +α
=
(θ
e
i=1 ei )
j=1 ej
j=1 j
Q
Q
Q
Q
α
A
n
n
n
= (γ α j=1 ej j ) i=1 (γ ri j=1 ej ji )ci = g 0 ni=1 e0ci i .

• sN

Qn

Pn
Pn
P
P
2
− c3j )) = (θ i=1 ρi ci + i=1 δi ci +ρ )N (1 + N nj=1 (( ni=1 Aji ci +
P
Q
P
Q
αj )3 − c3j )) = γ (1 + N nj=1 αj3 ) ni=1 (γ ρi (1 + N nj=1 3αj2 Aji ))ci ni=1 (γ δi (1 +
P
Q
2
c2
N nj=1 3αj Aji ))ci = v̇ ni=1 v̇i ci t˙i i .

• uN (1 + N

Pn

3
j=1 (sj
ρ

Pn

Pn
Pn
Pn
2
2
2
2
i=1 τi ci +τ )N (1 + N
(s
−
c
))
=
(θ
((
j
j
j=1
j=1
i=1 Aji ci + αj ) − cj )) =
Q
P
Q
P
γ τ (1 + N nj=1 αj2 ) ni=1 (γ τi (1 + N nj=1 2αj Aji ))ci = ẇ ni=1 ẇi ci .

• v N (1 + N

2
Theorem 7.3.6 (Soundness) Suppose the output and input of the shuffle consist of
valid Modified-Paillier ciphertexts. Under the CFB assumption, if V accepts with nonnegligible probability, then P knows a matrix (Aij ) such that there exist r1 , ..., rn ∈
{0, 1}`η satisfying equations (7.2), (7.3) and (7.19).
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Proof: First, we prove the following statement.
Statement. Consider VS2’s proof system. Under the CFB assumption, if V accepts
with non-negligible probability, then P knows a matrix (Aij ) satisfying equations (7.2),
(7.3) and the following equation with overwhelming probability.
n
Y
A
c(e0i ) = c( ej ji ), i = 1, ..., n

(7.20)

j=1

The statement can be proved in the same way as the proof of Theorem 7.2.6, except
that the CFB assumption and Theorem 7.3.4 (in the case U = ZM ) are used instead
of the CCR assumption and Theorem 7.2.4, respectively. Intuitively, the similarity
is due to the fact that VS1’s proof system and VS2’s proof system have the same
messages, which include a commitment ({g˜i 0 }, g̃ 0 , g 0 , {t˙i }, {v̇i }, v̇, {ẇi }, ẇ), a challenge
{ci } and a response ({si }, s̃, s, u, v). In both proof systems, the verifier needs to check
the same equations, i.e. equations (7.5), (7.6), (7.7) and (7.8). We just briefly outline
the statement’s proof in the following steps, which are similar to the proof of Theorem
7.2.6.
• Prove that if the CFB assumption holds, then it is computationally difficult for
Q
P to obtain {ai } ⊂ ZN such that c( ni=1 g˜i ai ) = 0 and at least one element of
{ai } is not 0.
• Based on Theorem 7.3.4 in the case U = ZM , prove that if V accepts with nonnegligible probability, then P knows a matrix {Aij } satisfying
n
Y
c(g̃i ) = c( g˜j Aji ), i = 1, ..., n
0

j=1

• Prove that either this matrix {Aij } satisfies equation (7.2) or P can compute
Q
{ai } ⊂ ZN such that c( ni=1 g˜i ai ) = 0 and at least one element of {ai } is not 0.
• Prove that either this matrix {Aij } satisfies equation (7.3) or P can compute
Q
{ai } ⊂ ZN such that c( ni=1 g˜i ai ) = 0 and at least one element of {ai } is not 0.
• Prove that this matrix {Aij } satisfies equation 7.20.
We have {ei } and {e0i } are valid Modified-Paillier ciphertexts. Thus, if c(e0i ) =
Qn Aji
c( j=1 ej ), i = 1, ..., n (that means {e0i } is a permutation of Paillier re-encryptions
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Qn

Aji
j=1 ej ,

i = 1, ..., n

(which is equation (7.19)). Therefore, Theorem 7.3.6 has been proved.

2

Proof of Theorem 7.3.3 for Privacy
Based on Theorem 6.2.1, proving Theorem 7.3.3 is equivalent to proving Theorem 7.3.7
below. We need Definition 7.3.1 and Lemma 7.3.3 to prove Theorem 7.3.7.
0
be the set of m-element tuples where all elements are in CN,γ
Definition 7.3.1 Let Rm
0
0
0
. The
and let Dm
⊂ Rm
be the set of m-element tuples where all elements are in CN,γ

DFBm problem is defined as the problem of distinguishing instances uniformly chosen
0
0
from Rm
and those uniformly chosen from Dm
. The DFBm assumption states that the

DFBm problem is computationally difficult.
Lemma 7.3.3 For any m ≥ 1, the DFBm assumption holds if the DFB assumption
holds.

Proof:

This proof is the same as the proof of Lemma 7.2.7, except that DCR and

DCRm in the proof of Lemma 7.2.7 are replaced by DFB and DFBm in this proof,
respectively. The proof is shown as follows.
We prove the lemma by induction. We prove that if either the DFB assumption
holds or the DFBm−1 assumption holds, then the DFBm assumption holds.
0
0
We define the subset Mm
of Rm
to be the set of tuples I = (x1 , ..., xm ) such that
0
0
0
x1 , ..., xm−1 ∈ CN,γ
and xm ∈ CN,γ . Hence, Dm
is a subset of Mm
.

If the DFBm problem is easy, then we can either distinguish between instances
0
0
or distinguish between instances chosen uniformly
and Mm
chosen uniformly from Rm
0
0
. In the former case, it means the DFBm−1 problem is easy. In the
and Dm
from Mm

following, we show that in the latter case, the DFB problem is easy.
0
as Im = (γ r1 , γ r2 , ..., γ rm−1 , x)
For any I1 = (x) ∈ R10 , we generate a tuple Im ∈ Rm

where ri ← {0, 1}`η . If I1 is chosen uniformly from D10 , then Im is distributed uniformly
0
0
.
. If I1 is chosen uniformly from R10 , then Im is distributed uniformly in Mm
in Dm
0
0
are distinguishable, then the DFB problem is easy.
and Mm
Therefore, if Dm

2
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Theorem 7.3.7 The shuffle provides IND-CPAS if the DFB assumption holds.
Proof:

This proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 7.2.7 and is shown as follows.

The reader can refer to subsection 6.2.3 for definitions of IND-CPAS and explanations
of the notations in this proof.
Suppose there is a publicly known set, {g˜i }ni=1 , of elements uniformly generated
from CN,γ . Suppose the challenge template includes two permutations π(1) , π(2) ∈ Tn ,
(p)

a list of ciphertexts Lin = (e1 , ..., en ), the list of corresponding plaintexts Lin and
the corresponding probabilistic inputs C

(p)
Lin ,Lin
Epk

. The actual challenge oπ(k) , which is

randomly generated by using π(k) (k = 1 or 2) and is given to the adversary, includes
(p)

L

(p)

in
Lin , Lin , CEpk

,Lin

, a list of re-encrypted ciphertexts Lout = (e01 , ..., e0n ) and

V iewVP (pk, Lin , Lout ) = ({g˜i }, {g˜i 0 }, g̃ 0 , g 0 , {t˙i }, {v̇i }, {ẇi }, v̇, ẇ, {ci }, {si }, s̃, s, u, v)
Let Oπ(k) be the set of all possible oπ(k) .
(p)

L

(p)

in
Let Og be the set of all tuples og , each of which includes Lin , Lin , CEpk

,Lin

, a

list of random Modified-Paillier ciphertexts Lout = (e01 , ..., e0n ), the set {g˜i }, a tuple
({g˜i 0 }ni=1 , {t˙i }ni=1 , {v̇i }ni=1 , {ẇi }ni=1 ) of randomly generated elements of CN,γ , a set {ci }ni=1
of randomly generated elements of ZM , a set {si }ni=1 of randomly generated elements of
ZN , a tuple (s̃, s, u, v) of randomly generated elements of Z∗N and g̃ 0 , g 0 , v̇, ẇ satisfying:

g̃ 0 = γ s̃
g0 = γ s

n
Y
j=1
n
Y

g˜j sj g˜j 0−cj
s

(7.21)

0−cj

ej j ej

(7.22)

j=1

v̇ = γ u (1 + N
ẇ = γ v (1 + N

n
n
X
Y
−c2
(s3j − c3j ))
v˙j −cj t˙j j
j=1
n
X
j=1

(s2j − c2j ))

j=1
n
Y

ẇj −cj

(7.23)
(7.24)

j=1

We first prove that if the DFB5n assumption holds, then the actual challenge oπ(k)
uniformly chosen from Oπ(k) is computationally indistinguishable from a tuple og uniformly chosen from Og .
We show that from an element I = (h1 , .., hn , h˜1 , .., h˜n , t1 , .., tn , v1 , .., vn , w1 , .., wn ) of
0
0
(see Definition 7.3.1), we can generate a random element or of Oπ(1) or Og
or R5n
D5n
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as follows. Choose {ci }ni=1 uniformly from ZM , {si }ni=1 uniformly from ZN and s̃, s, u, v
uniformly from Z∗N . Compute
αi = si − cπ(1) (i) mod N , i = 1, ..., n
e0i = hi eπ−1 (i) , i = 1, ..., n
(1)

g˜i

0

= h̃i g̃π−1 (i) , i = 1, ..., n
(1)

t˙i = ti (1 + N 3απ−1 (i) ), i = 1, ..., n
(1)

v̇i = vi (1 + N 3απ2 −1 (i) ), i = 1, ..., n
(1)

ẇi = wi (1 + N 2απ−1 (i) ), i = 1, ..., n
(1)

Compute g̃ 0 , g 0 , v̇, ẇ as in Equations (7.21), (7.22), (7.23) and (7.24). We have or =(Lin ,
(p)
L ,L
(p)
Lin , CE in in , (e01 , ..., e0n ), ({g˜i }, {g˜i 0 }, g̃ 0 , g 0 , {t˙i }, {v̇i }, {ẇi }, v̇, ẇ, {ci }, {si }, s̃, s, u, v)).
pk

0
0
Then or ∈ Oπ(1) if and only if I ∈ D5n
, and or ∈ Og if and only if I ∈ R5n
. So,

if the DFB5n assumption holds, then a random element of Oπ(1) is computationally
indistinguishable from a random element of Og , and so is from a random element of
Oπ(2) .
Therefore, if the DFB5n assumption holds, then a challenge generated from π(1) ,
which is a random element of Oπ(1) , is computationally indistinguishable from a challenge generated from π(2) , which is a random element of Oπ(2) (as both are computationally indistinguishable from a random element of Og ). Based on Lemma 7.3.3, if
the DFB assumption holds, then the shuffle achieves IND-CPAS .

7.4

2

Comparison

This section compares FS01, Groth03, Neff03, VS1 and VS2. Compared to the FS01
and Groth03 proof systems that use the El Gamal encryption scheme, VS1’s proof
system has a more efficient initialization phase. In the FS01 and the Groth03 proof
systems (using El Gamal ciphertexts), a set of subgroup elements is used whereas
it is not needed in the Neff03 scheme. Construction of these elements in general is
computationally expensive [Neff03]. In VS1 (using Paillier ciphertexts), the proof
systems use a set ({g˜1 , ..., g˜n }) of elements of Z∗N 2 that are randomly generated.
In VS2, Theorem 7.3.4 allows ci , i = 1, ..., n to be chosen in ZM , which is much
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smaller than ZN as required in the verifiable shuffle VS1. This reduces the cost of exponentiations with the exponents ci , i = 1, ..., n. Following [FS01] and using computation
techniques such as the ‘fixed-based comb’ method and the ‘simultaneous multiple exponentiation’ algorithm [MvOV96], the number of exponentiations can be substantially
reduced and becomes smaller than other schemes.
Table 7.1 summarizes the result of efficiency comparison between FS01, Groth03,
Neff03, VS1 and VS2. Note that exponentiations in VS1 and VS2 cases are in modulo
N 2 which is more expensive than modulo p. The comparison is based on the following
criteria.
• (1) Number of exponentiations by prover
• (2) Number of exponentiations by verifier
• (3) Total number of exponentiations
• (4) Total number of exponentiations, using computation techniques in [MvOV96]
• (5) Number of sent bits
• (6) Number of rounds

Table 7.1: Comparison of
Shuffles (1) (2) (3)
FS01
8n 10n 18n
Groth03 6n 6n 12n
Neff03 11n 12n 23n
VS1
11n 7n 18n
VS2
6n 7n 13n

7.5

Verifiable Shuffle schemes

(4)
4.84n
3.54n
6.3n
5.07n
3.4n

(5)
(5|p| + 2|q|)n
(|p| + 2|q|)n
(7|p| + 4|q|)n
10|N |n
10|N |n

(6)
3
7
7
3
3

Summary

In this chapter, we proposed two new verifiable shuffle schemes VS1 and VS2, proved
their security in our proposed formal security model described in Chapter 6, and compared them with previous schemes, including FS01, Groth03 and Neff03. We showed
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that VS1, which is a verifiable shuffle scheme for Paillier ciphertexts, has a more efficient initialization phase than other schemes. VS2 also has the smallest number of
exponentiations when using computation techniques in [MvOV96].

Chapter 8
Conclusion and Future Extensions

We discussed a number of cryptographic-based privacy enhancing technologies, including group signatures, identity escrow, traceable signatures, ID-based ring signatures, ID-based ad-hoc anonymous identification, k-times anonymous signatures, ktimes anonymous authentication, anonymous credentials, verifiable shuffles and robust
mix-nets. Group signatures are anonymously produced by an arbitrary group member,
whose identity can only be revealed by the group manager in case of dispute. A fully
dynamic group signature scheme allows revocation of members from the group. The
interactive counterpart of group signatures is identity escrow, which allows a user to
anonymously prove his membership of a group but the anonymity is also revocable.
A traceable signature scheme is a group signature scheme, which allows a designated
party to trace all signatures of a given group member and a signer to provably claim
his signatures. An anonymous credential system allows a user to obtain credentials
from organizations and anonymously prove possession of these credentials. In ring signature schemes, a user can form an ad-hoc group and anonymously sign messages on
behalf of the group. ID-based ring signature schemes allow users to use identities rather
than public keys to form groups and sign messages. In k-TAA schemes, users can be
anonymously authenticated to access applications whereas each application provider
can decide the number of times users can access its application. Mix-nets allow transmission of messages in communication networks so that the network observers can not
find the sender of each message. Robust mix-nets, which guarantee correctness of their
message transmission, can be constructed from verifiable shuffles, which permute and
re-encrypt lists of ciphertexts and prove correctness of their operation.
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Chapter 1 introduced the privacy enhancing technologies and outlined the motivations, objectives and contributions of this thesis. Chapter 2 presented more descriptions of the cryptographic privacy enhancing technologies and their literature reviews.
The chapter also provided fundamental cryptographic concepts, which were used to
construct privacy enhancing systems in this thesis.
In Chapter 3, we proposed two group signature schemes with provable security in
the BSZ04 formal model and showed their advantages over previous schemes. The
new schemes provide much shorter signatures and keys in comparison with previous
schemes. Our schemes also allow sharing of system parameters among different groups,
thereby, improve system management in multiple-group scenarios. We showed that the
schemes can be extended to provide traceable signatures and can be converted into
identity escrow systems.
Chapter 4 proposed a dynamic accumulator scheme from bilinear pairings and
showed its applications, including an ID-based ad-hoc anonymous identification scheme,
an identity escrow with membership revocation scheme and their non-interactive counterparts, i.e. an ID-based ring signature scheme and a fully dynamic group signature
scheme. Security proofs for these schemes were also provided. Our ID-based ring signature scheme is the first to provide constant-size signatures (without counting the list
of identities to be included in the ad-hoc group). Signature sizes in our schemes are
also much smaller than those in the corresponding state-of-the-art schemes. The dynamic accumulator scheme can also be used to provide membership revocation for other
primitives, such as traceable signature schemes and anonymous credential systems. We
also provided a generalized model of accumulators and formal security models of IDbased ad-hoc anonymous identification schemes and identity escrow with membership
revocation systems.
In Chapter 5, we provided a formal model of dynamic k-TAA schemes by extending
the formal model of ordinary k-TAA schemes in [TFS04]. Using the dynamic accumulator scheme proposed in Chapter 4, we then proposed a dynamic and an ordinary
k-TAA schemes with security proofs. As based on bilinear pairings, our schemes have
communication costs much lower than the only known TFS04 scheme.
Chapter 6 proposed a formalization of verifiable shuffles and their security requirements under chosen permutation attacks and chosen transcript attacks. This provides
a general framework for security assessment of shuffle systems and can be extended to
model security of mix-nets. We also showed a general construction of robust mix-nets
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from verifiable shuffles.
In Chapter 7, we proposed two new verifiable shuffle schemes, proved their security
in our proposed model and compared their efficient performance with other efficient
shuffle systems. The first one is based on the Paillier encryption scheme. For the
second system, we proposed a variant of the Paillier encryption scheme that reduces
computation costs of encryption, re-encryption and decryption while still preserving
the homomorphic property. We then used the variant encryption scheme to construct
the second verifiable shuffle system.
Open Problems and Future Extensions
The development of this thesis has given rise to a number of issues that require
further attention. Some challenges are very difficult to overcome and some problems
would be likely to be solved but need further future work. We will continue to work
on these challenges in future. Some of these issues are elaborated below.
The proposed group signature, ID-based ring signature and k-TAA schemes only
provide provable security in the random oracle model. An open problem is to construct
these schemes without random oracles so that the security does not rely on the assumption of ideal hash functions. Some digital signature schemes without random oracles
have been proposed [BB04a, CS99, GHR99] that may provide some initial approach
in constructing group signature, ID-based ring signature and k-TAA schemes without
random oracles.
Efficient ring signature and group signature schemes were recently proposed in
[DKNS04], using accumulators with one-way domain based on the Strong RSA assumption. A possible research direction is to extend the accumulator scheme proposed
in Chapter 4 to accumulators with one-way domain based on the Strong DDH assumption, that can be used to construct efficient ring signature and group signature
schemes.
In the existing ordinary and dynamic k-TAA schemes, the authentication procedure
has computation and communication costs linearly depending on the bound k. If an
application provider sets k to be a large number, the authentication procedure becomes
expensive. So, the open problem is to construct k-TAA schemes where the computation
and communication costs in the authentication procedure do not depend on k.
Based on our formal model for verifiable shuffles, formalizing security of robust
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mix-nets and providing security proofs for our general construction of robust mix-nets
is an interesting extension of our work. Finally, it is still an open question whether the
FS01 proof system provides zero-knowledge property.

Bibliography

[Abe98] M. Abe. Universally verifiable mix-net with verification work independent of
the number of mix-servers. EUROCRYPT 1998, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 1403, pp.
437-447, 1998.
[Abe99] M. Abe. Mix-networks on permutation networks. ASIACRYPT 1999, SpringerVerlag, LNCS 1716, pp. 258-273, 1999.
[Abe04] M. Abe. Combining Encryption and Proof of Knowledge in the Random Oracle
Model. Computer Journal 47/1, pp. 58-70, 2004.
[AH01] M. Abe and F. Hoshino. Remarks on Mix-Network Based on Permutation Networks. Public Key Cryptography (PKC) 2001, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 1992, pp.
317-324, 2001.
[AI03] M. Abe and H. Imai. Flaws in Some Robust Optimistic Mix-nets. ACISP 2003,
Springer-Verlag, LNCS 2727, pp. 39-50, 2003.
[ACJT00] G. Ateniese, J. Camenisch, M. Joye, and G. Tsudik. A practical and provably
secure coalition-resistant group signature scheme. CRYPTO 2000, Springer-Verlag,
LNCS 1880, pp. 255-270, 2000.
[AdM03] G. Ateniese and B. de Medeiros. Efficient Group Signatures without Trapdoors. ASIACRYPT 2003, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 2894, pp. 246-268, 2003.
[AdM04] G.

Ateniese

and

B.

de

Medeiros.

Secu-

rity of a Nyberg-Rueppel Signature Variant. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report
2004/093, http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/093, 2004.
[AT01] G. Ateniese and G. Tsudik. Quasi-efficient revocation of group signatures.
Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2001/101, http://eprint.iacr.org/2001/101,
2001.
212

BIBLIOGRAPHY

213

[Baek04] J. Baek. Construction and Formal Security Analysis of Cryptographic
Schemes in the Public Key Setting. PhD Thesis, Monash University, January 2004.
[BP97] N. Baric and B. Pfitzmann. Collision-free accumulators and fail-stop signature
schemes without trees. EUROCRYPT 1997, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 1233, pp. 480494, 1997.
[BLS03] P. Barreto, B. Lynn, and M. Scott. On the Selection of Pairing-Friendly
Groups. Selected Areas in Cryptography (SAC) 2003, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 3006,
pp. 17-25, 2003.
[Bellare98] M. Bellare. Practice-Oriented Provable-Security. International Workshop
on Information Security (ISW) 1997, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 1396, 1998.
[BBP04] M. Bellare, A. Boldyreva and A. Palacio. An uninstantiable random-oraclemodel scheme for a hybrid-encryption problem. EUROCRYPT 2004, SpringerVerlag, LNCS 3027, pp.171-188, 2004. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report
2003/077, 2004.
[BMW03] M. Bellare, D. Micciancio, and B. Warinschi. Foundations of Group Signatures: Formal Definitions, Simplified Requirements, and a Construction Based
on General Assumptions. EUROCRYPT 2003, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 2656, pp.
614-629, 2003.
[BNN04] M. Bellare, C. Namprempre, and G. Neven. Security Proofs for IdentityBased Identification and Signature Schemes. EUROCRYPT 2004, Springer-Verlag,
LNCS 3027, pp. 268-286, 2004.
[BR93] M. Bellare and P. Rogaway. Random oracles are practical: A paradigm for
designing efficient protocols. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
Security 1993, ACM Press, pp. 62-73, 1993.
[BSZ04] M. Bellare, H. Shi, and C. Zhang. Foundations of Group Signatures:
The Case of Dynamic Groups. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2004/077,
http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/077, 2004.
[BdM93] J. Benaloh and M. de Mare. One-way accumulators: A decentralized alternative to digital signatures. EUROCRYPT 1993, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 765, pp.
274-285, 1993.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

214

[Boneh98] D. Boneh. The Decision Diffie-Hellman Problem. Third Algorithmic Number Theory Symp. 1998, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 1423, pp. 48-63, 1998.
[BB04a] D. Boneh and X. Boyen. Short Signatures Without Random Oracles. EUROCRYPT 2004, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 3027, pp. 56-73, 2004.
[BB04b] D. Boneh and X. Boyen. Efficient Selective-ID Secure Identity-Based Encryption Without Random Oracles. EUROCRYPT 2004, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 3027,
pp. 223-238, 2004.
[BB04c] D. Boneh and X. Boyen. Secure Identity Based Encryption Without Random
Oracles. CRYPT0 2004, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 3152, pp. 443-459, 2004.
[BBS04] D. Boneh, X. Boyen, and H. Shacham. Short Group Signatures. CRYPT0
2004, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 3152, pp. 41-55, 2004.
[BF01] D. Boneh and M. Franklin. Identity based encryption from the Weil pairing.
CRYPTO 2001, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 2139, pp. 213-229, 2001.
[BG02] D. Boneh and P. Golle. Almost Entirely Correct Mixing with Application to
Voting. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security 2002, ACM
Press, pp. 68-77, 2002.
[BLS01] D. Boneh, B. Lynn, and H. Shacham. Short signatures from the Weil pairing.
ASIACRYPT 2001, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 2248, pp.514-532, 2001.
[Boyen03] X. Boyen. Multipurpose Identity-Based Signcryption (A Swiss Army Knife
for Identity-Based Cryptography). CRYPTO 2003, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 2729,
pp. 383-399, 2003.
[Brands93] S. Brands. An efficient off-line electronic cash system based on the representation problem. CWI Technical Report CS-R9323, 1993.
[BS01] E. Bresson and J. Stern. Group signatures with efficient revocation. Public Key
Cryptography (PKC) 2001, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 1992, pp. 190-206, 2001.
[BSS02] E. Bresson, J. Stern, and M. Szydlo. Threshold ring signatures and applications
to adhoc groups. CRYPTO 2002, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 2442, pp. 465-480, 2002.
[Camenisch97] J. Camenisch. Efficient and generalized group signatures. EUROCRYPT 1997, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 1233, pp. 465-479, 1997.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

215

[CL01] J. Camenisch and A. Lysyanskaya. Efficient non-transferable anonymous multishow credential system with optional anonymity revocation. EUROCRYPT 2001,
Springer-Verlag, LNCS 2045, pp. 93118, 2001.
[CL02] J. Camenisch and A. Lysyanskaya. Dynamic Accumulators and Application to
Efficient Revocation of Anonymous Credentials. CRYPTO 2002, Springer-Verlag,
LNCS 2442, pp. 61-76, 2002.
[CL04] J. Camenisch and A. Lysyanskaya. Signature Schemes and Anonymous Credentials from Bilinear Maps. CRYPTO 2004, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 3152, 2004.
[CM98] J. Camenisch and M. Michels. A group signature scheme with improved efficiency. ASIACRYPT 1998, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 1514, pp. 160-174, 1998.
[CS97] J. Camenisch and M. Stadler. Efficient group signature schemes for large
groups. CRYPTO 1997, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 1296, pp. 410-424, 1997.
[CvH02] J. Camenisch and E. Van Herreweghen. Design and Implementation of the
idemix Anonymous Credential System. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security 2002, ACM Press, 2002.
[CGH98] R. Canetti, O. Goldreich and S. Halevi. The random oracle model revis- ited.
Annual Symposium Theory of Computing 1998, ACM, pp. 209-218, 1998.
[CC03] J. Cha and J. Cheon. An Identity-Based Signature from Gap Diffie-Hellman
Groups. Public Key Cryptography (PKC) 2003, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 2567, pp.
18-30, 2003.
[Chaum81] D. Chaum. Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital
pseudonyms. Communications of the ACM 24(2), pp. 84-88, 1981.
[Chaum84] D. Chaum. Blind signature system. CRYPTO 1983, Plenum Press, pp.
153-153, 1984.
[Chaum85] D. Chaum. Security without identification: Transaction systems to make
big brother obsolete. Communications of the ACM 28(10), pp. 1030-1044, 1985.
[CvH91] D. Chaum and E. van Heyst. Group signatures. CRYPTO 1991, SpringerVerlag, LNCS 547, pp. 257-265, 1991.
[CP94] L. Chen and T. P. Pedersen. New group signature schemes. EUROCRYPT
1994, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 950, pp. 171-181, 1994.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

216

[CK03] S. Choi and K. Kim. Authentication and Payment Protocol Preserving Location
Privacy in Mobile IP. GLOBECOM 2003.
[CDS94] R. Cramer, I. Damgard, and B. Schoenmakers. Proofs of partial knowledge
and simplified design of witness hiding protocols. CRYPTO 1994, Springer-Verlag,
LNCS 2139, pp. 174-187, 1994.
[CS99] R. Cramer and V. Shoup. Signature schemes based on the strong RSA assumption. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security 1999, ACM
Press, 1999.
[DK00] Y. Desmedt and K. Kurosawa. How to break a practical mix and design a new
one. EUROCRYPT 2000, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 1807, pp. 557-572, 2000.
[DH76] W. Diffie and M. Hellman. New directions in cryptography. IEEE Transactions
on Information Security, IT-22, pp. 644-654, 1976.
[DKNS04] Y. Dodis, A. Kiayias, A. Nicolosi, and V. Shoup. Anonymous Identification
in Ad Hoc Groups. EUROCRYPT 2004, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 3027, pp. 609-626,
2004.
[ElGamal85] T. El Gamal. A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based on
discrete logarithms. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, IT-31, pp. 469-472,
1985.
[FS86] A. Fiat and A. Shamir. How to prove yourself: practical solutions to identification and signature problems. CRYPTO 1986, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 263, pp.
186-194, 1986.
[FP01] P. Fouque and D. Pointcheval. Threshold Cryptosystems Secure against ChosenCiphertext Attacks. ASIACRYPT 2001, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 2248, pp. 351-369,
2001.
[FO97] E. Fujisaki and T. Okamoto. Statistical zero knowledge protocols to prove modular polynomial relations. CRYPTO 1997, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 1297, pp. 16-30,
1997.
[Furukawa04] J. Furukawa. Efficient, Verifiable Shuffle Decryption and Its Requirement
of Unlinkability. Public Key Cryptography (PKC) 2004, Springer-Verlag, LNCS
2947, pp. 319-332, 2004.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

217

[FMMOS02] J. Furukawa, H. Miyauchi, K. Mori, S. Obana, and K. Sako. An Implementation of a Universally Verifiable Electronic Voting Scheme based on Shuffling.
Financial Cryptography 2002, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 2357, pp. 16-30, 2002.
[FS01] J. Furukawa and K. Sako. An Efficient Scheme for Proving a Shuffle. CRYPTO
2001, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 2139, pp. 368-387, 2001.
[GGMM97] E. Gabber, P. Gibbons, Y. Matias, and A. Mayer. How to make personalized Web browsing simple, secure, and anonymous. Financial Cryptography 1997,
Springer-Verlag, LNCS 1318, pp. 17-31, 1997.
[GHR99] R. Gennaro, S. Halevi, and T. Rabin. Secure hash-and-sign signatures without
the random oracle. EUROCRYPT 1999, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 1592, pp. 123-139,
1999.
[GWB97] I. Goldberg, D. Wagner, and E. Brewer. Privacy-enhancing technologies for
the Internet. IEEE COMPCON 1997.
[Goldreich01] O. Goldreich. Foundations of Cryptography, Basic Tools. Cambridge
University Press 2001.
[Goldreich03] O. Goldreich. Foundations of Cryptography, Basic Applications. Cambridge University Press 2004.
[GM84] S. Goldwasser and S. Micali. Probabilistic Encryption. Journal of Computer
and System Sciences, Vol. 28, Elsevier Inc., pp. 270-299, 1984.
[GMR84] S. Goldwasser, S. Micali and R. Rivest. A “paradoxical” solution to the signature problem. Annual Symposium Foundations of Computer Science 1984, pp.
441-448, 1984.
[GMR88] S. Goldwasser, S. Micali and R. Rivest. A digital signature scheme secure
against adaptive chosen-message attacks. SIAM Journal on Computing, 17 (1988),
pp. 281-308, 1988.
[GT03] S. Goldwasser and Y. Tauman. On the (in)security of the Fiat-Shamir
paradigm. Annual Symposium Foundations of Computer Science 2003, pp. 102113. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2003/034, 2003.
[GZBJJ02] P. Golle, S. Zhong, D. Boneh, M. Jakobsson, and A. Juels. Optimistic
Mixing for Exit-Polls. ASIACRYPT 2002, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 2501, pp. 451465, 2002.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

218

[GN00] R. Gore and L. Nguyen. CardKt: Automated Multi-modal Deduction on Java
Cards for Multi-application Security. Java Card 2000, Springer-Verlag, LNCS
2041, pp. 38-51, 2000.
[GPS04] R. Granger, D. Page, and M. Stam. A Comparison of CEILIDH and XTR.
Algorithmic Number Theory, 6th International Symposium, ANTS-VI, SpringerVerlag, LNCS 3076, pp. 235-249, 2004.
[Groth03] J. Groth. A Verifiable Secret Shuffle of Homomorphic Encryptions. Public
Key Cryptography (PKC) 2003, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 2567, pp. 145-160, 2003.
[IEEE00] IEEE P1363. Standard Specifications for Public Key Cryptography. 2000.
[Jakobsson98] M. Jakobsson. A practical mix. EUROCRYPT 1998, Springer-Verlag,
LNCS 1403, pp. 448-461, 1998.
[Jakobsson99] M. Jakobsson. Flash mixing. ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing (PODC) 1999, ACM, pp. 83-89, 1999.
[JJ99] M. Jakobsson and A. Juels. Millimix: Mixing in small batches. DIMACS Technical Report, pp. 99-33, 1999.
[JJ00] M. Jakobsson and A. Juels. Mix and match: Secure function evaluation via
ciphertexts. ASIACRYPT 2000, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 1976, pp. 162-177, 2000.
[JJ01] M. Jakobsson and A. Juels. An Optimally Robust Hybrid Mix Network. ACM
Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing (PODC) 2001, ACM, pp.
284-292, 2001.
[JJR02] M. Jakobsson, A. Juels, and R. Rivest. Making Mix Nets Robust For Electronic
Voting By Randomized Partial Checking. USENIX Security Symposium 2002, pp.
339-353, 2002.
[JM98] M. Jakobsson and D. M’Raihi. Mix-based electronic payments. Selected Areas
in Cryptography (SAC) 1998, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 1505, pp. 157-173, 1998.
[Juels01] A. Juels. Targeted advertising and privacy too. Cryptographers’ Track, RSA
(CT-RSA) 2001, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 2020, pp. 408-425, 2001.
[KTY04] A. Kiayias, Y. Tsiounis, and M. Yung. Traceable Signatures. EUROCRYPT
2004, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 3027, pp. 571-589, 2004.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

219

[KY03] A. Kiayias and M. Yung. Extracting Group Signatures from Traitor Tracing
Schemes. EUROCRYPT 2003, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 2656, pp. 630-648, 2003.
[KY04] A. Kiayias and M. Yung. Group Signatures: Provable Security, Efficient Constructions and Anonymity from Trapdoor-Holders. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2004/076, http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/076, 2004.
[KP98] J. Killian and E. Petrank. Identity escrow. CRYPTO 1998, Springer-Verlag,
LNCS 1642, pp. 169-185, 1998.
[KPW96] S. Kim, S. Park, and D. Won. Convertible group signatures. ASIACRYPT
1996, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 1163, pp. 311-321, 1996.
[KM04] N. Koblitz and A. Menezes. Another Look at “Provable Security”. Technical
Report CORR 2004-20, University of Waterloo, 2004.
[KH03] J. Kong and X. Hong. ANODR: ANonymous On Demand Routing with Untraceable Routes for Mobile Ad-hoc Networks. ACM International Symposium on
Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing (MobiHoc) 2003, pp. 291-302, 2003.
[LV01] A. Lenstra and E. Verheul. Selecting Cryptographic Key Sizes. Journal of Cryptology 14:2001, pp. 255-293, 2001.
[LP98] H. Lewis and C. Papadimitriou. Elements of the Theory of Computation. Second Edition, Prentice Hall, 1998.
[LRSW99] A. Lysyanskaya, R. Rivest, A. Sahai, and S. Wolf. Pseudonym systems.
Selected Areas in Cryptography (SAC) 1999, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 1758, pp.
184-199, 1999.
[MvOV96] A. J. Menezes, P. C. van Oorschot, and S. A. Vanstone. Handbook of Applied
Cryptography. CRC Press 1996.
[Michels96] M. Michels. Comments on some group signature schemes. TR-96-3-D,
Department of Computer Science, University of Technology, Chemnitz-Zwickau,
1996.
[MK00] M. Mitomo and K. Kurosawa. Attack for flash mix. ASIACRYPT 2000,
Springer-Verlag, LNCS 1976, pp. 192-204, 2000.
[MSK02] S. Mitsunari, R. Sakai, and M. Kasahara. A new traitor tracing. IEICE Trans.
Vol. E85-A, No.2, pp.481-484, 2002.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

220

[NHS99] T. Nakanishi, N. Haruna, and Y. Sugiyama. Unlinkable Electronic Coupon
Protocol with Anonymity Control. Information Security Workshop 1999, SpringerVerlag, LNCS 1729, pp. 37-46, 1999.
[NY90] M. Naor and M. Yung. Public-Key Cryptosystems Provably Secure against Chosen Ciphertexts Attacks. ACM STOC 1990, ACM, pp. 427-437, 1990.
[Neff01] A. Neff. A verifiable secret shuffle and its application to e-voting. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security 2001, ACM Press, pp. 116-125,
2001.
[Neff03] A. Neff. Verifiable Mixing (Shuffling) of ElGamal Pairs. Manuscript.
http://www.votehere.org/vhti/documentation/egshuf.pdf.
[Nguyen05] L. Nguyen. Accumulators from Bilinear Pairings and Applications. RSA
Conference 2005, Cryptographers’ Track (CT-RSA), Springer-Verlag, LNCS 3376,
pp. 275-292, 2005.
[NS03] L. Nguyen and R. Safavi-Naini. Breaking and Mending Resilient Mix-nets. Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PET) 2003, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 2760, pp. 66-80,
2003.
[NS04a] L. Nguyen and R. Safavi-Naini. An Efficient Verifiable Shuffle with Perfect
Zero-knowledge Proof System. Cryptographic Algorithms and their Uses 2004, Eracom, pp. 40-56, 2004.
[NS04b] L. Nguyen and R. Safavi-Naini. Efficient and Provably Secure Trapdoor-free
Group Signature Schemes from Bilinear Pairings. ASIACRYPT 2004, SpringerVerlag, LNCS 3329, pp. 372-386, 2004.
[NS05] L. Nguyen and R. Safavi-Naini. Dynamic k-Times Anonymous Authentication. Applied Cryptography and Network Security (ACNS) 2005, Springer-Verlag,
LNCS 3531, 2005.
[NSK04a] L. Nguyen, R. Safavi-Naini, and K. Kurosawa. Verifiable Shuffles: A Formal
Model and a Paillier-based Efficient Construction with Provable Security. Applied
Cryptography and Network Security (ACNS) 2004, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 3089,
pp. 61-75, 2004.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

221

[NSK04b] L. Nguyen, R. Safavi-Naini, and K. Kurosawa. A Provably Secure and Efficient Verifiable Shuffle based on a Variant of Paillier Cryptosystem. Journal of
Universal Computer Science, Springer, to appear.
[NSSW02] L. Nguyen, R. Safavi-Naini, W. Susilo, and T. Wysocki. Secure Authorization, Access Control and Data Integrity in Bluetooth. IEEE International Conference on Network (ICON) 2002, pp. 428-433, 2002.
[NIST] NIST.

Dictionary

of

Algorithms

and

Data

Structures.

http://www.nist.gov/dads/.
[OKST97] W. Ogata, K. Kurosawa, K. Sako, and K. Takatani. Fault tolerant anonymous channel. International Conference on Information and Communication Security (ICICS) 1997, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 1334, pp. 440-444, 1997.
[OA00] M. Ohkubo and M. Abe. A length-invariant hybrid mix. ASIACRYPT 2000,
Springer-Verlag, LNCS 1976, pp. 178-191, 2000.
[Paillier99] P. Paillier. Public-Key Cryptosystems Based on Composite Degree Residuosity Classes. EUROCRYPT 1999, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 1592, pp. 223-239,
1999.
[PIK93] C. Park, K. Itoh, and K. Kurosawa. Efficient anonymous channel and
all/nothing election scheme. EUROCRYPT 1993, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 765, pp.
248-259, 1993.
[Pass03] R. Pass. On Deniability in the Common Reference String and Random Oracle
Model. CRYPTO 2003, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 2729, pp. 316-337, 2003.
[Pfitzmann94] B. Pfitzmann. Breaking an Efficient Anonymous Channel. EUROCRYPT 1994, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 950, pp. 332-340, 1994.
[PS96] D. Pointcheval and J. Stern. Security Proofs for Signature Schemes. EUROCRYPT 1996, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 1070, 1996.
[PS00] D. Pointcheval and J. Stern. Security arguments for digital signatures and blind
signatures. Journal of Cryptology 13(3), pp. 361396, 2000.
[Preneel et al.] B. Preneel, B. Van Rompay, L. Granboulan, G. Martinet, S. Murphy, R.
Shipsey, J. White, M. Dichtl, P. Serf, M. Schafheutle, E. Biham, O. Dunkelman, V.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

222

Furman, M. Ciet, J-J. Quisquater, F. Sica, L. Knudsen, H. Raddum. Security Evaluation of NESSIE First Phase. New European Schemes for Signature, Integrity
and Encryption (NESSIE) project report (IST-1999-12324), 2001. Full version
available at https://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/nessie/deliverables/D13.pdf.
[RS91] C. Rackoff and D. Simon. Non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowl- edge
and chosen ciphertext attack. CRYPTO 1991, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 576, pp.
433-444, 1992.
[RSA78] R. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. Adleman. A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems. Communications of the ACM, 21, no. 2, pp.
120-126, 1978.
[RST01] R. Rivest, A. Shamir, and Y. Tauman. How to leak a secret. ASIACRYPT
2001, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 2248, pp.552-565, 2001.
[Sahai99] A. Sahai. Non-Malleable Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge and ChosenCiphertext Security. FOCS 1999, LNCS 2139, 1999.
[Schnorr90] C. Schnorr. Efficient Identification and Signatures for Smart Cards.
CRYPTO 1989, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 435, pp. 235-251, 1990.
[Schnorr91] C. Schnorr. Efficient Signature Generation by Smart Cards. Journal of
Cryptology, 4(3):161-174, 1991.
[SJ00] P. Schnorr and M. Jakobsson. Security of signed El Gamal encryption. ASIACRYPT 2000, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 1976, pp. 73-89, 2000.
[Scott04] M. Scott. Computing the Tate Pairing. Manuscript.
[SB04] M. Scott and P. Barreto. Compressed Pairings. CRYPTO 2004, SpringerVerlag, LNCS 3152, 2004.
[Shamir79] A. Shamir. How to Share a Secret. Communications of the ACM 22, pp.
612-613, 1979.
[Shamir84] A. Shamir. Identity-based cryptosystems and signature schemes. CRYPTO
1984, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 196, pp. 47-53, 1984.
[Shoup01] V. Shoup. A Proposal for an ISO Standard for Public Key Encryption (Version 2.1). ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27, 2001.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

223

[Sipser97] M. Sipser. Introduction to the Theory of Computation. PWS Publishing,
1997.
[Song01] D. Song. Practical forward secure group signature schemes. ACM Conference
on Computer and Communications Security 2001, ACM Press, pp. 225-234, 2001.
[Stern03a] J. Stern. Why Provable Security Matters? EUROCRYPT 2003, SpringerVerlag, LNCS 2656, pp. 449-461, 2003.
[Stern03b] J. Stern. Cryptography and the Methodology of Provable Security. AAECC15 2003, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 2643, pp. 1-5, 2003.
[Stinson02] D.

Stinson.

Cryptography:

Theory

and

Practice.

2nd

Edition,

Chapman&Hall/CRC, 2002.
[TFS04] I. Teranisi, J. Furukawa, and K. Sako. k-Times Anonymous Authentication.
ASIACRYPT 2004, Springer-Verlag, LNCS, to appear, 2004.
[TSZ03] V. To, R. Safavi-Naini, and F. Zhang. New traitor tracing schemes using
bilinear map. ACM workshop on Digital Rights Management 2003, ACM, pp.
67-76, 2003.
[TY98] Y. Tsiounis and M. Yung. On the security of El Gamal based encryption. Public
Key Cryptography (PKC) 1998, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 1431, pp. 117-134, 1998.
[TX03] G. Tsudik and S. Xu. Accumulating Composites and Improved Group Signing.
ASIACRYPT 2003, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 2894, pp. 269-286, 2003.
[WSI03] Y. Watanabe, J. Shikata and H. Imai. Equivalence between semantic security
and indistinguishability against chosen ciphertext attacks. Public Key Cryptography (PKC) 2003, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 2567, pp. 71-84, 2003.
[Wikipedia] Wikipedia.

Wikipedia,

the

free

encyclopedia.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Algorithm.
[Wikström02] D. Wikström. The security of a mix-center based on a semantically secure cryptosystem. INDOCRYPT 2002, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 2551, pp. 368-381,
2002.
[Wikström03] D. Wikström. Five Practical Attacks for “Optimistic Mixing for ExitPolls”. Selected Areas in Cryptography (SAC) 2003, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 3006,
pp. 160-175, 2003.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

224

[ZK02] F. Zhang and K. Kim. ID-Based Blind Signature and Ring Signature from
Pairings. ASIACRYPT 2002, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 2501, pp. 533-547, 2002.
[ZSS04] F. Zhang, R. Safavi-Naini, and W. Susilo. An Efficient Signature Scheme from
Bilinear Pairings and Its Applications. Public Key Cryptography (PKC) 2004,
Springer-Verlag, LNCS 2947, pp. 277-290, 2004.

